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ABSTRACT
The energy sector enables us to do business, manufacture products as well as
enjoy a better quality of life. However, our current energy system depends heavily
on fossil fuels. Currently 85% of the world energy consumption stems from fossil
fuel sources, which bring two main challenges: the limitation of resources and
emissions of green house gases. From an economic perspective, a decline in the
supply and non-decreasing consumption will lead to an increase in energy prices.
Such an increase should lead to an increase in efficiency and a shift to alternative
technologies, such as renewable energies.
The first part of this dissertation tries to explore the energy market mechanism
and answer the question whether energy prices lead to an improvement in effi-
ciency levels as well as an increase in innovation activities for renewable energies.
Evidence is found, supporting the theory that energy markets are shifting toward
more carbon free technologies.
The second part of the dissertations takes up the empirical findings, asking about
the inhibiting determinants which accelerate the speed of technical and structural
change toward a renewable era. Usually the political agenda is set in advance, but
it can be still alternated in the case of two events: cases of natural disasters and
intensive media coverage. Results show that accidents, such as nuclear reactor
accidents, can highlight the risks of nuclear technologies and lead political leaders
to support renewable energy with adequate policies. Additionally, mass media
can impact the political agenda setting and promote more supportive policies for
renewable energies.
i
Der Energiesektor ermöglicht es uns, Geschäfte zu machen, Produkte herzustellen
und eine bessere Lebensqualität zu genießen. Unser derzeitiges Energiesystem
hängt jedoch stark von fossilen Brennstoffen ab. Derzeit stammen 85% des welt-
weiten Energieverbrauchs aus fossilen Brennstoffen, was zwei große Herausforderun-
gen mit sich bringt. Die Begrenzung von Ressourcen und Emissionen von Treib-
hausgasen. Aus wirtschaftlicher Sicht sollen ein Rückgang des Angebots und ein
nicht abnehmender Verbrauch zu einem Anstieg der Energiepreise führen. Eine
solche Erhöhung sollte zu einer Effizienzsteigerung und einer Umstellung auf al-
ternative Technologien, wie beispielsweise erneuerbare Energien, führen.
Der erste Teil dieser Dissertation versucht, den Energiemarktmechanismus zu er-
forschen und die Frage zu beantworten, ob die Energiepreise zu einer Verbesserung
der Effizienz sowie zu einer Steigerung der Innovationsaktivitäten bei erneuerbaren
Energien führen. Es werden Beweise gefunden, die die Theorie stützen, dass sich
die Energiemärkte in Richtung kohlenstofffreier Technologien verschieben.
Der zweite Teil der Dissertationen greift die empirischen Ergebnisse auf und
fragt nach den hemmenden Determinanten, die die Geschwindigkeit des technis-
chen und strukturellen Wandels in Richtung einer erneuerbaren Ära beschleunigen.
In der Regel wird die politische Agenda im Voraus festgelegt, kann aber bei zwei
Ereignissen noch abgeändert werden: bei Naturkatastrophen und intensiver Medi-
enberichterstattung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Unfälle, wie z.B. Unfälle in Kern-
reaktoren, den Nutzen für erneuerbare Energien verdeutlichen können. Darüber
hinaus können Massenmedien die Festlegung der politischen Agenda beeinflussen
und zu einer unterstützenderen Politik für erneuerbare Energien beitragen.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
85% of the current energy production in the world is generated from fossil energy
sources. Though fossil energy may still supply us with relatively cheap energy,
it comes with two major challenges. The first roots in the fact that fossil energy
sources are limited and will be depleted one day. Second, their exploitation gen-
erates greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide or methane as by-products, which
eventually contribute to global warming. The well-known consequence is climate
change, which threatens our life conditions.
It is in everyone’s interest to find solutions to those challenges and limit any
undesirable consequences for society. The intention of this dissertation project is to
look from an economic viewpoint at the energy markets with a focus on the climate
change topic. From a näıve, economic point of view, if markets were perfect, a
social welfare optimum would be guaranteed. A change toward renewable energy
should emerge endogenously. With dwindling fossil energy sources, energy prices
should rise as demand is non-decreasing. The consequence of a price increase
is twofold. As it raises competitive pressure, rising prices should force energy
suppliers to increase the efficiency in production. In addition, producers will search
for alternative energy sources such as renewable energy, since their relative prices
go down. Technologies which not used to be competitive will gradually become
competitive. This, in turn, should give producers the incentive to invest in new
renewable energy technologies.
Against this background, the objective of this dissertation is to shed light on
the sluggish change in energy systems. It consists of four papers which can be
partitioned into two groups of papers. The first group of papers (paper 1 and 2)
investigates the functioning of the market mechanisms. Can rising energy prices
lead to higher efficiency levels in energy production? Do they boost innovative ac-
tivities as well? The empirical answer given to these questions suggests a positive
correlation between energy prices and energy efficiency as well as innovative ac-
tivities, but the evidence is rather weak. Markets seem to induce technical change
1
toward renewables but not to the extent to which society and policy makers hope
for. Indeed, new renewable energy production technologies are gaining momentum
in terms of installed capacity, but they fall short in fighting climate change.
The second group of papers (paper 3 and 4) takes up on the empirical findings,
asking about the inhibiting determinants which slow down the speed of technical
and structural change toward a renewable era. Instead of performing policy eval-
uation studies, which are abundant in literature, we investigate the determinants
of the political decision making process when it comes to new policy measures.
In paper 3 we try to identify the role of “focusing events” that function as a cat-
alytic moment to pass new renewable policy measures. In a similar vein, paper 4
underlines the role of the media in this process.
For this reason, policy makers do interfere in the energy markets. With a set of
policies and measures, they try to boost the implementation and diffusion process
of renewable energy technologies. While most studies concentrate on evaluating
the effectiveness of these policies and measures, my research focuses on the trig-
gering factors for decision makers, to pass more policies. Usually the political
agenda is set in advance, but it can still be alternated in the case of two events:
unexpected natural disasters that turn into focus events and intensive media cov-
erage. In the third paper I try to understand the effect of major environmental
accidents on the policy making process and whether renewable energy solutions
can be introduced as an alternative. Solutions introduced within the first five
years after similar accidents are more likely to take place. Media can promote
these solutions and signal their importance to policy makers. The media effect
and the underlying mechanism that shapes the political agenda are the topics of
my last research paper.
Plan of the dissertation
The dissertation is divided into six sections. In section 1, I lay out the motivation,
the theoretical framework and the mechanism of perfectly competitive markets..
Afterwards, a short overview of the research papers is presented in sec. 1.5. The
research papers are presented in sections 2 to 5. Section 6 concludes the results
and discusses the future outlook.
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1.2 The energy sector and its challenges
The energy sector enables us to do business, manufacture products as well as enjoy
a better quality of life. Since the industrial revolution, the energy produced as
well as consumed has been expanding, giving us more opportunities and mobility
options that were not possible before. Also, the economy has benefited from the
growing energy sector. More energy produced is translated into more products and
more trade, hence helping economic growth to flourish (Stern, 2011a; Kammen,
2006).
In 2018, the global primary energy consumption grew by 2.9% - the fastest
growth seen since 2010 (Dudley et al., 2019). 80% of this energy consumed
stemmed from fossil fuels. Crude oil is the main energy source with around 40
percent of the fossil energy generated, followed by coal and natural gas at 33 and
29 percent, respectively (Ritchie and Roser, 2019b). While some countries like
the EU and OECD countries try to substitute fossil fuels, their shares have been
declining since the 1980s, see fig.(1.1, green and blue lines). Developing countries
such as China and India as well as the US have been increasing their shares and
dependencies on fossil fuels as a response to their growing demand for energy, as
illustrated in fig.(1.1, red and orange lines). All three countries combined account
for around two thirds of the growth in 2018. IEA’s world energy outlook (2018b)
projects that the dependency for low and middle income countries as well as Asian
and pacific ones on fossil fuels as primary energy sources will last at least until
2030.
There is no doubt that fossil fuels are a major energy supply contributor in the
world energy market; however, the global reliance on them brings two associated
challenges. The first is linked to the uncertainty surrounding the availability of
these sources in the future, especially because of their finite, non-renewable nature
and the fact that they are diminishing. To determine when fossil fuel production
peaks, declines and depletes depends on proven reserves, exploration and con-
sumption rates (Abas et al., 2015). However, there has been an academic debate
around this topic with no concurrence to date (Cheney and Hawkes, 2007; Shafiee
and Topal, 2009). The first group believes that the global oil, gas and coal reserves
are actually steadily increasing, due to new discoveries (Helm, 2016, 2015). An
example can be the case of the US, where new discoveries of shale gas changed
the US position from being a net oil importer to a net exporter (Tan et al., 2018).
This group believes that no immediate depletion threat is in sight (Abas et al.,
2015; Dudley et al., 2015). The second group of studies does support the theory
that fossil fuel supply has peaked already and speculates by using the depletion
rate curves and current consumption pattern that an end is in sight (Deffeyes,
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2008; Simmons, 2007). This group estimates that current reserves will only last
between 40 to maximum 200 years (Shafiee and Topal, 2009). Despite the debate
and the disagreement among researchers, both groups still do agree, however, on
one fact, namely that global resources will eventually run out.
The second side effect from using fossil fuels is its negative impact on the en-
vironment. They contribute the largest share of the generated greenhouse gases
(GHGs)1 emissions, in particular carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (IEA, 2013;
Bauer et al., 2015). Around 72% of the GHG emissions in 2017 are related to
the usage or production of energy. And since the discovery of oil in the 1850s,
CO2 concentrations have doubled compared to the pre-industrial levels (Ritchie
and Roser, 2019b). They increased from 210ppm to a historical record of 411ppm
in August 2019, as seen in Fig.1.2. This concentration is the highest in the last
650,000 years and is expected to continue rising.
The idea itself that GHG are emitted in the atmosphere is not harmful. On
the contrary, the existence of GHGs is vital for our livelihood. They do play an
important role in warming the Earth surface’s temperature. Without GHG the
1Greenhouse gases refer to the sum of seven gases that have direct effects on climate change:
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hy-
drofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and nitrogen
trifluoride (NF3) (OECD, 2019).
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surface temperature would have dropped to -18°C, according to Ma (1998), and the
likelihood that life could exist on earth would vanish. GHG concentration in the
atmosphere can also be naturally regulated and absorbed through the carbon cycle.
Plants, oceans and soil absorb GHG. The problem however, started around 1950,
when the amount of emissions began to exceed nature’s capacity to absorb them
(IEA, 2018b). During the past five decades, nature could only absorb between 25%
to 30% of the CO2 emissions (Le Quéré et al., 2009; Schimel, 1995). This imbalance
between the emissions and nature’s capacity to absorb them tends to excessively
warm the planet in the long run. This phenomenon is known as ”global warming”,
where the average global temperature increases. Fig.1.2 shows, along with the CO2
concentration in the atmosphere, the average median temperature trend. When
the emissions started to exceed the natural capacity, the average temperature
started steadily increasing. Along with the increase in energy demands and the
excessive usage of coal fired power plants in 2018, the average temperature median
reached its maximum level at 0.83°C relative to pre-industrial temperatures. If
the situation continues uncontrolled, the global average temperature could rise by
between 1.1 to 6.5°C (IPCC, 2013). Such an increase in CO2 concentrations and
subsequent increase in average temperature will not just cause global warming,
but will have several further consequences, which are generally summarized under
the term “climate change”.
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1.3 Climate change
Climate change will not only have an impact on the environment, and the ecosys-
tem, but will by far threaten public health and livelihood (Smith et al., 2001).
All these consequences combined will be reflected in the end in the economic per-
formances of the countries. Although the main research idea of this dissertation
is to understand the mechanisms of the energy market and not to investigate or
quantify the effects of climate change, highlighting the consequences of climate
change justifies the main idea and the content of this dissertation.
If global warming continues, environmental changes will take place. Examples
will be rising sea-levels along with increased intensity and frequency of extreme
weather events, such as days with very high or very low temperatures, extreme
floods, tropical cyclones and storms (Allen et al., 2019; Weitzman, 2015; Barnett
and Adger, 2003a; Smith et al., 2001). Currently the Amazon rain forest has been
burning at a record speed and the dry season is one of the reasons for accelerating
the fire. Finally, droughts and desertification will also be direct outcomes of climate
change (Gough, 2013). These changes on the global environment will reflect as
well on the ecosystem and raise the probability of species losses and extinction.
In addition to the above mentioned effects, it is our health which is at stake.
Climate change will get hold of public health and food security (Costello et al.,
2009; Smith et al., 2001). The IPCC (2013) report expects an increase in related
illnesses in many regions and especially in developing countries. Examples include
higher likelihood of injury, disease, and death due to more intense heat waves
and fires. In addition, risks from food- and water-borne diseases will increase.
Droughts, floods and desertification will lead to a shrinkage in the available land
for agriculture and cultivation of staple food will become more costly and diffi-
cult (Smith et al., 2001, 938). This will lead directly to under-nutrition threats
(Costello et al., 2009).
From an economic prospective, risks of under-nutrition, diseases and increase
in the mean temperature will have a direct impact on the capacity of workers
and their productivity (Day et al., 2019; IPCC, 2013). Since labour productivity
is a key element of any economic success, economists devote great attention to
understanding, measuring and enhancing it (Bosworth and Collins, 2008; Jorgen-
son et al., 2008; Van Ark et al., 2008). Any decrease in labo ur productivity will
negatively affect the economic performance and lead to a decrease in the income
within and between nations (Lemoine and Kapnick, 2016; Bretschger and Valente,
2011; Eboli et al., 2010; Fankhauser and Tol, 2005; Hallegatte, 2005). The In-
ternational Labour organisation published a report in 2019 about the impact of
heat stress on labour productivity and concluded that climate change will cause
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losses in productivity capacity reaching 2.2%. The percentage might look small,
but it is equivalent to 80 millions full time jobs or to 2400 billions US dollars.
As a conclusion, the potential impact of climate change is therefore an important
economic concern (Day et al., 2019).
Perhaps, quantifying the consequences and aggregating them can throw some
light on the total cost of climate change. However, researchers are in disagreement
about the exact estimated cost. Tol (2014), in his research, reviewed 27 published
studies that estimated the total economic impact of climate change and came
to the conclusion that an increase in the average temperature by 2.5° will cause
individuals on average to loose around 1.3% of their income. It is also estimated
that the overall costs and risks of climate change can reach up to 5% of the global
GDP (Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 2007).
Unfortunately, regardless of all the above mentioned consequences, global emis-
sions are still on the rise (IEA, 2018b) and have been increasing at an annual
rate of 3% since 20002. However, to reduce carbon emissions and to avoid the
consequences, actions must be taken in two directions: increasing the energy effi-
ciency and adopting new technologies. For these reasons, governments have been
involved and have set mitigation actions (Fisher et al., 2007).
Since the energy sector is the greatest emitter of GHGs and responsible alone
for 72% of the total GHG emissions, governments intervene, taking corrective ac-
tions to reduce these emissions. Government intervention with adequate policies
may help decelerating the emissions in general by setting incentives to increase the
efficiency and supporting the market adopting new technologies like renewables.
Government intervention can induce efficiency by setting uniform standards and
regulations for firms and specifying technologies like filters for industries to use
(Popp et al., 2010; Jaffe and Stavins, 1995; Hepburn, 2010). These kinds of policies
are known as ”Command and Control“ policies and can limit the amount of emis-
sions but, on the other hand, determining exact technologies for firms can decrease
their incentive to move beyond the current standards, deterring investments in in-
novation and leading to a technology freeze (Kemp, 2000; Heaton Jr and Banks,
1997). For these reasons, governments pass ”Market based“ policies, which tend to
induce rather than command. These policies encourage companies to be efficient
by creating financial incentives for them. Market based policies try to strengthen
the market signal, i.e. energy prices, rather than setting standards. They do so
by adding a price tag, known as the social cost of carbon, to the energy generated
from fossil fuels. If the energy generated from fossil fuels is more costy, market
participants will change their behaviours and search for alternative technologies
2Mainly dominated by Asia’s growing economy (IEA, 2018)
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(Markandya, 2009; Abolhosseini and Heshmati, 2014)3. Economic theories help
to explain why market participants react to changes in prices and change their
behaviour.
1.4 Economic framework
From a näıve, economic point of view, if markets were perfect, a social welfare op-
timum would be guaranteed. This idea was explained first by Adam Smith in his
work “The wealth of nations”. He argued that, if individuals (suppliers and con-
sumers) behave like ‘homo oeconomicus’4, who pursue rationally their self-interest
under conditions of justice, the good of the whole society will be promoted. The in-
teraction between profit maximizing producers and utility maximizing consumers
will lead the market to reach a maximum social welfare and will lead to economic
prosperity (Pol, 2013). This mechanism will take place when prices for goods or
services are freely set implicitly by supply and demand, both reacting in turn to
the prices. Smith then concluded that, without business or consumers being given
any protection, market activities will be beneficial to the whole society.
With dwindling fossil energy sources, the additional price tag, imposed by the
state intervention and non-decreasing energy demand, energy prices are rising as
a response. Figure (1.3,blue line) illustrates the historical development of the av-
eraged price of oil, gas and coal. To simplify and implicitly show the increasing
trend in energy prices over the years, a linear fit (Fig.1.3,red line) is calculated with
95% confidence bands. An increase in the relative price for energy will provide
incentives for both consumers and energy producers to change their behaviour.
Consumers, for example, will try to adapt by decreasing their energy consump-
tion. They, for example, could reduce the usage of energy-consuming household
devices.5 In the long run, however, they will search for alternatives to substitute
the energy intensive devices with more efficient ones (Newell et al., 1999). On the
producers’ side, the results are similar even if the incentives are different. An in-
crease in raw material prices, either because of a decrease in the supply or because
of the additional social carbon cost, will increase the competition pressure on en-
ergy producers, and rising prices will force suppliers to reallocate and selectively
utilize the most energy-efficient capital among the existing vintages (Gamtessa
and Olani, 2016). In the long run, producers will search for alternative energy
sources such as renewable energy, since their relative prices go down. Thus tech-
nologies which used to be noncompetitive become gradually competitive. This,
3see also: (Milliman and Prince, 1989; Orr, 1976; Wenders, 1975; Smith, 1972; Zerbe, 1970)
4The term was formulated later on by John Stuart Mill’s work on political economy.
5such as air conditioners
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Figure 1.3 Averaged energy prices in blue. Linear fit is in red with confident limits
of 95% (gray). Own graph. Data source: Ritchie and Roser (2019b)
in turn, should give producers the incentive to invest in new technologies, and a
change toward renewable energy should emerge endogenously. Hicks (1932), in
his publication “The theory of wages”, labelled this mechanism as the ”induced
innovation hypothesis“, where he stated:
“A change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a
spur to invention, and to invention of a particular kind – directed at
economizing the use of a factor which has become relatively expensive”6
(Hicks, 1932, p. 124).
According to Hicks, an increase in the relatively expensive production factor,
like energy prices, will not only lead to changes in input proportions: energy
efficiency, but will also affect the pace and direction of the technological change
(Brugger and Gehrke, 2017).
Against this background, the aim of this dissertation is to understand the func-
tionality of the energy markets and whether prices can endogenously lead to
6Hicks back then did not differentiate between using the word “invention” and “innovation”
as later specified by Schumpeter and got adopted later by authors. Hicks, however, use the two
terms in a synonym sense encompassing both invention and innovation, as used today (Jaffe
et al., 2003).
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the aforementioned changes, namely induce energy efficiency and technological
changes, as explained by Hicks. The first group of papers (paper 1 and 2) of
this dissertation is trying to answer this question. Do rising energy prices lead to
higher efficiency levels in energy production? Do they boost innovative activities
as well?
1.5 Research papers
1.5.1 Part I:
Paper I
The first step to understand market mechanism, as discussed in section 1.4, is to
investigate the link between rising energy prices and the resulting effect on the
energy efficiency. Research done in this area is numerous but mainly concentrated
on a specific industrial sector or country specific studies, like the energy sector,
the automobile and steel industry as well specific products like air conditioning,
refrigerators.
In the energy sector, for example, Rose and Joskow (1988) and his colleagues
investigated the effect of increasing fuel prices as a production cost factor for
electric utilities in the US and collected data for 144 plants for the time period
between 1950 and 1980. Their conclusion was that electricity producers respond
to an increase in fuel prices by adopting fuel saving technologies. Nevertheless,
Rose and Joskow notice that company size and their organization structure play an
important role in the adoption of new technologies, where large and investor owned
companies adopt technologies earlier than small and publically owned plants. A
more recent study was done by Gamtessa and Olani (2016). They employed panel
vector auto regressions as well as co-integration and error correction techniques
to study the link between increasing energy prices and whether they can lead to
more efficiency. They included 33 different industries in Canada and concluded
that a one percent rise in energy prices will reflect positively on energy efficiency
by 0.23%, both in the short-run and in the long-run. Similar studies, from the
automobile and steel industry, concluded a direct correlation between an increase
in energy prices and an upgrade in energy efficiency (Ohta and Griliches, 1976;
Goodman, 1983; Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1984; Wilcox, 1984; Ohta and Griliches,
1986; Boyd and Karlson, 1993).
The difference between the above mentioned research and the research presented
here, is that we concentrate on the macro scale, rather than a specific market
sector. We aggregate the data from all sectors to calculate a country specific
efficiency index. Using DEA analysis, we calculate the efficiency index, where the
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production system is described by inputs (energy and labor), good output (GDP)
and bad output (CO2). In addition, we also calculate a Malmquist index for all
of the 34 OECD countries over the period of 1990 to 2015. For each year, every
country get an efficiency score depending on its distance to the frontier. The
two efficiency indices are later used to measure energy efficiency and technological
change. Explanatory variables are energy prices, stock of knowledge, competition
in the energy market and governmental policies. In addition to the explanatory
variables, we control for the size of the country and the total energy production.
As for the empirical analyses, we started our models with a typical OLS re-
gression and extended the calculations later to use an ARDL technique called
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models (DHPM). With the help of this technique
we can differentiate between the short- and the long-run effects of energy prices
on energy efficiencies.
The results show evidence that energy prices positively correlate with energy
efficiency. In all 16 models, energy prices positively correlate with the efficiency
indices. Using the Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models, we distinguish between
the short- and long-run effect. Energy prices positively affected the efficiency
scores in both the short- and the long-run.
Paper II
In the context that the energy market can efficiently allocate enough resources
to enable technological change (Induced innovation theory) toward low-carbon
technologies, we introduce the second research paper entitled: “Rising Energy
Prices and Advances in Renewable Energy Technologies”. We raise the following
research question:
Research question: Do rising oil prices induce technological progress
in renewable energies?
Researches have tried to answer similar questions before. Prominent research
efforts in this field are, for example, the works done by Johnstone et al. (2010b)
and Popp (2002), where they tried to understand the effect of both energy prices
and environmental policies on the innovation activities in the renewable energy
field. Popp (2002) collected patent data from 1970 to 1994 to estimate the effect of
energy prices on innovation activities. In addition to the sum of registered patents,
he included a quality index as well, by using patent citations as an indicator for
the quality of innovation. He concluded that both energy prices and the quality
of the stock of knowledge have strong positive effects on innovation activities.
Johnstone et al. (2010a) collected data for 25 countries over the period between
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1978 and 2003 and used electricity prices as a proxy for energy prices. Beside
the innovation index, Johnstone controlled for public policies by counting active
renewable energy policies. He could find that public policies have a significant role
in determining patent applications and that renewable energy technologies respond
differently to the type of policy. However, he found no link between energy prices
and the overall patent activities in renewable energy in general but only on solar
cells patent activities.
A more recent study was conducted by Nesta et al. (2014). Nesta and his
colleagues extended Johnston’s and Popp’s work and added a market liberalization
index to measure market competitiveness. They also control for patent quality and
not just the aggregated number of registered patents. They came to the conclusion
that environmental policies are more effective in liberalized markets to foster green
innovation, especially regarding high quality patents. Energy prices, however, did
not prompt any technological change (patenting activities). Similar results to
Nesta et al. (2014); Johnstone et al. (2010b) were also reported by Nicolli and
Vona (2016). They extended the work of Nesta et al. and examined in depth
the role of competition, policies and energy prices on the innovation activities in
different renewable energy technologies. They came to the conclusion that both
energy prices and the entry barriers index have a positive impact on the total
innovation activities in the renewable energy domain. However, with respect to
single technologies, energy prices have an effect only on solar, wind and biofuel
technologies.
Because the results of different researchers are inconsistent, we decided to con-
duct a cross country analysis in order to answer the research question. For this
purpose, we collected data for 36 OECD countries covering a time span from 1970
to 2010. As an independent variable, we count patents for wind energy as an
indicator for innovation activities. Data are collected from the European Patent
Office Worldwide Patent Statistics Database PATSTAT (EPO, 2015). We alter-
natively use oil prices as a proxy for energy prices and expect that an increase in
the price of energy would induce innovation incentives in renewable energy tech-
nologies (Popp, 2002; Johnstone et al., 2010b; Nesta et al., 2014). In addition, we
control for country size, research and development funding, financial development
and electrical consumption. We apply 11 models in-total, starting with OLS, bi-
nomial regression and continuing with pooled mean group (PMG), mean group
(MG) and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) as dynamic heterogeneous models.
Our results show a positive effect of energy prices on innovation activities mea-
sured in the number of registered patents. When differentiating between the short-
run and the long-run, energy prices had a significant effect only on the long-run.
Therefore, we conclude that energy prices can, in the long run, direct the mar-
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ket participants towards new low carbon technologies and induce a technological
change towards renewable energies.
Conclusion of part I
The outcome from the first two research papers has shown that increasing energy
prices can induce higher levels of efficiency in energy production. Besides energy
efficiency, innovation activities are induced as well. Their is evidence that the
number of patents registered rises after energy prices go up. These are the answers
for the two main questions raised before and they conclude that energy markets
seem to function as theoretically expected.
If the results can reflect the real market mechanism, then global emissions should
be reducing and adopting and diffusing renewable energies should be observable.
Unfortunately, global emissions are still on the rise (IEA, 2018b) and have been
increasing at an annual rate of 3% since 2000.7 Regarding the renewable energy
adoption and diffusion, the global renewable energy consumption can be seen as
a proxy. At the first glance, the current consumption of renewable energies is six
times more the values in 1970, see figure 1.4. While it can be concluded that
renewable energy technologies (REN) have been adopted and well diffused in the
energy market, by having a closer look at the shares of renewable energies rather
than seeing only the absolute values, the data provide another insight. In contrast
to the rapid increase in the absolute values of renewable energy consumption, the
shares have just increased by 2% since 1970. This observation is similar in the
OECD countries, where the shares of REN have increased from 6.2% in 1997 to
just 10.7% in 2017 (IEA 2019). An increase that did not exceed 5% over a period
of 20 years.
Conclusively and based on these two observations, the problem in reducing emis-
sion and the adopting more renewable energy technologies, might not be the di-
rection of the energy market but rather its speed. The market is shifting in the
right direction but not at the needed pace. For these reasons, governments have
been involved in the energy market and have set mitigation actions (Fisher et al.,
2007). Government intervention with adequate policies may help decelerating the
emissions in general by setting incentives to increase the efficiency and supporting
the market adopting new technologies like renewables.
7Mainly dominated by Asia’s growing economy (IEA, 2018)
13
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
60
00
To
ta
l r
en
ew
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
[T
w
h]
5
15
25
35
To
ta
l r
en
ew
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
sh
ar
es
 [%
]
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
Ren shares Ren Consumption
Total renewable energy consumption and shares
Figure 1.4 Renewable energy consumption [Twh] in red and their shares of global
electricity production [%] in green. Own Diagram. Source: Ritchie and Roser
(2019c)
Motivation part II
Government intervention can induce efficiency by setting uniform standards and
regulations for firms and specifying technologies like filters for industries to use
(Popp et al., 2010; Jaffe and Stavins, 1995; Hepburn, 2010). These kinds of poli-
cies are known as ”Command and Control“ policies and can limit the amount of
emissions but, on the other hand, determining exact technologies for firms can
decrease their incentive to move beyond the current standards, deterring invest-
ments in innovation and leading to a technology freeze (Kemp, 2000; Heaton Jr
and Banks, 1997). For these reasons, governments pass ”Market based“ policies,
which tend to induce rather than command. These policies encourage companies
to be efficient by creating financial incentives for them. Market based policies try
to strengthen the market signal, i.e. energy prices, rather than setting standards.
They do so by adding a price tag, known as the social cost of carbon, to the
energy generated from fossil fuels (Markandya, 2009; Abolhosseini and Heshmati,
2014).8 Studies like (Nesta et al., 2014; Johnstone et al., 2010a) have raised the
importance of proper policies in accelerating the rates of development, adoption
and diffusion of renewable energies. Policies have proven to be effective and the
8see also: (Milliman and Prince, 1989; Orr, 1976; Wenders, 1975; Smith, 1972; Zerbe, 1970)
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2°C target can still be met if more stringent policies were to be adopted (Alcamo
et al., 2013, p. 11).
Instead of pursuing further evaluation studies of policy measures, which are
abundant in literature, I decided to pursue my dissertation by asking about the
inhibiting determinants which induce changes toward a more renewable era. My
research focuses on the triggering factors for decision makers to pass more policies.
The political agenda is usually set in advance, however it can be altered in the
case of two events: natural disasters, that turn into focusing events and intensified
media coverage. In the first paper concerning this question (and the third paper of
my dissertation), I try to understand the effect of major environmental accidents
on the policy making process and whether renewable energy solutions can be
introduced as an alternative. In a similar vein, the second paper (the fourth and
final paper of the dissertation) underlines the role of the media to promote solutions
and raises the question whether media can help setting the political agenda within
the renewable energy domain.
1.5.2 Part II
Paper III
Disruptive moments like major accidents in nuclear reactors, such as Fukushima
and Chernobyl reinforce society’s disapproval against polluting technologies. They
give policymakers the chance to form coalitions and gain political momentum
to introduce alternatives. Policies previously excluded from the political agenda
are brought back for discussion and appear enforceable. In other words, we ask
whether these accidents function as a catalyst, i. e. as a focusing event (Kozluk
and Zipperer, 2015; Nohrstedt, 2005) for policy making. The Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) is a theoretical framework, which explains the link and the
momentum of external shocks, i.e. nuclear accidents to the consequential policy
initiatives arising from it. Within this context, we propose the following hypoth-
esis:
Hypothesis: Nuclear accidents should have a positive effect on green
energy policies.
Based on the data of 34 OECD countries, we disentangle the effect of disruptive
exogenous shocks on countries’ policy activity. Starting with OLS regressions, we
run several robustness checks by using a pre-sample mean approach, an ARDL
technique called Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models (DHPM), which allows for
the distinction between long- and short-run effects. The results corroborate the
hypothesis that unexpected, disruptive events have a positive impact on the actual
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number of renewable energy policies. The fade-out time for shocks is about seven
years, leaving a positive long-term effect.
However, for crises to have the expected changes in policymakers behaviours,
mass media has to cover the topic. By reporting intensively about an accident like
Fukushima, or alternative technologies, policy makers can signalize the importance
of these topics. They can understand and reevaluate the costs and benefits of dif-
ferent technologies (Cohen, 1963; McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Therefore, studying
the role of mass media in the environmental policy making process is of interest.
Paper IV
Traditionally, such a study of mass media has been viewed through the lens of
communication and political sciences. Yet more economists have turned their at-
tention to mass media, especially because of its strong influence on the policy
making process (McCluskey and Swinnen, 2010). Comprehensive studies on why
political actors react to media coverage might be still missing, but multiple rea-
sons for media responsiveness have been suggested (Mathias Kepplinger, 2007;
Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). The straightforward answer is driven by the pre-
vious research paper and it is the association of media coverage with public opinion
(Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006; Protess, 1992). Mass media can put pressure on
politicians to respond and take positions.
In this research paper, I am trying to understand and highlight the role the mass
media plays to draw public attention to climate change issues. Such an attention
can reflect on the actions of policymakers to increase their support for renewable
energies and pass supportive policies. Because of the multiple reasons how media
can influence politicians and force them to take actions, the following hypothesis
is suggested.
Hypothesis 1: Media coverage can promote the introduction of more
environmental policies
I built a data set for four OECD countries: Germany, Austria, United Kingdom
and the United States, covering the period from 1985 until 2013. Media coverage
is measured in the number of published articles. I run several regression models
such as OLS, negative binomial regression and pooled mean group estimation.
The results shed light on the positive and consistent influence of mass media
on the policy making process. An increase in the number of publications about
environmental topics is translated into more policies. Mass media can interfere
in the environmental political agenda and raise the importance of the climate
change topic. In return, policymakers react accordingly and pass more supportive
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policies. This effect is persistent only in the short run, which adheres well with
the attention cycle theory, introduced by .
Additional results can be derived from paper III and IV. Intuitively, it can be
concluded that there is a pattern in which policymakers can be pushed by external
catalysts to adopt the climate change topic. It seems that, when disasters happen
or mass media intensively report about environmental topics, policymakers sense
the seriousness of the topic and act accordingly to pass more supportive policies.
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Chapter 2
Can rising energy prices lead to higher efficiency levels in energy
production?
Authors: Sherief Emam, Thomas Grebel
Fossil fuels are the primary energy source and their role is essential for economic
performance and growth. However, the GHGs emissions have been increasing
steadily, which lead to global warming and climate change. To mitigate the effects,
governments have been intervening in the energy market to increase its efficiency
and induce technological change.
In this paper, we investigate if an increase in energy prices can lead to better
energy efficiency and direct technological change toward renewable energies. For
this purpose, we calculate country specific efficiency and technological change in-
dices for 31 OECD countries, over a period of 25 years using DEA model. We
could find evidence that an increase in energy prices can induce energy efficiency
and lead to a long-run technological change. In addition to that, public policies
and competition have positive roles, promoting renewable energies.
2.1 Introduction
Fossil fuels are the major energy source for modern economies and that they deliver
us relatively cheap energy. Fossil fuels continue to play a dominant role in the world
energy consumption. According to Dudley et al. (2019), global primary energy
grew by 2.9% in 2018 and around 80% of the world primary energy consumption
originated from fossil fuel sources. A big change in this pattern is not expected as
reported by the IEA’s world energy outlook (2018b), where it forecasts that the
dependency on fossil fuels as a primary energy source will last least until 2030.
However, the dependency on fossil fuels brings two main challenges. The first is
linked to the fact that fossil fuels are limited and discussions about actual reserves
and their availability have been taking place. Although there is no concurrence
between researchers to date about the exact time frame, most researchers do agree
that fossil fuel resources are limited and will end (Abas et al., 2015; Cheney and
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Hawkes, 2007; Shafiee and Topal, 2009). The second challenge from using fossil
fuels is the negative impact on the environment. Fossil fuels are the main source for
generating green house gases (GHGs)1 (IEA, 2013; Bauer et al., 2015). Around
72% of the GHGs emissions in 2017 are related to the usage or production of
energy. And since the discovery of oil in 1850s, CO2 concentrations have doubled
compared to the pre-industrial levels (Ritchie and Roser, 2019b).
Emissions can in general be absorbed and regulated by nature. Carbon sinks
like oceans, plants and soil can regulate the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere;
however, the capacity is limited. During the past five decades, nature could only
absorb between 25% to 30% of the CO2 emissions (Le Quéré et al., 2009; Schimel,
1995). This imbalance between the emissions and nature’s capacity to absorb
them tend to excessively warm the planet and lead to global warming and climate
change on the long run.
Climate change and its dangers have long been known, and they do not only
have an impact on the environment and the ecosystem, but they also threaten
public health and livelihood (Smith et al., 2001). Examples are rising sea-levels,
along with increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, such as
days with very high or very low temperatures, extreme floods, tropical cyclones,
and storms (Allen et al., 2019; Weitzman, 2015; Barnett and Adger, 2003a; Smith
et al., 2001). In addition, it is our health which is at stake. Climate change will
get hold of public health and food security (Costello et al., 2009; Smith et al.,
2001). In addition, The IPCC (2013) reports expect an increase in illness in many
regions and especially in developing countries. From an economic perspective, an
increase in the mean temperature will have a direct impact on the capacity of
workers and their productivity (Day et al., 2019; IPCC, 2013). 80 million jobs are
at risk with climate change, as the international Labour organisation has reported
(ILO, 2019). An overall cost of mitigating climate change is difficult to quantify;
however, Tol (2014) in his research reviewed 27 published studies that estimated
the total economic impact of climate change and came to a conclusion that an
increase in the average temperature by 2.5° will cause individuals on average to
lose around 1.3% of their income. It is also estimated that the overall cost and
risks of climate change can amount to 5% of the global GDP (Nordhaus, 2007;
Stern, 2007).
Unfortunately regardless of all the above mentioned consequences, global emis-
sions are still on the rise (IEA, 2018b) and in 2018 alone carbon emissions grew
by 2%, the fastest for seven years (Dudley et al., 2019). Governments are involved
1Greenhouse gases refer to the sum of seven gases that have direct effects on climate change:
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hy-
drofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and nitrogen
trifluoride (NF3) (OECD, 2019).
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and have set mitigating actions to limit the emissions. Government intervention
with adequate policies might provide a solution to decrease the level of emissions
in general, by increasing the efficiency and supporting the market adopting new
technologies like renewables. The first step is to set uniform standards or regu-
lations for firms and specify technologies for industries to use (Popp et al., 2010;
Jaffe and Stavins, 1995; Hepburn, 2010). The second set of policies are market
based policies with the aim to strengthen the market signal, the energy prices.
They achieve that either by adding a price tag in form of taxes (social cost of
carbon) to the energy generated from fossil fuels, or by subsidizing new technolo-
gies like renewables. If the energy generated from fossil fuels gets more costly,
market participants will be encouraged to change their behaviors and search for
alternative technologies (Markandya, 2009; Abolhosseini and Heshmati, 2014).2
From a simplified economic point of view, if markets were perfect, a social
welfare optimum would be guaranteed and an increase in the relative price for
energy will provide two incentives for energy producers to change their behavior.
In competitive markets, rising prices should force energy suppliers to increase their
efficiency in production to avoid losing their market shares (Gamtessa and Olani,
2016; Newell et al., 1999). In the same vine, an increase in the relative price
will induce innovation activities. According to Hicks (1932, p.124), an increase in
the relatively expensive production factor, like energy prices, will not only lead
energy producers to change their inputs proportions: energy efficiency, but will
also reflect on the pace and direction of technological change. Producers will
search for alternative energy sources such as renewable energy, since their relative
prices go down. Technologies which used to not be competitive become gradually
competitive. This, in turn, should give producers the incentive to invest in new
renewable energy technologies.
Against this background, we raise the following research question: can energy
prices in competitive markets under government intervention induce energy effi-
ciency and lead to technological change towards carbon free technologies? The
novelty of our research lies in using a non-parametric approach, Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA), to calculate efficiency scores and implement the Malmquist
index to measure discontinuous and localized technological change for 30 OECD
countries, over a 25 years period.
Our main findings are the following. First and foremost, we find that energy
prices have a positive effect on improving the energy efficiencies. This effect is
more consistence when technological heterogeneities between countries are taken
into account. Public policies introduced by governments have a positive outcome
as well on increasing energy efficiency. Technology changes react similarly to
2see also: (Milliman and Prince, 1989; Orr, 1976; Wenders, 1975; Smith, 1972; Zerbe, 1970)
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increasing energy prices on both the short as well as the long run.
The paper is organised in the following order. In section 2.2, we will list the
related work and our research questions, followed by the empirical protocol in
section 2.3, where we will discuss the basic DEA model and drive our adapted
model. In section 2.4 we will illustrate the results of our regressions, and finally,
the discussion and conclusion will be presented in section 2.5.
2.2 Related work and research questions
In the energy sector, Rose and Joskow (1988) and his colleges investigated the
effect of increasing fuel prices as a production cost factor for electric utilities in
the US and collected data for 144 plant for the time period between 1950 and
1980. Their conclusion was that electricity producers respond to an increase in
fuel prices by adopting fuel saving technologies. Nevertheless Rose and Joskow
notice that company size and their organization structure play an important role
in the adoption of new technologies, where large and investor owned companies
adopt technologies earlier than small and public owned plants. A more recent
study was done by Gamtessa and Olani (2016). They conducted a broad vector
panel analysis to study the effect increasing energy prices exert on energy effi-
ciency. They included 33 different industries in Canada and concluded that a one
percentage rise in energy prices will reflect positively on energy efficiency by 0.23%
both in the short-run and in the long-run.
Similar results were also reported from the automobile industry: an increase in
energy efficiency was linked as well to rising oil prices (Ohta and Griliches, 1976;
Goodman, 1983; Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1984; Wilcox, 1984; Ohta and Griliches,
1986). In the iron and steel industry, Boyd and Karlson (1993) investigated the US
steel industry and collected data for 30 years to monitor the effect of crude oil prices
on replacing steel furnaces with basic oxygen to more efficient electric arc furnaces.
The price for energy had an effect but was marginal, and non-price parameters
were more significant. They conclude that the adoption of the new technology was
not price induced but a part of a major technical change in the industry. Jaffe
and Stavins (1995) found evidence for adoption of thermal insulation technologies
as a response to energy prices but stated that the magnitude is small compared
to other variables effect. Similar results to the marginal effect of energy prices on
the demanded quantity between 1970s and 1980s was also found by Linn (2008).
Finally, Newell et al. (1999) investigated the air conditioning market. He com-
piled a database for 735 room air conditioner models between the period of 1958
and 1993. He used a relative price index for electricity to test the inducement
mechanism. For the regulatory index, Newell used the National Appliance En-
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ergy Conservation Act of 1987 as a policy index, where he differentiated its effect
from passing the act till enforcement to measure the different effect through time.
He concluded that an increase in the energy prices changed the offered model’s
pattern. However, he also noticed that the induced effect by energy prices was
particularly stronger after regulations (government intervention) were introduced.
In the field of price induced innovation, research has tried to investigate this topic
before. Prominent research done in this field is, for example, the works done by
Johnstone et al. (2010b) and Popp (2002), where they tried to understand the effect
of both energy prices and environmental policies on the innovation activities in the
renewable energy field. Popp (2002) collected patent data from 1970 to 1994 to
estimate the effect of energy prices on innovation activities. In addition to the sum
of registered patents, he included a quality index as well, by using patent citations
as an indicator for the quality of innovation. He concluded that both energy
prices and the quality of the stock of knowledge have strongly positive effects on
innovation activities. Johnstone et al. (2010a) collected data for 25 countries over
the period between 1978 and 2003 and used electricity prices as a proxy for energy
prices. Beside the innovation index, Johnstone controlled for public policies by
counting active renewable energy policies. He could find that public policies have
a significant role in determining patent applications and that renewable energy
technologies respond differently to the type of policy. However, he found no link
between energy prices and the overall patent activities in renewable energy in
general but only on solar cells’ patent activities.
Nesta et al. (2014) extended Johnstons and Popps work and added a market
liberalization index to measure markets competitiveness. They also control for
patent quality and not just the aggregated number of registered patents. They
came to the conclusion that environmental policies are more effective in liberalized
markets to foster green innovation, especially high quality patents. Energy prices,
however, did not have influence on promoting any technological change (patenting
activities). Similar results to Johnstone et al. (2010a) were also reported by Nicolli
and Vona (2016). They extended the work of Nesta et al. and examined in depth
the role of competition, policies and energy prices on the innovation activities
in different renewable energy technologies. They came to the conclusion that
both energy prices and entry barriers index have a positive impact on the total
innovation activities in renewable energy domain. However, with respect to single
technologies, energy prices have an effect only on mature technologies, like solar,
wind and biofuel technologies.
Based on the mentioned studies, we are raising the following research questions:
• Research Question 1: Do increasing energy prices induce energy efficiency
22
and technological progress in renewable energies?
• Research Question 2: What are the effects of state intervention and compe-
tition in improving energy efficiency and boosting technological change?
2.2.1 Measuring Heterogeneity with Data Envelopment Analysis
In this section, we briefly introduce the Data envelopment analysis (DEA). We
follow closely the approach by Sueyoshi and Goto (2012, 2011). DEA is a math-
ematical method based on linear programming techniques with the purpose to
evaluate relative efficiencies of entities, which are called ”Decision Making Units“
(DMU). In our case the ”Decision Making Units“ are the OECD countries. Typi-
cally, in DEA the resources are referred to as “inputs” and outcomes as “outputs”,
where each DMU can be of a unique combination of inputs and outputs in order
to maximize its relative efficiency. The calculated efficiency score is the ratio of
the total weighed output to the total weighed input, and hence it determines how
a DMU is efficient compared to a frontier of efficiency. (Mardani et al., 2017; Zhu,
2014; Grebel, 2018).
There are two main approaches while using DEA: ”input“ and ”output“ oriented
approaches. Input oriented approachs ask how much inputs should be reduced to
achieve the given output values, in order for the DMU to be technically efficient.
The output oriented approach, on the other hand, measures the value with which
the output has to be increased at a given set of inputs. In our research, we are
interested in reducing the consumption of fossil fuels (inputs), while maintaining
the GDP levels (output), and therefore we will base our calculations using the
input oriented approach. An additional assumption has to be met before we can
measure the potential reduction in inputs, namely the returns to scale (increasing,
decreasing, or constant). A constant returns on scale (CCR) means that outputs
will increase proportionally to inputs. If DMUs are homogeneous in sense of size
and technology used, then a constant returns on scale can be assumed; however,
this is not our case. We compare 31 OECD countries together and they vary in
size, GDP and technology usage, and therefore we expect heterogeneity between
the DMUs. In this case a variable returns on scale (BCC) should be applied (Oh
et al., 2009; Grebel, 2018).
To simplify the DEA idea, we assume that there is only one input x , one output
y and n = 6 observations i.e. j DMUs with j = {A, B,C, . . . , F}. The two lines in
figure (2.1) illustrate both best practice frontiers for the constant returns to scale
(CCR) and the variable returns to scale (BCC). Only the DMU B has the best
output-input ratio under the assumption of CRS. No other DMU achieves higher
productivity of factor x compared to B. While under the assumption of variable
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return on scale, the DMU A and B are technically efficient. DMU C and E are
not located on the frontier line and they are technically inefficient. For DMU E
to become technically efficient, the input-oriented form of the VRS model gauges
E relative to point E∗. In another words, DMU E needs to reduce its inputs by a
fraction (1-θx E) to reach the frontier. (Grebel, 2018).
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Figure 2.1 Best-practice frontier. Source: Grebel (2018)
2.2.2 Technological change
Measuring technological change (TC) is an intangible concept, and so there is no
unique way to measure it. TC is defined as an endogenous, localized (Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1969) and heterogeneous process. It could be understood as well as
a continuous and incremental process, or even as a disruptive process (Dosi, 1982;
Rosenberg, 1976; Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Rosenberg, 1982; Freeman,
1982; Mokyr, 1990; Grebel, 2018).
Based on the aforementioned description of technological change, measuring it
using a parametric approach and assuming an explicit functional form might seem
inappropriate. Conversely, using a non-parametric approach can offer more generic
results and features like measuring the discontinuous shifts in technical change.
In this contribution, we use dynamic DEA approach to measure the technical
change. We follow the same approach applied by (Färe et al., 1992) and use
the input-based Malmquist productivity index introduced by (Caves et al., 1982).
Figure (2.2), illustrates the concept with two CCR frontiers at time t0 and t1.
Following the earlier example, E is the only inefficient DMU, where Et0 stands for
the productivity situation of E at time t0 and Et1 for the situation at t1 (Grebel,
2018).
Equation (2.1), explains how to mathematically measure the technology change.
It consists of two parts, the efficiency and technical shift. The ratio between the
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Figure 2.2 Technological Change – a shift of the best-practice frontier. Source:
Grebel (2018)
two efficiencies of E delivers the change in efficiency (ECt0|t1) from t0 to t1, when
compared to their corresponding frontier. This explains the first part of equation
(2.1). The second part is the technical shift TCt0|t1 of the frontier from t0 to t1
(Grebel, 2018). Malmquist (1953)
MQt0|t1 =
θt1|t1
θt0|t0
︸︷︷︸
ECt0 |t1
×
√
√
√
θt0|t0
θt0|t1
×
θt1|t0
θt1|t1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TCt0 |t1
(2.1)
If the EC value is greater (less) than one, an improvement (deterioration) in
efficiency can be concluded. In the same manner, if TC is greater (smaller) than
one, technical change is progressive (regressive). A value of 1 for TC means no
change has occurred. ncy. Multiplying both indexes leads to the Malmquist
productivity index as stated by Färe et al. (1992) (Grebel, 2018).
2.3 Empirical protocol
In this section, we describe our econometric protocol and the data with which
we proxy the efficiency improvement for the OECD countries. We test the effect
of an increase in the price, on efficiency index and technological changes in 30
countries. For that, we perform panel data regressions such as LSDV. Moreover,
a heterogeneous dynamic panel regression will allow us to monitor whether there
is a difference between the short- and longrun effects.
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2.3.1 Data and methodology
Overall, we collected an unbalanced panel data set of 30 OECD countries (DMUs)
from 1990 to 2015. From these, the information used to build the DEA indices
are collected from the the International Energy Agency (IEA) database, as well
as energy prices and renewable energy policies (REP). The competition variable
(product market regulation) index as well as patent data are retrieved from the
OECD database. GDP per capita as well as the total renewable energy generated
stems also come from the IEA.
As dependent variables, we calculate two efficiency indices based on the input
oriented theory. We build two indicators, one for constant return to scale (CCR)
and the second is for variable returns to scale (BCC). For measuring the techno-
logical change over time, we calculate the Malmquist index. As output we pick
the gross domestic product in 2005 bn. US$ purchasing power parity. As inputs
we use population (POP – in millions), total primary energy supply (TPES – in
terajoule: production + imports - exports ± stock changes) and finally carbon
dioxide emissions (CO2 – in tons of CO2). Although carbon dioxide is an output,
we employ it as an input. The DEA model minimizes all inputs per unit output.
As CO2 is to be minimized per unit output, it can technically be treated as an
input (Seiford and Zhu, 2002; Chung et al., 1997; Førsund, 2009; Sueyoshi and
Goto, 2011). Hence, the simplified production process consists of three inputs,
POP, TPES, and CO2 that transform into GDP.3
We calculated the Malmquist index in a more generic way, based on the variable
returns to scale. Figure (2.3,orange line) shows the values distribution and the
histogram of the calculated index before and after the transformation to the data.
The index has a high density of values around the value 1 and the value changes
are relatively small; however, these small changes in the efficiency values have an
important economic meaning. Therefore, we exponentially transformed the index
to explore these small differences and label it for further analysis as eMQ−BCC
index, see figure (2.3,green line).
Explanatory variables
Energy prices: diminishing fossil fuel sources will increase energy prices. This, in
turn, should increase the incentive for energy producers to improve their energy
efficiency and in the long run search for alternatives. The energy prices index
3Capital and labor are the traditional input factors. This is why we use those. Instead of
capital input, however, we use TPES, which can be considered an instrument for capital input.
As a proxy for labor input we use population. With carbon dioxide we add an environmental
variable which countries should economize on. This examplifies how to take environmental
aspects into account in DEA.
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Figure 2.3 Transformation of the Malmquist index.
is calculated based on data on end-user electricity prices in both residential and
industrial sectors. The calculated price index was constructed by weighing the
prices by the consumption in both residential and industrial sector, respectively,
similar to Johnstone et al. (2010b); Popp et al. (2010) or Nesta et al. (2014).
We expect a positive effect of increasing energy prices on energy efficiency and
technological change.
Renewable energy policies (REP): states have been intervening in the energy
market, trying to boost their efficiency and induce a technological change. There-
fore, we include the number of policies in force during a given year. As in Johnstone
et al. (2010a); Nesta et al. (2014), and Dasgupta et al. (2001), we build a policy
index by counting the number of active renewable energy policies by country and
year. The effectiveness period of each policy can be derived from the reported in-
formation about the year of adoption and expiration date. Each policy from these
takes the value of zero, and only during the effectiveness period does the value
change to one. The aggregated index includes different kinds of policies such as
economic instruments, regulatory instruments, policy support and information and
education. By doing this we might be losing information about singular effect and
scope of each policy type; nevertheless, it allows us to track the activity level of
policymakers.
Competition: To measure the level of competition in the energy sector, we
use the “Product Market Regulation” (PMR) index, developed at the OECD. It
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combines information about multiple features, such as the number and market
shares of the largest energy suppliers; the higher the number and low market
concentration levels, the more competitive the market is. Secondly, we view public
ownership/state control (such as price control and ownership), vertical integration,
and finally entry barriers and market regulations4 (regulations of third party access
to the grid). The combined index ranges from 0 to 6, where high values indicate
a high level of regulation and hence a low level of competition. Therefore we
expect a negative correlation sign between the PMR index and energy efficiency;
the higher the level of competition, the more efficient energy producers will be.
Green knowledge: Innovation, accumulated Learning and scientific results and
evidences can lead to technological change, as discussed by Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1999). The more scientific knowledge a country has, the more alternatives
they will have to enable the swift change to other technologies than fossil fuels
(Weible et al., 2011). Therefore, we include patent counts per country for each
year as an indicator for innovation activities. They can be seen as proxy for the
scientific and technical information available.
Despite several empirical and conceptual caveats (Griliches, 1990), patents have
been widely used in quantitative empirical studies in environment domains as
an indicator for innovation (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier and Cohen,
2003; Costantini and Crespi, 2013). Just counting the annual number of patents
in green technologies does not reflect the actual stock of knowledge of a coun-
try. The Stock of Knowledge, by nature, is difficult to measure. Accumulating
patent counts instead would ignore the fact that knowledge wears off over time
(Popp, 2002). Therefore, we use the perpetual inventory method (PIM) as sug-
gested and applied by (Meinen et al., 1998; Hall, 1993; Hall et al., 2000; Nesta
and Saviotti, 2006). The number of patents (Patt at time t ) is counted while
depreciating past patent counts. Correspondingly, the stock of green knowledge
(GK) is calculated as GKi t = (1−δ)GKt−1+Pa tt .5 The patent data originates from
PATSTAT6. For patents identification purposes, we used the OECD Indicator of
Environmental Technologies (OECD, 2012). We expect that countries with high
level of green knowledge, will positively lead to a technological change toward
renewables sources.
GDP and population: are the simplest measures used to account for the eco-
nomic growth, the size of the country. To decrease the correlation between these
two variables, we prefer to calculate GDP per capita as a combined variable. By
including this variable we expect that the bigger and richer a country, the better
4 For a more detailed information and different weighting for features, please refer to (Conway
et al., 2005)
5The annual depreciation rate δ is assumed to be 15%
6We used the 2015 version of the EPO database PATSTAT EPO (2015).
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the level of efficiency and technological change.
Total renewable energy generation: To control for the energy sector structure
and energy mix, we include the total energy generated from renewable sources. We
expect that the higher the integration capacity of renewable energies in a country
energy mix, the higher the energy efficiency levels and the faster technological
change will be.
Table (2.1) collects the summary statistics of variables.
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max
CCR in 754 0.181 0.241 0.00142 1
BCC in 754 0.861 0.0958 0.636 1
eMQ BCC 574 1.483 0.585 0.439 3.561
Energy price 642 0.873 0.231 0 1.490
REP 884 0.116 0.141 0 1.010
PMR 795 3.841 1.665 0.872 6
GDP per Capita 772 3.198 0.401 1.872 3.917
Ren. energy generation 789 2.839 1.591 0.001 6.270
Green Knowledge 782 3.971 2.22 0 8.671
Table 2.1 Summary statistics
2.3.2 Basic Econometric Specification
To test whether energy prices can induce energy efficiency in OECD countries and
lead to a technological change, we state the following basic econometric specifi-
cation, where we start with a least square dummy variable (LSDV) regression,
expressed in equation (5.1).
Efi t = β0+φ1t EPi t +φ2t REPi t +φ3t PMRi t +ψX i t + εi t (2.2)
with i = 1, 2, .., n as number of countries, t = 1, 2, .., T as time span, and Efi t as
the dependent variable, which will vary between (constant returns to scale (CCR),
variable returns to scale (BCC) and technological change (eMQ BCC)). β0 is the
constant term, EP is the energy price variable, REP represents the renewable
energy polices and PMR is the competition index. φ1..3t represent the explanatory
variables coefficients respectively, while ψ is the coefficient matrix for the control
variables X . Finally, an error term is assumed with εi t .
Using models like the suggested LSDV model is proper for micro panels with
small time series (T) and a large number of cross section observations (N). Such
panel structure usually rely on either fixed effects, random effects, static fixed
effect (SFE), or a combination of those (Arellano and Bond, 1991), to estimate
the coefficients. However, as Pesaran and Smith (1995) point out, with large T,
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such traditional estimators may generate inconsistent results, because they assume
homogeneous slopes among panel units.7 To make sure the results are robust,
we will apply, in additional to the LSDV model, a dynamic heterogeneous panel
model. The latter will be explained in the following:
2.3.3 Estimators for heterogeneous slopes
In general, the assumption of homogeneous slope parameters does not hold in dy-
namic panel data with large T and large N (Phillips and Moon, 2000; Im et al.,
2003). With T increasing, more attention has to be paid to issues like serial corre-
lation, as shocks, whether temporary or persistent, may lead to biased estimation
results. Pesaran and Smith (1995), show that GMM estimation in a dynamic
panel model has inconsistent long-term coefficients when actual slopes are het-
erogeneous. For these reasons, we apply the pooled mean group model (PMG)
introduced by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Blackburne and Frank (2007).
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models (DHPM) are based on an autoregressive
distributed lag model, which includes an error correction, and allows addressing
endogeneity issues. In a nutshell, it estimates a short-run dynamic to which the
system returns after an exogenous shock, and additionally, it estimates long-run
effects. It allows, in the short-run, coefficients, convergence adjustment speed
(the coefficient of error correction term), and the error variances to differ across
countries. However, it assumes homogeneity of slope parameters across countries
on the long-run (Blackburne and Frank (2007)).
The DHPM estimator can be calculated as mean group (MG), dynamic fixed-
effects (DFE) models or a combination of both. Whereas the MG model averages
the slope coefficients of separate regressions by panel-unit, the DFE model is sim-
ilar to the one-way fixed effects or least square dummy variable (LSDV) approach
allowing for heterogeneous intercepts but homogeneous slope coefficients. In con-
trast to the fixed-effects model, the DFE approach also distinguishes between
short-run and long-run effects. There are various reasons to assume common
long-run coefficients across OECD countries, because they have access to common
technologies and very similar policies trends. Popp et al. (2011), for example, put
forward that the Kyoto protocol played a fundamental role in accelerating the
development of renewable energy installed capacities, where all member countries
are exposed to the same international pressure for more environmental regulations.
Nesta et al. (2014) identify a positive effect between the introduction of the Kyoto
protocol and renewable energy policies.
Conversely, assuming the speed of convergence across countries to be similar is
7Compare Pesaran et al. (1999).
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rather implausible, as countries‘ institutional frames differ. Together with the fact
that our data set is a large T, large N data set, the DFE is comparable to the
LSDV model (eq. 5.1, with heterogeneous intercepts assumed. The mathematical
background of the DHPM models is described in the following:
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models
The general model of the dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation, which will
be presented here, is discussed by (Blackburne and Frank, 2007; Freeman, 2000;
Pesaran et al., 1999).
General Model
The general model assumes that the input data on time period t = 1, 2, ..., T and
across section groups i = 1, 2, ..., N can be estimated by an autoregressive distribu-
tive lag model ARDL(p , q , .., qk ):
yi t =
p
∑
j=1
λi j yi ,t− j +
q
∑
j=0
δ
′
i j Xi ,t− j +µi + εi t (2.3)
where Xi t is the (k ×1)-vector of explanatory variables, λi j a scalar of constants,
δi t the k × 1 coefficient vectors, µi the group specific effect and, εi t the group
specific effect. As T is large enough, each group can be estimated separately. The
variables in equation (5.2) are cointegrated of level I(1) and the error term is an I(0)
process for all i , therefore, the error correction equation can be reparameterized:
4yi t =φi (yi ,t−1−β
′
i Xi t ) +
p−1
∑
j=1
λ∗i j4yi ,t−1+
q−1
∑
j=0
δ
′∗
i j4Xi ,t−1+µi + εi t (2.4)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., T. The error correction speed of adjustment
parameter is expressed as in the following:
φi =−(1−
p
∑
j=1
λi j ), (2.5)
β
′
i =
q
∑
j=0
δi j , (2.6)
λ∗i j =−
∑p
m= j+1λi m j = 1, 2, ..., p −1 (2.7)
and
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δ∗i j =−
∑q
m= j+1δi m j = 1, 2, ..., q −1 (2.8)
assuming that the ARDL model in equation (5.2) is stable in that the roots of
∑p
j=1λi j z
j = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., N lie outside the unit circle, ensuring that the error
correcting speed of adjustment term φi < 0. This implies that there is a long-
run relationship between the dependent variable yi t and the regressors xi t . It is
calculated as:
yi t =−(β
′
i/φi )xi t +ηi t (2.9)
Adapted Model
When adapting the general model to our case, we obtain the following long run
function:
Yi t = θ0t +θ1t EPt +θ2t REPt +θ3t PMRt + B i X i t +µi + εi t (2.10)
where i = 1, 2, .., N is the number of countries, t = 1, 2, .., T the time span, and
yi t the respective dependent variables (constant returns to scale, variable returns
to scale (BCC) and technological shift (eMQBCC). X i t stands for the control
variables and B i are their corresponding coefficients. According to a cointegration
test, the data is cointegrated I(1) and the error term is an I(0) process for all i .
This transforms the ARDL(1,1,1) dynamic panel specification of equation (5.9)
into our basic regression equation:
4Yi t =φi (θ0i +θ1i EPi t +θ2i REPt +θ3i PMRt + B i X i t )
+δ11i4EPi t +δ21i4REPt +δ31i4PMRt +δ41i4B X i t + εi t (2.11)
where θ0i =
µi
1−λi , θi t =
δi 0i+δi 1i
1−λi , and φi =−(1−λi ). The error correction speed of
adjustment parameter is φi . θ1i ,θ2i , ...,θNi are the long-run coefficients.
2.4 Empirical results
We begin by presenting the result from the LSDV model, presented in equation
(5.1). Beforehand, we performed a unit root and cointegration test. The unit-root
test is executed using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The null hypothesis of
the panel containing a unit root can be rejected with a p-value of 0.006 for all
values except the CCR variable, therefore we calculated and use the exponential
form in our calculations. All regressions and tests are performed using STATA 15.
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Table (2.2) shows our first results. We apply fixed effect LSDV regression8 with
a time trend. In models (1-4) we use the efficiency score calculated by means
of the CCR model as a dependent variable. In the first model, we regress only
energy prices on efficiency score. The results show a significant positive effect
of energy prices on the energy efficiency. In further models, we started adding
variables sequentially. In models (2 and 3), we added renewable energy policies
and competition variable. Energy prices kept their effect, and the effect of REP on
energy efficiency is additionally strongly positive. The competition variable is also
significant and has a negative sign, as expected. State intervention in the energy
market as well as market liberalization can lead to a better efficiency. In model 4,
we added further control variables (GDP.p.c, share of renewable energy capacities
and stock of green knowledge). As a result, both energy prices and PMR lost
their significance and only renewable energy policies kept their significance level
in addition to the GDP per capita variable.
In models (4-8) we repeat the same sequence and same regression specifications,
but use the variable returns to scale (BCC) as a dependent variable. The BCC
variable is used to account for the technological heterogeneity between countries.
At the first glance, the results seem similar to the previous models, where energy
prices correlate positively with the efficiency variable, even when additional vari-
ables are added. Both REP and competition variables have the expected effects
on the BCC variable. REP kept a positive sign through all the models and PMR,
on the other hand, has a negative sign, meaning that competitive markets can
boost the efficiency levels in the market. In model 8, add all the control variables.
In contrast to model 4, where energy prices lost their effect, the sign and signif-
icance level of energy prices on the BCC variable did not change. In addition,
both renewable energy policies indicator and competition variable have held their
significance and signs.
Table (2.3) shows the results to test the second hypothesis, if energy prices can
lead to technological change. The dependent variable is the Malmquist index ex-
plained in section 2.3.3, which is exponentially transformed. As for the regression
specification, we apply a LSDV regression, with year dummies and standard error
robustness check through all the models (9-13). The results show a strong and sig-
nificant correlation between energy prices and the technological change variable.
In models (2 and 3) we added both the policy and competition indices sequentially.
Only the competition index is negatively significant. Following this, we add an
interaction term between both indices to test the effect of increasing policies in
competitive markets. The variable is significant, showing that policies might be
not significant in general, but only in more liberalized markets. In model 5, we
8The Hausmann tests suggests to use a fixed-effect model.
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add the control variables, where only energy prices kept their significant level and
sign. In addition to that, the stock of green knowledge plays a positive role in
inducing technological change.
Dept. Variable: eMQ−BCC
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Energy price 2.828*** 2.825*** 2.808*** 2.793*** 2.774***
(0.116) (0.113) (0.110) (0.109) (0.132)
REP -0.160 -0.164 0.051 0.025
(0.158) (0.153) (0.159) (0.149)
PMR -0.020** -0.015* -0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
REPxPMR -0.095* -0.080
(0.049) (0.050)
GDP per Capita -0.086
(0.091)
GK 0.035*
(0.017)
Ren cap 0.154
(0.303)
Constant -0.924*** -0.921*** -0.795*** -0.809*** -0.692**
(0.089) (0.088) (0.093) (0.092) (0.297)
Observations 574 574 574 574 572
R-squared 0.973 0.973 0.974 0.974 0.975
Number of ctry 31 31 31 31 31
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robustness check Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 adj. within 0.973 0.973 0.974 0.974 0.975
R2 adj. between 0.987 0.986 0.987 0.987 0.976
R2 adj. overall 0.976 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.970
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3 LSDV regression. Dept. variable Malmquist index index.
Our last results are presented in table (2.4). We apply the dynamic fixed effects
model, presented in section 3.5. In the first two models, we use the eCCR variable,
followed by the BCC and finally the eMQ-BCC variable. All regressions have the
same specifications. The advantage of using this model is the ability to distinguish
between short- and long-run effects and the additional error correction term that
captures serial correlations between the variables.
The results for the constant returns to scale show no effect of energy prices
neither in the short nor the long run. On the other hand, the effect of energy
prices appears significant, when the technological heterogeneity between countries
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14 15 16 17 18 19
Variables eCCR eCCR BCC BCC eMQ-BCC eMQ-BCC
L
on
g
ru
n
Energy price -0.020 -0.125 0.212*** 0.243*** 2.350*** 2.412***
(0.115) (0.189) (0.043) (0.063) (0.155) (0.148)
REP 0.273 0.235 -0.053 -0.049 -0.073 -0.067
(0.314) (0.290) (0.056) (0.054) (0.185) (0.181)
PMR 0.024 0.041 0.006 0.006 0.003 -0.007
(0.018) (0.032) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
GDP.p.c 0.176 0.011 -0.148
(0.129) (0.058) (0.127)
Ren. cap. 0.350 -0.259 0.066
(0.283) (0.256) (0.352)
GK 0.021 -0.003 -0.003
(0.052) (0.018) (0.022)
sh
or
t
ru
n
Error term 0.044* 0.046 0.177*** 0.168*** 0.191*** 0.202***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.037) (0.039) (0.027) (0.028)
Energy price 0.007 0.005 0.023 0.025 2.681*** 2.686***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.159) (0.159)
REP, 0.013 0.015 0.009 0.010 0.053 0.043
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.040) (0.036)
PMR, 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.055* -0.024 -0.117*** -0.114** 0.114*** 0.030
(0.034) (0.036) (0.028) (0.045) (0.038) (0.091)
Esigma 0.0281 0.0283 0.0239 0.0265 0.0358 0.0381
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4 Dynamic fixed effect models.
is taken into consideration. Models (3 and 4) show these results. Energy prices
have a positive effect on energy efficiency on the long-run. The last two models (5
and 6) we introduce to run the regression against the Malmquist index, measuring
shift in the technological frontier. The results show a significant positive effect of
increasing energy prices on inducing technological change both in the short-run
and the long-run. Also, the error correction term is significant, meaning serial
correlation between the variables is captured. Additional information from the
error correction term can be concluded, namely the length of the shock after a
change in energy prices. An increase in energy prices will induce technological
change for 5 years, before its effect fades away. However, the effect of energy
prices can fade away, but the system will have gained from a positive effect on the
technological change frontier.
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2.5 Discussion and conclusion
In our research paper, we raised the question whether an increase in energy prices
can lead to a better energy efficiency between countries and accelerate a tech-
nological change toward renewable energies. The decrease in the supply of fossil
fuels and the additional taxes introduced after state intervention, to mitigate the
effects of climate change, both lead energy prices to go up. According to funda-
mental economic theories, if energy prices increase and markets are competitive,
energy producers will try to increase their efficiency levels, in order to not lose
their market shares. Also, simultaneously alternative technologies that seemed
too expensive in the past will be more attractive and more investment will be put
into new technologies.
To answer this question and model the effect on the efficiency levels and tech-
nological change, we collected a dataset for 31 OECD countries between 1990 and
2015. To build our dependent variables we used data envelopment analysis and
we calculated two efficiency scores. The first depends on the assumption that
countries have the same technologies and have a constant returns to scales. The
second efficiency score assumes heterogeneity between countries technologies and
assumes variable returns to scale. An additional outcome from the calculated effi-
ciency scores is the Malmquist index, which measures the shift of the technological
frontier. Based on this index we can measure the technological change.
Overall, we observe an elevation in the energy efficiency levels across the OECD
countries after energy prices rise. The results using constant returns to scale
are inconsistent, which indicates that countries apply different technologies. On
the other hand, the effect on the dependent variable BCC, which accounts for
the technological heterogeneity between countries, has been consistently positive
through all the models. The role of policies and competition can not be neglected.
renewable energy policies and competition both have a positive effect on energy
efficiency. The dynamic panel regressions as well point toward a long-run positive
correlation between energy prices and energy efficiency when heterogeneity is taken
into consideration.
With regard to inducing technological change, energy prices have a positive
significant effect through all the models. Additionally the Dynamic Heteroge-
nous Panel Models show a positive effect on both the short-run and the long-run.
In addition to energy prices, competition does play a positive role in inducing
technological change. State intervention does have a positive effect on inducing
technological change in more competitive liberalized markets. These findings are
similar to those reported by (Nesta et al., 2014).
Our results are in line with previous studies that concluded that an increase
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in energy prices can boost energy efficiency levels. Additionally this increase can
lead to technological change. These findings might be different than the results
documented by (Johnstone et al., 2010a; Nesta et al., 2014), however coherent
with the results from (Popp, 2002; Nicolli and Vona, 2016).
In summary, we can conclude that energy prices can lead to better energy ef-
ficiency, when heterogeneity between countries is taken into consideration and in
the long-run induce technological change. Renewable energy policies play a critical
role in supporting the shift when markets are liberated and competition is taking
place.
In future research, we can introduce attempts to measure technological change
based on innovation activities,i.e. patent counts. Nesta et al. (2014) used patents
data as an indicator for technological change. In additional to that, we can dis-
tinguish the types of policies and monitor their singular effects. In a similar vein,
we can determine empirically the interaction between those policies and market
liberalization steps.
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Chapter 3
Rising Energy Prices and Advances in Renewable Energy
Technologies
Authors: Sherief Emam, Thomas Grebel
In this paper we investigate the impact of rising energy prices on technological
progress in the market for renewable energies. We use patent data of OECD
countries from 1970 to 2010 and test the impact of oil prices on the innovative
success of countries; R & D, investment activities, electricity consumption , etc. are
used as control variables. We compare several models such as Pooled Mean Group
(PMG), Mean Group (MG), Count data (CD) and Dynamic fixed effects (DFE)
models to distinguish short and long-term effects. The preliminary results show
that increasing energy prices seem to encourage innovation in renewable energy
technologies.
3.1 Introduction
This paper tries to provide evidence for the relationship between rising energy
prices and technological progress in the market for renewable energies. The tech-
nology push and the demand pull approach, respectively, argue why we observe
technological advances in industries (Di Stefano et al., 2012; Schmookler, 1966;
Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Rosenberg and Nathan, 1982). The technology
push argument claims that it is the advances in sciences that may induce the rate
and direction of technological change in contrast to the demand pull approach
which finds the drivers of technological change in yet unsatisfied consumer needs.
Both arguments received critique. The demand pull approach would be too broad
as a concept to be useful. It would be inadequate to explain discontinuous change
as the most important source of progress. Firms would not have sufficient capabil-
ities to identify consumer needs, nor would they have the chance to choose from a
ready-made stock of technological solutions to come to grips with consumer needs.
It neglects the role of technological opportunities. The technology-push argument
has been strongly criticized as it ignores the role of prices as an incentive to invest
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in new technologies. With respect to technology policies, as Nemet (2009) points
out, a consensus has evolved that both types of instruments – demand-pull and
technology-push policies – should be pursued as market conditions (to which the
demand-pull argument relates to), and technological opportunities (the basis for
the technology push argument) have to coincide in order to lead to technological
progress. On these grounds, we will focus on the demand pull argument and try to
find out whether increasing oil prices (changing market conditions), as indicators
for a steadily increasing demand for energy and the general perception of dwin-
dling fossil energy resources, make countries increase their innovative activities in
order to boost technological progress in alternative renewable energy technologies.
Our work draws to a large extent on Nesta et al. (2014), Johnstone et al. (2010b)
and Nemet (2009).
As in Johnstone et al. (2010b) and Nesta et al. (2014), we apply negative bi-
nomial regression and extend our empirical exercise with estimators allowing for
non-stationary heterogeneous panels suggested by Blackburne and Frank (2007),
which also allows, besides traditional fixed-effects estimation, the estimation of
the mean-group estimator (MG) (Pesaran et al., 1999) and the pooled mean-group
estimator (PMG) put forward by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Thus we try to
differentiate long-run and short-run effects.
In section 3.2 we refer to related work on the determinants of the technological
progress in renewable energies. Section 3.3 presents the construction of our data
and the methodological specifications we use. Results delivered by negative bi-
nomial count data models will be discussed in section 3.4. These results will be
compared with the results of dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation in section
3.5. Section 3.6 primarily discusses shortcomings/caveats and conclusions.
3.2 Related Work and Research Question
Economic growth hinges on the disposability of energy. As Stern (2011b) points
out, energy scarcity is a main constraint for economic growth. The industrial
revolution impressively showed that the invention of new technologies that drove
economic growth was based on the usage of fossil fuels. This was key to substitute
human labor for automated labor and thus enhance economic growth. Ever since
the world economy has been growing, the consumption of fossil fuels has been also
growing. A side effect of the steady increase in demand for fossil fuels has been
rising energy prices. Standard textbook economics tells us about the consequences
of increasing (relative) prices: all market participants will adapt their behavior. If
fossil fuels become more expensive relative to non-energy goods, (1) the demand
for energy should go down, as consumers adapt their behavior. They try to substi-
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tute energy-intensive goods for non-energy goods. Quite similarly, (2) the supply
side will change its behavior as well. Producers will try to innovate on energy-
efficient products and technologies. They try to find less expensive substitutes
(Newell et al., 1999). Last but not least, (3) policy makers will participate in this
process, too. Legitimizing their interventions by market failure, they carry out
reforms to foster renewable energy sources and, at the same time, try to fight neg-
ative externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions or the potential risks involved
in nuclear waste as a by-product of electricity production. Hence, renewable en-
ergies should be attractive for all market participants: policy makers, consumers
and suppliers. Renewable energies make us believe that they can be supplied at
almost zero marginal costs and no negative externalities. All that remains to be
done is to develop and employ such new energy sources and to build the required
infrastructure.
In traditional theory, markets should do the job, and as Newell et al. (1999)
concludes, rising energy prices should eventually lead to increasing innovative ac-
tivities. We want to empirically answer the following research question:
Research Question: Can rising oil prices induce technological progress in
renewable energies?
Meanwhile, this topic of technological progress in renewable energies and its de-
terminants has been investigated intensively. Johnstone et al. (2010b) and Nesta
et al. (2014) give an excellent overview of this strand of literature. By and large,
there are two fundamental options to boost technological progress – and this we
can already conclude from Newell et al. (1999): either leave it to the market
(Nesta et al., 2014; Sanyal and Ghosh, 2012) or try to induce innovation by policy
intervention (Nesta et al., 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Johnstone et al., 2010b).
In many countries, market liberalization has intensified competition. Along with
an increasing demand for renewable energy sources, due to a growing consumer
awareness of environmental issues, innovative activity has risen. Many countries
also carried out policy reforms to stimulate the innovation and adoption of renew-
able energy technologies (Johnstone et al., 2010b; International Energy Agency,
2004). However, it is not obvious to which extent rising energy prices actually
contribute to increasing innovative activities. If we can shed light on this, we will,
at the same time, gain insights in the question of how well the price mechanism
and the market for energy works as a whole.
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3.3 Data
As dependent variable to measure innovative activity in renewable energy tech-
nology, we collected patent statistics from the European Patent Office Worldwide
Patent Statistics Database PATSTAT (EPO,2012) and focused on patents related
to wind power technologies. Oil prices were retrieved from the Federal Reserves
Economic Data (FRED) database. As further controls we included GDP, financial
development funding, and electricity consumption all downloaded from the World
Bank database. Research and development data stem from the OECD database.
The time span of annual data covered ranges from 1970 to 2010.
Variable Label Source Unit
PatNumb # of patents PATSTAT 2012 counts
GDP gross domestic prod-
uct
World Bank DB In Millions $
Fdev financial development World Bank DB % of GDP
R & D research and develop-
ment funding
OECD database bn.$
OilPrice oil price Dow Jones & Company Ind $
ElecConsump Electrical Consump-
tion
World Bank DB MWh
Table 3.1 Data properties and sources.
A higher GDP stands for a country’s potential to generate technological progress
in general. Industrialized countries manage to patent far more than less developed
ones. As a further control we introduce financial development, which gives indica-
tions on the investment activity within a country. Financial development can be
measured in various ways. The ratio of broad Money (M2) to GDP, for example,
expresses the overall size of the financial intermediary of the country. Or, it can be
expressed in terms of domestic credit to private sector to GDP (Hamdi et al., 2013;
Fernandez and Galetovic, 1994; Calderón and Liu, 2003; Khan and Semlali, 2000).
Due to missing data in the M2 indicator, we calculate financial development as
the ratio of domestic credit of the private sector to GDP.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PatNumb 414 28.14 57.85 0 393
GDP 11.555 1.467 8.023 15.186 504
Fdev 87.047 43.39 20.749 227.753 501
R & D 1.647 1.552 0.015 10.497 417
OilPrice 24.477 15.358 3.4 72.400 504
ElecConsump 0.878 0.545 0.142 2.559 504
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics.
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An increase in credit offered for the private sector should lead to an increase
in patents counts. R & D is included as a major input factor in generating tech-
nological progress. Hence, a positive impact of R & D on patent counts should
be expected. With the consumption of electricity, patenting activities should also
increase, as producers try to escape the shortage in its supply. Table (3.1) depicts
the sources and units of our data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) PatNumb 1.00
(2) OilPrice 0.34 1.00
(3) GDP 0.60 0.17 1.00
(4) RD -0.07 0.27 -0.15 1.00
(5) Fdev 0.60 0.36 0.58 0.00 1.00
(6) ElecConsump -0.08 0.07 0.03 0.14 -0.02 1.00
Table 3.3 Cross-correlation table
Descriptive statistics can be found in table (3.2). With respect to patents, we
confined the analysis to all OECD countries patents on wind power. Table (3.3)
shows the pairwise correlations between dependent variables and all covariates.
We also performed a multicollinearity test the variance inflated factor (VIF) and
did not find multicollinearity among regressors.
In the following, negative binomial regressions provide first preliminary results
with respect to our research question, whether oil prices have an effect on innova-
tive activities among in respective countries.
3.4 Negative Binomial Regressions
Since the dependent variable is count data, we use negative binomial regression.
Additionally, because of over dispersion, this model has to be preferred to a Poisson
model. We introduce variables sequentially to see whether there are changes in
the signs of estimated coefficients, when further covariates are considered. All
covariates are instrumented by their one year lag. All models in this table are
fixed-effects models taking a full set of year dummies into account. Model (1)
in table (3.4) is a univariate regression of PatNumb on OilPrice. The correlation
suggests a positive relationship between rising oil prices and patent counts. With
GDP as a first control, OilPrice remains positive and significant, and so does
GDP. Model (3) takes additional control variables into account; that is, R & D,
Fdev, and ElectConsump. The coefficients of OilPrice and GDP change little; they
are positive and the correlation is significant to the 1% level.
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Dependent Variable: PatNumb (model: 1-3) log(PatNumb) (model: 4-5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OilPrice 0.038** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.917*** -0.607
(0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.350) (0.531)
GDP 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.397* -0.186
(0.000) (0.000) (0.228) (0.424)
RD 0.017 -0.002 -0.139 0.491***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.098) (0.148)
Fdev 0.005*** 0.333*** 0.047
(0.001) (0.119) (0.244)
ElectConsump -0.113 -1.029 -5.207*
(0.237) (1.039) (2.829)
Constant 0.192 0.641* 0.599 -2.730*** 1.792***
(1.063) (0.366) (0.372) (0.674) (0.278)
Observations 408 377 375 375 364
Number of country1 14 14 14 14 14
LL -1288 -1128 -1110 -255.4 -248.4
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4 Regression 1: Neg. Bin (1-3), Panel fixed effects (4-5)
From the three variables introduced, only Fdev has a significant, positive effect
on the number of patents generated in a country. R & D and Fdev, however, are
insignificant. To calculate the elasticity, all variables are logged in model (4). The
fixed-effect model applied here does not change the basic relationship between the
dependent variable and the independent variables. Model (5) differs from model
(4) in this regard that all logged variables are in differences; in other words, model
(5) regresses the logged growth rates. The interesting observation in this model is
that all variables which are significant in the previous models become insignificant,
whereas R & D and ElecConsump all of a sudden have a significant effect, a positive
effect with respect to R & D and a negative effect with respect to ElecConsump.
A change in R & D funding has a positive effect on patent counts, the absolute
amount of R & D does not. The same holds for ElecConsump. A positive change in
electricity consumption explains a decreases in patent counts; the absolute value,
however, does not.
We are aware that these results are very rudimentary. But what we can infer is
that there are differences in the time patterns. An increase in R & D funding as
a short-term impulse may induce patenting activities, and a short-term positive
change in electricity consumption seems to reduce patent counts. This can be
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explained as following. R & D funding is directed to support research and devel-
opment and a positive result in the number of patents is a direct outcome, while
an increase in electricity consumption can exert budget restrictions on Firms and
hence, lead to budget allocations and a decrease in the private funding for R & D
activities. Models (1) to (3) suggest that there might be a positive long-term re-
lationship between oil prices, GDP and patent counts. As most of these variables
are co-integrated, a robust conclusion cannot be drawn from these results. Fur-
thermore, spurious regression and endogeneity problems qualify these results even
more. In order to face those problems, we apply dynamic heterogeneous panel
models, which offer alternative estimators in addition to the traditional fixed-
effects estimator, i.e. the pooled mean-group estimator by Pesaran and Smith
(1995) and the mean-group estimator by Pesaran et al. (1999) (Blackburne and
Frank, 2007).
3.4.1 Estimators for heterogeneous slopes
So far the two introduced models do not handle macro panel problems. Micro
panels, i.e. small T and large N, usually rely on either fixed- or random-effects
estimators or a combination of both including instrumental variable estimators
such as the Generalized Method Of Moments (GMM) put forward by Arellano
and Bond (1991). It requires pooling individual groups and allows for different
intercepts across groups.
As a rule, macro panels do not fulfill the assumption of homogeneous slope
parameters (Phillips and Moon, 2000; Im et al., 2003). In contrast to micro panels,
the issue of non-stationarity plays a more important role. When T becomes large,
it is necessary to pay more attention to serial correlation, when shocks, whether
temporary or persistent, bias estimation results. Traditional nonstationary panels
with a short time span T have different characteristics (Phillips and Moon, 2000).
Analyzing panel data with large T in this paper, we draw on techniques introduced
by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Blackburne and Frank (2007), which allow
estimating nonstationary dynamic panels heterogeneous parameters across groups:
the mean-group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects
(DFE) estimators.
The MG estimator depends on estimating N time series regressions and averag-
ing the coefficient (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). PMG is based on a combination of
pooling and averaging coefficients (Pesaran et al., 1999). The dynamic fixed-effects
estimator (DFE) is similar to the PMG estimator. Both restrict the coefficients
of the cointegrating vector to be equal across all panels. The fixed-effects model
additionally restricts the speed of the adjustment coefficient to be equal to the
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short-run coefficients.
3.4.2 Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models
In this subsection, we introduce the general model of dynamic heterogenous panel
estimation as presented by (Blackburne and Frank, 2007) and then adapt this
model to our example.
General Model
In the general model it is assumed that the input data on time period , t = 1, 2, ..., T,
and cross section groups, i = 1, 2, ..., N, can be estimated by an autoregressive
distributive lag (ARDL) model (p , q , .., qk ) as in the following:
yi t =
p
∑
j=1
λi j yi ,t− j +
q
∑
j=0
δ
′
i j Xi ,t− j +µi + εi t (3.1)
where Xi t is the (k × 1)-vector of explanatory variables, µi the group specific
effect, λi t the k ×1 coefficient vectors and λi j a scalar of constants. As T is large
enough, each group can be estimated separately and the variables equation (5.2)
are conintegrated with I(1), then the error term is an I(0) process for all i , thus
the error correction equation can be reparameterized:
4yi t =φi yi ,t−1−β
′
i Xi t +
p−1
∑
j=1
λ∗i j4yi ,t−1+
q−1
∑
j=0
δ
′∗
i j4Xi ,t−1+µi + εi t (3.2)
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for i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., T where the error correction speed of adjustment
is the parameter expressed by:
φi =−(1−
p
∑
j=1
λi j ), (3.3)
βi =
q
∑
j=0
δi j , (3.4)
λ∗i j =−
∑p
m= j+1λi m j = 1, 2, ..., p (3.5)
and
δ∗i j =−
∑q
m= j+1δi m j = 1, 2, ..., q −1 (3.6)
assuming that the ARDL model in equation (5.2) is stable, where the roots of
p
∑
j=1
λi j z
j = 1 i = 1, 2, ..., N (3.7)
lie outside the unit circle, ensuring that the error correcting speed of adjustment
term φi < 0. This indicates that there is a long-run relationship between dependent
variable yi t and controllers xi t and is defined by
yi t =−(β
′
i/φi )xi t +ηi t (3.8)
Adapted Model
Adapting the general model from above to our case renders the long-run function:
p a t n umi t = θ0t +θ1t GDPi t +θ2t Oi l Pr i c ei t +θ3t RDi t +θ4t Fd e vi t
+θ5t El e c t Co n s umpi t +µi + εi t (3.9)
where i = 1, 2, .., N is the number countries in our panel. t = 1, 2, .., T the time
span of the panel, and p a t n umi t the real number of patents per country i in
period t .
The variables are cointegrated with I(1) and cointergrated. Hence, the ARDL(1,1,1)
dynamic panel specification of 5.9 is
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4Pa t Num bi t =φi (Pa t Num bi t−1−θ0i +θ1i GDPi t +θ2i Oi l Pr i c ei t+
θ3i RDi t +θ4i Fd e vi t +θ5i El e c t Co n s umpi t )
+δ11i4GDPi t +δ21i4Oi l Pr i c ei t +δ31i4RDi t +δ41i4Fd e vi t
+δ51i4El e c t Co n s umpi t + εi t (3.10)
where φi =−(1−λi ), θ0i =
µi
1−λi , θi t =
δi 0i+δi 1i
1−λi , and φi =−(1−λi ). The error correc-
tion speed of adjustment parameter is φi . The long-run coefficients θ1i ,θ2i , ...,θNi
are of primary interest.
3.5 Dynamic Heterogeneous Estimators
The regressions in this section refer to the heterogeneous panel techniques dis-
cussed above. All three estimators, PMG, MG and DFE, are applied in order
to investigate short-run and long-run effects. The preliminary findings, depicted
in table (3.4), give some indications to possible short-run and long-run effects.
Therefore, we consider R & D and electricity consumption to also have short-run
effects on innovative activities. In table (3.5) all three model results are reported
with two model versions each.
In models (6-11), we introduced R & D and El e c t Co n s ump as short-term
variables and also as variables for the long-run. Persistent R & D investments
should, in the long-run, increase the country stock of knowledge captured in new
technologies and human capital. Further long-term explanatory variables are GDP,
Fd e v and Oi l Pr i c e , the latter as the variable of our interest. Note that these
variables are the same as in our negative binomial regressions above. The two
model versions of each estimation approach differ only in the (non-)inclusion of
El e c t Co n s ump . Comparing all six models, we observe that the error correction
coefficient (e c ) is positive and significant in all models. This suggests that the
time series components are serially correlated. In model (6-9) R & D seems to have
a short-term effect on patent counts.1 Electricity consumption has no significant
explanatory power. Looking at the long-run coefficients, Oi l Pr i c e has a positive
effect on patent counts, a preliminary result which is in line with our research
hypothesis that it should have such an effect on innovative activities. In models
(8) and (9), this effect vanishes; that is, it becomes insignificant. GDP has a
negative long-run effect on patenting in renewable energy in all six models. A
1We used a five-year forward window of patent counts to take into account that the time
span between innovative activities and the resulting actualization of innovation can take several
years. Compare e.g. Nesta (2008).
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Dependent Variable: PatNumb
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
PMG PMG MG MG DFE DFE
sh
o
rt
ru
n
ec 1.018*** 1.018*** 0.875*** 0.824*** 1.045*** 1.045***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.114) (0.124) (0.011) (0.011)
D.RD 5.784** 5.605** 18.555** 14.736** -0.696 -0.836
(2.475) (2.468) (7.812) (6.446) (2.238) (2.249)
D.Elect.
Con-
sump
131.473 133.617 -477.713 -485.562 -15.419 -13.202
(108.852) (109.555) (499.072) (488.092) (75.411) (75.550)
lo
n
g
ru
n
OilPrice 0.177*** 0.168** -0.468 -1.116 0.546** 0.557**
(0.065) (0.066) (0.835) (1.122) (0.256) (0.256)
GDP2 -0.084*** -0.079*** -2.285 -2.283 -0.181*** -0.184***
(0.016) (0.016) (1.746) (1.575) (0.021) (0.022)
RD 2.127*** 2.031*** 34.015 40.263 -2.041 -1.818
(0.434) (0.471) (22.485) (32.712) (1.528) (1.560)
Fdev 0.036* 0.043* -0.880 -1.242 -0.237*** -0.258***
(0.020) (0.023) (1.413) (2.512) (0.071) (0.076)
Elect.
Con-
sump
-4.498*** -274.220 12.671
(1.364) (223.733) (17.875)
Constant 3.234 0.309 -78.869 -137.879 -31.176*** -21.790
(6.235) (6.131) (66.371) (106.134) (8.684) (15.849)
Observations286 286 286 286 286 286
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5 Regression 2: Pooled-Mean-Group (PMG) (6-7), Mean-Group (8-9) and
Dynamic Fixed-Effects (10-11)
possible explanation could be that economic growth is uncoupled from the progress
in renewable energy technologies. To recall, we only consider wind power patents
so far, which gives us a rather blurred picture of the role of renewable energy
technologies. The sign of its coefficient is consistently negative. The reported
long-run effects of R & D investments deliver only in model (6) and (7) a positive
significant effect. In all other models it is insignificant. The sign of financial
development (Fd e v ) is ambiguous. In model (6) and (7), Fd e v , i.e. the share of
credits to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, appears as a positive driver of
patenting in this field. In model (8) and (9) this effect is insignificant, and in model
(10) and (11) we observe flipped and significant signs. Electricity consumption
(model 7) has a significant and negative long-run effect on patent counts. When
comparing model (6) and (7), we observe that introducing El e c Co n s ump does
not change a lot with regard to the other coefficients. So far, this can be interpreted
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as an indication for these two models’ robustness.
There is no need for denying that the results in Table (3.5) are mixed. This
calls for further research efforts on our side. One step to differentiate and choose
the most suitable model is to run the Hausman test. It suggests that the PMG
estimator, models (6-7) are to be preferred over the MG and DFE estimator. This
is good news with regard to the effect of Oi l Pr i c e , R & D and Fd e v . All three are
positive, which is consistent with the results in the negative binomial regressions
above.
3.6 Discussion, Caveats and Conclusion
From an econometric stance, more tests have to be performed to understand the
characteristics of the panel time series. This hopefully sheds more light on the
inconsistencies identified. A further option is to compare the models with other
models such as a pre-sample mean count data specification used in Nesta et al.
(2014). It is conceivable that this could explain the negative sign of the long-run
effects of GDP. Moreover, the paper by Nesta et al. (2014) also gives good ad-
vice on further factors that have an impact on innovative activities in the field
of renewable energies. For example, weighting patent counts by patent family
or by their triadic relationship to adjust for patent quality makes a difference.
Industry dynamics play an important role, too. Many countries have liberalized
their energy markets in recent years. This has increased market competition, and
the ongoing technological progress in renewable energies driven by small start-up
firms change the industry dynamics (Klepper, 1997, 1996; Abernathy and Utter-
back, 1978). This scrapes off some of the market power of large incumbent firms.
Another aspect is the role of global warming that has risen consumer awareness
to environmental issues. The demand for renewable energies has been steadily in-
creasing Nesta et al. (2014). Even households become energy producers, as is the
case in Denmark, where the majority of wind power plants are owned by house-
holds Hadjilambrinos (2000). From the viewpoint of policy making, policy reforms
adapt the institutional frame of energy markets to the new needs. Consumers are
drawn in to participate in energy production. An example for having introduced
such demand side policies is the US (Loiter and Norberg-Bohm, 1999). Finally,
the interplay between industrial change and policy reforms needs attention in our
work, too. Nesta et al. (2014) provide evidence for such kind of endogeneity issues.
For the time being, it remains our positive attitude that we will find convincing
evidence of the oil price impact on countries’ innovative activities in renewable
energies.
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Chapter 4
Do we need disasters to adopt more environmental policies?
Authors: Sherief Emam, Thomas Grebel and Ana-Despina Tudor
Background
In this paper, we try to shed light on the question whether natural disasters,
such as nuclear accidents, have an impact on policy makers’ activity in passing
new green energy policies. Disruptive moments like exogenous shocks reinforce
society’s disapproval against polluting technologies and should open a window of
opportunities to eventually initiate a change toward green energy.
Methods
Based on the data of 34 OECD countries, we disentangle the effect of disruptive
exogenous shocks on countries’ policy activity. Starting with OLS regressions, we
run several robustness checks by using a pre-sample mean approach, an ARDL
technique called Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models (DHPM), which allows for
the distinction between long- and short-run effects.
Results
The results corroborate the hypothesis that unexpected, disruptive events have a
positive impact on the actual number of renewable energy policies. The fade-out
time for shocks is about seven years, leaving a positive long-term effect.
Conclusion
Exogenous events such as nuclear disasters act as “focusing event” and seem to
offer policy makers a window of opportunities to initiate conducive policy measures
toward a cleaner economy. Furthermore, a country’s capacity in green technologies
is key to a pervasive diffusion of green technologies.
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4.1 Introduction
The dangers of climate change have long been known. Global warming along with a
rising sea-level, increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather events (Allen
et al., 2019; Weitzman, 2015; Barnett and Adger, 2003b) threaten our livelihood.
Apart from the negative effect on economic development, beyond and above all,
it is our health which is at stake. Rising temperatures will make life impossible
in many regions that are already struggling with heat. The cultivation of staple
food becomes more costly and difficult (Costello et al., 2009). In spite of all the
damaging consequences, global emissions are still on the rise (IEA, 2018a).
The reasons for this political sclerosis are threefold. Firstly, it is difficult for the
public to understand climate change. Already the time dimension causes problems
in doing so. A single hot summer day does not prove climate change, a persistent
increase in average temperature however does, although 2 degrees Celsius might
sound little (Nordhaus, 2007). Secondly, climate change is delocalized, meaning
that the polluters are not necessarily those directly affected. Atoll countries, for
example, despite little domestic emissions suffer from a declining habitat due to
climate change (Barnett and Adger, 2003b), whereas the effects on industrialized
countries emitting a multiple of greenhouse gases are less immediate and therefore
less obvious to the public. This makes it difficult for the broad public to discern the
injured from the injuring party. So it thirdly is little surprising that the awareness
of having to act against climate change is little pronounced in the public eye
(Hamilton et al., 2018; Marquart-Pyatt, 2012, 2008, 2007). The public reacts if
it can “see” or “feel” the obvious consequences of a pressing problem. It seems
that only after some natural disaster (i.e., hurricanes or heatwaves) the public
becomes aware of the possible dangerous consequences of climate change. As it
has been observed in previous studies, people search the Internet for keywords
such as “climate change” or “global warming” (Herrnstadt and Muehlegger, 2014).
This phenomenon is even more obvious in the case of nuclear energy produc-
tion. The danger of nuclear technology has been known ever since its discovery.
Exposure to nuclear radiations can lead to environmental distraction (Alexakhin
et al., 2006), food insecurities (Fesenko et al., 2007) as well as health complications
(Yasumura et al., 2013; Havenaar, 1996). On the other hand, energy produced by
nuclear technology is stable and relatively low in price. Therefore, public aware-
ness and beliefs about possible consequences are heterogeneous across countries
and fluctuating over time (Millner and Ollivier, 2016; Pajo, 2015). For instance,
Bisconti (2018) analysed long-term public opinion data and concluded that the
larger portion of the US public takes a neutral position concerning nuclear energy.
For example, 64% of the population neither strongly favor nor oppose nuclear
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energy. However, changes in public opinion can be observed as an immediate
consequence of sudden nuclear accidents, where generic support for nuclear en-
ergy decreases. Such decrease in support was reported in a cross-country public
opinion survey (WIN-Gallup). In April 2011, after the accident of Fukushima, an
average of 8% loss in nuclear energy support was measured in 47 countries (Bis-
conti, 2018). Taking this into consideration, it is plausible that accidents would
raise public concern and, in turn, result in changes on the political level as a search
for alternative solutions.
Hence, an unexpected crisis, such as nuclear accidents, can help accelerate the
political process. Policies previously excluded from the political agenda, suddenly
are brought back and appear enforceable. According to the policy literature (Birk-
land, 1998), these events become so-called“focusing events”. They make citizens as
well as politicians alert to the risks of nuclear power production or climate change.
In the aftermath of the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Germany took drastic de-
cisions concerning the phase-out of nuclear energy. As a response to decreasing
public support for nuclear power, the government decided to shut down seven re-
actors temporarily and to accelerate the phase-out of nuclear energy production .
Similar reactions took place in other countries, where governments rethought their
energy production strategy and decided to withdraw from nuclear power produc-
tion. For instance, Switzerland voted for a phase-out by 2034 (Glaser, 2011). In
Japan, after the Fukushima accidents, the government shifted its energy consump-
tion to fossil fuels resources (Taghizadeh-Hesary et al., 2017).
The main interest in policy research is to investigate the challenges of their im-
plementation or ex-post – the evaluation of policy effectiveness (Gerhartz-Muro
et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2015; Hoppe et al., 2014). Scholars investigate the chal-
lenges when implementing policy measures (Beveridge and Kern, 2013), however,
the vast majority of studies address policy effectiveness questions. To wit, whe-
ther policies positively affect green innovation (Nesta et al., 2014; Johnstone et al.,
2010b; Popp, 2002; Jaffe et al., 2003), the potential of policies to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions (Fischer and Newell, 2008), or whether they contribute to eco-
nomic growth (Kozluk and Zipperer, 2015; Lund, 2009).
To our knowledge, there is little work on the possible determinants triggering
respective green policies. We raise the question if external shocks can work as
incentives for decision makers to pass new renewable energy policies. In other
words, we ask whether these accidents function as a catalyst, i. e. as a focusing
event (Kozluk and Zipperer, 2015; Nohrstedt, 2005) for policy making. The strand
of literature, to which we intend to contribute, is the so-called Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) as put forward by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994). This
concept offers a general frame explaining the basic mechanisms of shifts in pol-
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icy making.1 As, for instance, Nohrstedt (2005) points out, the ACF links the
momentum of external shocks (i.e. nuclear accidents) to the consequential pol-
icy initiatives arising from it. Complementary to the abundance of micro studies
in the literature, we add a quantitative cross-country comparison quantifying the
results of a crisis to policy change on the theoretical grounds of the ACF.
The data we use is gathered from various data sources. From the International
Energy Agency, we collected about 60 different supply and demand side policies
in renewable energy of 34 OECD countries.2 For identifying nuclear accidents
as possible focusing events triggering new renewable energy policies, we perform
several regression models such as ordinary least square regressions, followed by
count data models; to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects, we per-
form dynamic heterogeneous panel model (DHPM) estimation. Thus we retrieve
a proxy for the fade-out time of shocks. The proxy will be implemented in further
robustness checks. Additionally, several controls are included in the models, such
as energy prices, power production capacities as well as shares of renewable energy
production.
The results suggest a significantly positive effect of nuclear disasters on the
enactment of renewable energy policies. The shock, according to our calculations,
fades out after about seven years, indicating that the “window of opportunity” for
policy makers lasts about seven years. Finally, evidence for an increase in R & D
as well as diffusion policies after both Fukushima and Ibaraki are found; however,
no effect was found for either of the policies after Chernobyl.
We may conclude that severe external shocks, such as nuclear accidents, redirect
policy makers’ attention. Such shocks function as “focusing events” which finally
have policy makers reconsider their policy agenda. They are catalytic moments
that help (political) actors form coalitions to eventually bring about policy change
and introduce supportive policies such as policies promoting renewable energy
technologies.
Moreover, as longing for further external shocks cannot be a serious policy im-
plication, it remains to pose the question whether there is a comparably effective
policy momentum to create the same effect as external shocks. This question,
however, cannot and is not to be answer with this research setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as in the following. In Section (4.2), we discuss
the concept of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and our adaptation of
the ACF for empirical testing. Section (4.3.1) delivers descriptive statistics, lays
out our general empirical approach, and discusses the econometric specification
1 See also Schlager (1995); Sotirov and Memmler (2012); Sabatier (1998, 1987); Henry et al.
(2014); Kübler (2001); John (2003).
2The data have also been used in studies by Nesta et al. (2014); Johnstone et al. (2010a);
Popp (2002); Fischer and Newell (2008).
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of models. Results are presented in Section (4.4) including robustness checks,
endogeneity issues and the differentiation between long- and short-run effects. A
discussion and conclusion round off the paper in Section (5.5).
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Crises, Focusing Events, and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)
Nuclear accidents mark moments of crisis, they manifest “... a combination of
severe threats, high uncertainty, and the need for urgent decision making” (Mc-
Connell, 2008, p. 557).3 In policy change literature, crises are often considered
as “focusing events”. Birkland (1997) distinguishes three categories: (1) normal
events which can be expected to happen but are unpredictable such as earthquakes,
hurricanes, or nuclear disasters; (2) new events which refer to unprecedented events
as induced by technological change, or the usage of new products; and (3) common
events under uncommon circumstances. This type of events refers to events which
occur on a fairly regular basis, but cannot be predicted where and when it hap-
pens. School shootings would be one those examples (Birkland and Warnement,
2013).
With respect to policy making, the bigger the accident, the more attention is
paid to the underlying political issue. Nuclear disasters, although labelled normal
event, are major events and unpredictable. Once an accident occurs, as Nohrst-
edt and Weible (2010) point out, the emerging crisis becomes a focusing event,
which has political actors focus on the issue and become aware of the potential
consequences of such accident. This moment opens up an opportunity to come to
a democratic consensus and make a change. Therefore, such events are frequently
considered causal drivers for major or non-incremental policy changes.
The underlying mechanism how such kind of events lead to policy change can be
described with the so-called Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as suggested
by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999). It is a general framework explaining the
basic mechanism how shifts in policy making occur, while linking the momentum
of crisis to the consequential policy initiatives arising from it (Nohrstedt, 2005).
Figure (4.1) sketches the basic concept in a simplified version. According to
Sabatier and Weible (2014, p. 191), (1) policy making takes place among spe-
3There are many terms in the literature which relate to the concept of“crisis.” These concepts
refer to different situations in academic discourse, however, they are clearly related (Boin and
’T Hart, 2007). They can be defined as a situation of large-scale public dissatisfaction, where
communities perceive an urgent threat to core values of life or even fear stemming from an unusual
degree of social unrest or economic problems or even threats to national security (Keeler (1993);
Flanagan (1973); Rosenthal et al. (2001)). Both crises and disasters deal with events that belong
in the “un-ness” category: unexpected, undesirable and often unmanageable situations Hewitt
(1983).
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cialists (macro perspective) who are influenced by many factors of the political as
well as the socio-economic system; (2) actors decide within lines of certain political
and social context, even if once taken decisions may not necessarily be perfectly
rational (micro perspective)4 and (3) actors need to form advocacy coalitions in
order to have a say in the political process (meso perspective).5 As a consequence,
subgroups emerge which share common expertise, interests, and beliefs. It is the
coalitions that take influence on the decision-making process within a given polit-
ical subsystem, which eventually results in the specific design of the institutional
frame or the (re-)distribution of resource.6
RELATIVELY STABLE 
(SYSTEM) PARAMETERS
EXTERNAL (SYSTEM)
EVENTS
LONG-TERM COALITION 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
SHORT-TERM CONSTRAINTS 
AND RESOURCES OF SUBSYSTEM 
ACTORS
POLITICAL SUBSYSTEM
COALITION A COALITION B
STRATEGY  STRATEGY
GOVERNMENT DECISIONS
POLICIES
INSTITUTIONAL FRAME
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
IMPACT OF POLICIES
Source: Adapted from Sabatier and Weible (2014)
Figure 4.1 Advocacy Coalition Framework
The emergence and the development of political subsystems are determined by
the opportunity structure constituted by actors, subgroups, and the prevailing
participation pattern. The more diverse beliefs or attitudes, the more difficult to
form coalitions. Some coalitions may remain uninfluential because of their (short-
term) resource constraints, or they may simply lack the funds to make themselves
be heard in the political process.
Whether a policy change is actually initiated or not, depends on various fac-
tors. The political proximity as well as the geographic proximity play a decisive
role (Keeler, 1993; Flanagan, 1973; Rosenthal et al., 2001). The closer political
4This micro concept is taken from social psychology and is in contrast to rational choice theory.
The concept refrains from the orthodox economic approach of methodological individualism.
Decision making is not performed in isolation as if actors behave purely rationally. Conversely,
the ACF follows the normative grounds of March and Olsen (1996), who argue that decisions are
made in accordance with the “logic of appropriateness” and the “logic of consequences”; decision
makers follow rules and intend to maximize good consequences. Compare Sabatier and Weible
(2014, p. 194). This also explains the inertia in the political system; it is not sufficient when
individuals change their mind. It needs the majority of a group to come to new beliefs and
convictions. Only if the majority shares new common attitudes, beliefs, or interests, a change in
the coalition’s strategy can occur.
5With regard to an endogenous concept of change, rule-based behavior, and meso economics,
see also Dopfer and Potts (2008), Dopfer (2004), and Dopfer et al. (2004), respectively.
6It shall be stressed that coalitions are not confined to political parties rather than any kind
of participant in the political process such as interest group leaders, journalist, or researchers.
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parties’ proximity, the simpler a consensus to achieve. The more geographically
concentrated the point of interest, the less difficult the opinion-forming process.
Also, the political system itself may represent an inhibiting factor, since the inert
institutional setting of a political system, may create a “... policy equilibrium,
that cannot be changed from within.” (Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010, p. 3). Hence,
an external shock can help destruct the political equilibrium and initiate a pol-
icy change (Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010). Whether the effect of a crisis is long
lasting or not, depends on the severity of the crisis: the bigger the cause, the
bigger the impact (Keeler, 1993; Flanagan, 1973; Rosenthal et al., 2001). But it is
also conceivable that small events have a large and enduring political consequence
(Pierson, 2000). Further complexity is added by the fact that not all system pa-
rameters are stable over time. Some are rather stable, such as the constitutional
structure, the social structure, or the socio-cultural values within society, oth-
ers may change substantially, such as the public opinion or the socio-economic
conditions. The wholistic approach of the Advocacy Coaltion Framework (ACF)
captures all these factors that take impact on the participating subsystems within
the political decision-making process.
4.2.2 A Simplified ACF for Empirical Testing
For the purpose of this paper, we will not elaborate any further on the ACF
as such. Instead, we intend to use the concept to describe the country-specific
context in which external shocks, i. e. nuclear disasters, may have an impact
on the political process. To date, most empirical studies focus on case studies.7
Instead, we want to perform a quantitative study evaluating the impact of external
shocks on political activity in 34 OECD countries. For this reason, the ACF has to
be simplified even further. The perspective of case studies using the ACF model
are quite detailed and differentiate many micro-level parameters which cannot be
identified when it comes to country comparisons. To our knowledge, there is no
available data set, which would contain all required variables for a detailed descrip-
tion of the underlying mechanisms.8 As we deal with annual data, we concentrate
on system elements trackable on a yearly basis.
On these grounds, we reduce the ACF to an even simpler representation in Figure
(4.2). Three building blocks remain in our version of the ACF. The (1) Relatively
Stable Parameters, as in the original version, reflect the substratum of the Long-
term Coalition Opportunity Structure, with which we will proxy the persistence
7Compare appendix in Sabatier and Weible (2014) for further information.
8Not only would we need to identify possible proxies for each element, including their inter-
dependencies, we would also need to have data of higher frequency, since many changes in the
political process may occur within days, weeks, or months.
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Figure 4.2 Simplified Advocacy Coalition Framework
of the political system of a country, (2) the representation of the country-specific
political subsystem, labelled Current Political Balance of Power, which is held
responsible for decisions made on policy measures, and (3) the resource constraints
referring to a country’s temporary socio-economic context in which policy making
occurs.9
Based on the country-specific ACF, we can now look at the effects external
shocks have on political activity. Nuclear disasters are major events with great
impact on the policy due to their gravity and breadth, as they affect political,
environmental, and societal levels. The nuclear events in the last decades, which
represent severe external shocks, are the accidents in Chernobyl, Ibraraki, and
Fukushima. Their severity can be measured by the International Nuclear Event
Scale (INES) introduced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
1990. The classification ranges from 0 to 7, where 0 means that a nuclear incident
has no significant effects on safety and 7 reflects an accident with a “major release
of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring
implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.” (IAEA, 2016, p. 3).
The accident in Chernobyl in 1986 was rated 7, the accident in the year 1999
in Ibaraki rated 4, and the Fukushima accident 7.10 In other words, these three
accidents can be considered as focusing events, with the potential to trigger a
9This is quite different from the understanding of short-term resource constraints in the
original ACF. In the latter, the constraints relate to the actors of political subgroups. Since this
micro-level information is not available across all countries, we interpret resource constraints as
the constraints given by a country’s economic context.
10According to the INES scale, an incident rated 4 or above is considered a severe accident
(IAEA, 2016).
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policy change. It is expected that they open up an opportunity to bring renewable
energy back on the policy agenda and that they not only gain increased attention
but turn into actual measures. This is what Baumgartner and Jones (1991) point
out: after disasters the agenda experiences a rapid growth, which in the case of
nuclear accidents should accordingly translate into an increase in renewable energy
policies. Nohrstedt (2008, 2005) investigating the impact of nuclear accidents on
nuclear energy policies provide corresponding evidence for the Swedish case. This
leads us to the hypothesis that, along the lines of our simplified ACF, the focusing
event of a nuclear accident should eventually lead the political system to increase
green energy initiatives.
Though a crisis may be a “little push” to catch public attention (Jenkins-Smith
and Sabatier, 1994; Kingdon, 2003), an event on its own does not make pol-
icy change. Event attributes, as Birkland (1997) and Birkland and Warnement
(2013) argue, are important in policy change, the crucial element, however, is the
“polictical climate”. An event-driven policy change takes place, when problems
are matched with feasible solutions together with political concordance (Kingdon,
2003). He refers to this moment as a “window of opportunity”. Likewise, Za-
hariadis (2014) argues that policy windows are a result of problems, i.e crises.
Also, windows of opportunity do not open eternally. It depends on the severity
of a crisis and the size of a mandate (Keeler, 1993). Therefore, we will also test
the hypothesis, whether a timely limit in the “windows of opportunity” can be
detected.
Last not least, the historicity of events needs to be considered. A policy change
toward green technologies requires the existence of feasible technologies. Without
available innovations/inventions, their diffusion is impossible. Nowadays, renew-
able energy technologies are far more advanced than at the time of the nuclear
accident in Chernobyl. This implies that also the kind of policies should have
changed over time. While policies supporting research and development should
have been prevalent in the 1980’s, diffusion-oriented policies should have gradu-
ally become more important over the years. This hypothesis we also test in this
paper.
4.3 Empirical Protocol
In this section, we describe our econometric protocol and the data with which
we proxy the building blocks of our simplified ACF above. We test the effect of
external shocks, i. e. nuclear disasters, on political activity in countries. For that,
we perform panel data regressions such as two-way fixed effects, pre-sample mean,
and count data regressions. Moreover, a heterogeneous dynamic panel regression
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shall help identify the time of shocks to fade out. This information will be used
as a proxy for the timely limit of the windows of opportunity with which we will
recalculate previous panel regressions. In addition, the distinction between types
of policies will shed light on the change in policy making over time, as diffusion-
oriented policies should gain importance while the role of R & D-oriented policies
should decline.
4.3.1 Data
The data we collected is an unbalanced panel data set of 34 OECD countries from
1980 to 2015. Thereof, the information about renewable energy policies (REP)
stems from the International Energy Agency (IEA). The data on the Relatively
Stable Parameters we took from Scartascini et al. (2018). Economic indicators
to proxy Resource Constraints were retrieved from the OECD database. Energy
prices and further information about countries’ energy production system also
come from the IEA.
As dependent variable throughout all regressions, we use the number of renew-
able energy policies in force during a given year. As in Johnstone et al. (2010a);
Nesta et al. (2014), and Dasgupta et al. (2001), we build a policy index by counting
the number of effective renewable energy policies by country, see Figure 4.3. The
time span of effectiveness can be derived from the reported information about the
year of adoption and expiration of the renewable energy policy. The aggregated
index covers all available types of renewable energy policies.11 The drawback of
this variable is that it does not compare on a cardinal basis, nor does it provide
any information about the actual scope of a policy. In addition, the aggregation
across different types of renewable energy policies in a single index incurs a loss of
information in terms of policy-specific individual effects (Johnstone et al., 2010a).
Nevertheless, it allows us to track the activity level of policy makers.
Whether natural disasters matter, certainly depends on their magnitude. The
extent of nuclear disasters is classified according to the International Nuclear Event
Scale (INES) introduced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
1990.12 The classification ranges from 0 to 7, where 0 means that a nuclear incident
has no significant effects on safety and 7 reflects an accident with a“[m]ajor release
of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring
implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.”(International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2008, p. 3).
Concerning the three accidents we chose for our analysis, they all are considered
11The IEA also reports different kinds of policies such as policies considered economic instru-
ments, regulatory instruments, policy support and information and education.
12See International Atomic Energy Agency (2008).
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Figure 4.3 Accumulated Renewable energy policies Index. Vertical lines indicate
the nuclear accidents. Source: own calculations from IEA data.
major accidents with an INES level of at least 4. The accident in Chernobyl in 1986
was rated 7, the accident in the year 1999 in Ibaraki Tokaimura rated 4, and the
Fukushima accident 7. In other words, these three accidents can be considered
as focusing events, which eventually may impact the political decision-making
process.
ACF model parameters:
To proxy the Relatively Stable Parameters of the ACF, we select the variable Es-
tablished Democracies from the Database of Political Institutions 2017 (Scartascini
et al., 2018). It counts the number of years when a country has been democratic.
In the case of countries that have been democratic even before 1980, this variable
represents a monotonously increasing line with slope one.
A further indicator of this database that we use, is the variable Autonomous
Region. This variable indicates, whether a region can make autonomous decisions
independently from some other institutional authority. If a region is independent,
it can pass its own legislation without the need to be granted a permission from
some other authority. This in turn should enable regions to be more active and
pass more green policies in the aftermath to nuclear disasters.
As a control for the Current Political Coalition, we use the variable Party orien-
tation from the same database. It indicates the political orientation for the formed
coalition. It assigns value (1) for right-wing, (2) for center, (3) for left-wing.
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The variable Resource Constraints is proxied by several variables to control for
the economic context and the scope for initiating renewable policies in countries.
Control variables:
Energy price: shrinking fossil fuel sources will increase energy prices. This, in
turn, should also increase the incentive to search for alternatives and therefore
foster policies supporting renewable energy production. Data on end-user elec-
tricity prices in both residential and industrial sectors were collected from the
IEA database. The calculated price index was constructed by averaging the price
indices for both sectors, similar to Johnstone et al. (2010b) or Nesta et al. (2014).
Whether countries have the scope to invest in new technologies, also depends
on available funds in countries. The GDP per capita will, therefore, serve as a
further control for a country’s resource constraints.
To control for the structure of the energy production system, we will also use
the total installed capacity in energy production, the amount of energy produced
by renewables as well as the share of renewables in total primary energy supply.
All the variables, except for the shocks and the ACF parameters are logged.13 For
robustness checks, however we will be using both forms of the dependent variables
(absolute and logged values).
Table (4.1) collects the summary statistics of variables and additional correlation
table can be found in appendix (table A.6).
Name Unit Obs Mean Std dev Min. Max.
REPs number 1224 1.475 1.281 0 4.625
GDP p. c. Billion US$ (2005) 1152 10.22 0.443 8.535 11.42
Total Capacity Installed MW 1220 9.856 2.504 0 14.87
Renewables gen. KTOE 1204 8.004 1.755 1.269 11.94
Share of Renew-
ables
% of total supply 1204 13.05 15.59 0.0100 89.75
Energy price US$ per unit (2005) 1130 4.630 0.529 0 5.763
Established
Democratic
number 1175 43.57 26.41 1 85
Autonomous
Region
Dummy 1175 0.254 0.435 0 1
Party orienta-
tion
Indicator 1063 1.898 0.920 1 3
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics (time span: 1980-2015)
13This transformation smooths the skewness of the data and brings it closer to a normal
distribution. It also reduces the influence of exterme values, i. e. possible outliers. Moreover,
the estimated coefficients of the so-called log-log-model offer a convenient way for interpretation,
as they represent changes measured in elasticities.
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4.3.2 Econometric Specification
To test whether nuclear shocks positively correlate with political activity, accord-
ing to the stylized ACF in Figure (4.2), we state the following basic econometric
specification:
REPi t = β0+ν
′N i t +ρ
′R i t +φ
′S i t +ψ
′P i t + yt +µi + εi t (4.1)
with i = 1, 2, .., n as number of countries, t = 1, 2, .., T as time span, and REPi t
as dependent variable. A constant term is assumed with β0. The nuclear disaster
dummies are summarized in vector N i t with the associated coefficient vector ν.
The controls referring to the ACF are contained in the following vectors: R i t for
Resource Constraints with R i t = {GPD p.c., Total Capacity, Renewables gen., En-
ergy price}, S i t for Relatively Stable Parameters with S i t = {Established Democ-
racies, Autonomous Region}, and P i t for Current Political Balance of Powers
with P i t = {Party orientation}; the associated coefficients are ν, ρ, and φ, respec-
tively. For two-way fixed effect models, yt and µi denote the time and country
fixed effects, respectively.
4.3.3 Procedure
In a first step, we run linear panel regression models on the pooled sample. Be-
forehand, we perform several unit-root and cointegration tests. Since the panel
as a whole is unbalanced, we draw on the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test
(see appendix A.3).14 The null hypothesis of the panel containing a unit root can
be rejected with a p-value of 0.0054. For cointegration, we run the Kao test and
the Pedroni residual cointegration test (see appendix tables A.4 and A.5), which
we performed using STATA 15.
The analysis begins with LSDV models, table 4.2, presented in equation 5.1.
These models are applied to test the first hypothesis, whether nuclear accidents
exert a positive impact on the number of adopted renewable energy policies, in the
aftermath of a nuclear accident. To check the robustness of the results, additional
pre-sample mean and binomial regression models are added, presented in tables
4.2 and 4.3. Then, to calculate the effectiveness of the“window of opportunity”, we
apply a Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Model presented in table 4.4. In table 4.6,
we split the policies into R & D and diffusion policies to test our third hypothesis,
whether we can observe a change in the type of policy measures. We expect
that at the beginning of the period under consideration R & D supporting policy
14In addition, as the dependent variable has no missing values, we add table A.2 in the ap-
pendix with additional unit-root tests for robustness.
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measures should prevail, whereas in later time, diffusion-oriented policy should
gain importance.
4.4 Results
Table (4.2) shows the first five models. Using logged values in regression allows us
to interpret estimated coefficients as elasticities.15 So we take logs of the dependent
variable REP (renewable energy policies). In later models, we use unlogged values
when we turn to count data models, since the dependent variable REP is countable.
Model (1) in table (4.2) regresses REP on the three dummy variables: Cher-
nobyl, Ibaraki, and Fukushima, which represent the starting point of the periods
after the respective nuclear disaster. Simultaneously, we included panel fixed ef-
fects (FE) to account for unobserved heterogeneity.16 After the accident in Cher-
nobyl in 1986, the average number of effective renewable energy policies increases
significantly, which is also the case for the accidents of Ibaraki and Fukushima.
Adding resource constraints, i. e. GDP p.c, Total Capacity, Renewables gen., and
Energy price as controls in model (2) leaves the significance of the coefficients of
the nuclear disaster dummies unchanged, except for the Chernobyl dummy. Con-
cerning the controls, the coefficient of GDP p.c. is significant and positive as to be
expected. Countries with a higher per capita income should also have the financial
capacity to induce a costly green policy change and pass more renewable energy
policies. They might be less financially constraint.17 Total Capacity takes a signif-
icantly negative coefficient. If the share in renewable energy production increases,
so does the number of renewable energy policies. The control Energy price refers to
the standard textbook argument that increasing prices simultaneously increase the
attractiveness to invest in new technologies – a relationship that governments try
to exploit through passing supportive policy measures. Alternatively, model (3)
includes the stable system parameters Established Democracies and Autonomous
Region as well as the Balance of Powers indicator variable Party orientation. The
coefficient for Established Democracies is positive and significant, indicating that
the longer a country has experienced democracy, the more active it is in renewable
policy making. The autonomy of a country also plays a positive role in renewable
15 See also footnote 12 for further advantages of logging variables.
16The Hausmann tests suggests to use a fixed-effect model.
17 GDP p. c. is a blurred proxy for financial constraints of and within a country. In regard to
the adoption of green energy technologies, however, access to financial funds is crucial. Because
of the risks involved in renewable energy projects and the uncertainty of their returns, as argued
by Taghizadeh-Hesary and Yoshino (2019), Yoshino et al. (2019), or Taghizadeh-Hesary et al.
(2017), the actual adoption of those technologies hinges on these institutional settings, which,
unfortunately, we could not capture in our regressions, because of the lack of a control variable
available for all countries.
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energy policies. If countries reflect an Autonomous Region in their policy making,
they pass more policy initiatives in renewable energy.
Combining the two groups of constraints, resource (model 2) and political (model
3), introduces high multicollinearity, rendering the estimation inefficient, though
consistent. Model (4) reports the respective results;18 additionally, year fixed ef-
fects are included. Aside from Chernobyl also Fukushima loses its significance.
Only Ibrahaki remains significant. Model (5) replicates the previous model. In-
stead of the fixed-effects estimator, we use a pre-sample mean (PSM) approach.19
With all controls included, Ibaraki and Fukushima remain significant and positive.
In the next step, we concentrate on the fact that the dependent variable REP
is count data. Table (4.3) reports three count data models. Because of overdis-
persion, we use negative binomial regression instead of Poisson regression.20 In
all models, the resource constraint variables take the same sign as in the previous
models and they are significant. In model (7), we alternatively use the share of
renewable energy production instead of the absolute amount of production as in
the remaining models.21 All coefficients of the system parameters which remain
significant also keep their sign. The Balance of Powers coefficients for left-wing
coalitions are throughout positive (Party orientation=L).22 This suggests a positive
effect of a left-wing coalition in governments passing significantly more renewable
energy policies than other constellations.
Models (6) to (8) uses the standard fixed-effects estimator of Hausman et al.
(1984), model (8) applies the pre-sample mean (PSM) estimator by Blundell et al.
(2002) and uses information before the actual years of investigation; in our case,
the pre-sample mean is calculated from the years 1975 to 1979.23 As the PSM
coefficient in model (8) shows, there is significant unobserved heterogeneity across
countries. Moreover, models (7) and (8) include year fixed effects.24 The coefficient
of Autonomous Regions becomes significant in all three models. Concerning Party
orientation, left-wing parties seem to pass more green energy policies than the
remaining ones. The coefficients of main interest, i.e. the coefficients of the nuclear
shocks remain always positive and significant except for Fukushima.
18 The variance inflation factors of Chernobly and Ibaraki are far beyond 10.
19The advantage of the PSM estimator is that the loss of information is less compared to the
Hausman et al. (1984) fixed-effect estimator, which simply demeans all variables wiping out a
major part of level effects. In addition, the PSM estimator has better finite sample properties
(Nesta et al., 2014).
20 An LR-test rejects the null of a unique parameter λ for the first two moments.
21 Due to multicollinearity, we did not include both variables simultaneously into regressions.
22For ease of reading, we recoded the variable Party orientation as in the following: left wing
(=L), right wing (=R) and center (=C).
23In contrast to the remaining variables, the policy measure variable (Rep) contains a longer
time span, starting in 1975. This allows calculating a pre-sample mean without loss of informa-
tion.
24The inclusion of years dummies takes away the significance of some of the control variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES FE FE FE LSDV PSM
Chernobyl 0.399*** 0.116 0.109 0.110 0.094
(0.075) (0.109) (0.165) (0.189) (0.093)
Ibaraki 1.609*** 1.070*** 1.091*** 1.225*** 1.035***
(0.108) (0.151) (0.236) (0.159) (0.137)
Fukushima 0.728*** 0.356*** 0.356** -0.135 0.269***
(0.068) (0.083) (0.155) (0.126) (0.084)
GDP p.c. (in logs) 1.346*** 0.291 0.574**
(0.430) (0.183) (0.274)
Total Capacity Mw -0.112*** -0.043** -0.058**
(0.032) (0.019) (0.027)
Renewables gen. (in KTOE) 0.205* 0.051 0.165**
(0.115) (0.038) (0.069)
Energy price (in logs) 0.525*** 0.223*** 0.542***
(0.159) (0.072) (0.152)
Established Democratic 0.045** 0.038*** 0.020***
(0.018) (0.008) (0.005)
Autonomous Region 0.221 0.131 0.150
(0.281) (0.104) (0.172)
Party orientation = C -0.069 -0.031 -0.024
(0.079) (0.065) (0.055)
Party orientation = L -0.034 0.031 0.017
(0.063) (0.037) (0.069)
Pre-sample Mean 0.468
(0.335)
Constant 0.282*** -15.834*** -1.169** -4.591*** -9.145***
(0.077) (3.517) (0.547) (1.692) (2.509)
Observations 1,224 1,057 1,063 955 955
R-squared 0.773 0.821 0.800 0.857
R2 adj. 0.772 0.820 0.799 0.845
Number of ctry 34 33 33 32 32
Year dummies no no no yes no
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes no
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include robust standard errors.
Table 4.2 Linear regression models. Dep. variable: ln(REP)
One of the caveats in the regressions above is the treatment of the nuclear dis-
aster dummies. Before the disaster, the respective dummy is 0, after the accident
it remains 1 till the end of the observed time span. One may argue that the effect
of a nuclear disaster opening up a window of opportunity for a policy change is
not lasting eternally, but fades out after some time. The length of effectiveness
of a shock, we identify via Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models (DHPM). The
technical description can be consulted in appendix A.1. This technique is based on
an autoregressive distributed lag model, it includes an error correction, and allows
addressing endogeneity issues. In a nutshell, it estimates a long-run dynamic to
which the system returns after an exogenous shock, and additionally, it estimates
short-run effects.
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Dep. variable: REP
(6) (7) (8)
NBREG NBREG NBREG
Chernobyl 0.540*** 0.565*** 0.453***
(0.141) (0.141) (0.119)
Ibaraki 1.140*** 1.131*** 0.958***
(0.080) (0.083) (0.074)
Fukushima 0.035 0.023 -0.015
(0.050) (0.051) (0.048)
GDP p.c. (in logs) 1.075*** 1.117*** 1.243***
(0.261) (0.264) (0.269)
Total Capacity (in Mw) -0.110*** -0.088*** -0.098***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.030)
Renewables gen. (in KTOE) 0.144*** 0.064
(0.049) (0.044)
Gen. share of Renewables (in %) 0.014*
(0.007)
Energy price (in logs) 1.055*** 1.074*** 1.163***
(0.093) (0.092) (0.098)
Established Democracy 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Autonomous Region 0.341** 0.446*** 0.263*
(0.167) (0.160) (0.150)
Party orientation = C 0.062 0.058 0.017
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078)
Party orientation = L 0.075** 0.077** 0.088***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.031)
REP psm 2.707**
(1.143)
Constant -15.985*** -15.666*** -18.099***
(2.415) (2.431) (2.451)
Observations 955 955 955
Number of ctry 32 32 32
Fixed effects yes yes yes
LL -1953 -1955 -1944
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.3 Count data regressions
In models (9) to (11) in table (4.4), we report three dynamic heterogeneous
panel models. As the Hausmann test suggests, we apply dynamic fixed-effects es-
timation. The long-run variables contain the same variables as in previous models
except for Established Democracies, because all three models calculate a long-run
trend with which the variable Established Democracies is in conflict due to multi-
collinearity. For the short-run, we include nuclear shock dummies, although in an
aggregated manner by adding up all three dummy variables. Because the short-
term variables are differenced in this error-correction model, dummy variables were
infeasible, therefore we aggregated the three accidents and built a single variable
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Dep. variable: ln(Rep)
VARIABLES (9) (10) (11)
L
o
n
g
ru
n
Chernobyl -0.166 -0.367 -0.331
(0.253) (0.281) (0.250)
Ibaraki 0.702*** 0.462* 0.553*
(0.222) (0.261) (0.303)
Fukushima 2.283*** 1.858*** 1.502***
(0.323) (0.303) (0.244)
GDP p.c. (in logs) 1.456** 1.381
(0.729) (0.961)
Total Capacity Mw -0.084 -0.070
(0.082) (0.070)
Renewables gen. (in KTOE) 0.176 0.195
(0.182) (0.139)
Energy price (in logs) 0.470
(0.342)
Autonomous Region -0.172
(0.274)
Party orientation -0.093
(0.084)
S
h
o
rt
ru
n
EC 0.097*** 0.117*** 0.141***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.021)
Nuc accidents 0.127*** 0.132*** 0.144***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.042)
Gen. share of Renewables (in %), -0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant -0.029 1.717** 2.257*
(0.020) (0.797) (1.207)
Observations 1224 1104 955
Number of countries 34 34 32
R2 adj. 0.262 0.275 0.282
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.4 Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel regressions
collecting the three accidents.25 The long-run coefficients indicate a persistently
positive and significant effect on the number of renewable policies only for Ibaraki
and Fukushima. The short-run analysis, illustrated in the lower part of this table,
also suggests significantly positive effects of nuclear disasters on renewable energy
policies. Equivalently, nuclear disasters correlate in the short run positively with
the number of renewable energy policies.
The statistic of this table, in which we are particularly interested, is the so-
called error correction term (EC). The EC coefficient is significant and ranges from
0.097 to 0.14. This indicates that serial correlation is present in our data. Unless
we correct for serial correlation, this leads to inconsistent estimates. Since the
EC coefficient reports the required error correction, its interpretation is straight
25Including further variables in the short-run part of the models prevents models to converge.
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forward. It denotes the persistence of shocks. After a shock, the system returns
to the long-run equilibrium after about 1/0.141= 7 years. In other words, a shock
such as a nuclear disaster, which increases political activity, fades out after about
7 years. This result can be interpreted as the length of the window of opportunity.
These results we use for a further robustness check. Again, we rerun the pre-
ferred models form above while changing the nuclear accident dummy variables to
windows. That is, before the accident the dummy remains 0, after the accident it
takes the value 1 for 7 years to finally return to 0. The results are presented in Ta-
ble 4.5. The treatment of the nuclear accident dummies also allows us to include
year dummies, because multicollinearity becomes less prevalent. Hence, model
(12) reports the results of a two-way fixed-effects model with a 7-year window for
each nuclear accident dummies. All three dummies are positive and significant,
which supports the hypothesis that more renewable energy policies are passed after
a nuclear accident.
In model (13), we include all control variables, which makes the Chernobyl
dummy lose significance. Taking the count data quality of the dependent variable
into account, as done in model (14), Chernobyl remains insignificant, whereas the
Ibaraki and Fukushima dummies are positive and significant. The control variables
keep their signs, if significant. Hence, also with a window of 7 years, which we
inferred from the dynamic heterogeneous panel regressions in table (4.4), we still
observe that nuclear accidents have a significant effect on political activity in
countries. To check for robustness, we additionally tried a 5-year (model 15) and
a 9-year (model 16) window for the nuclear shock dummies. Model 15 provides
less explanatory power comparing the R2-values between this model and model
(13). Model (16) generates the same goodness of fit as model (13), in other words,
it does not add more information. Hence, we pick model (13) as the preferred
model being in line with the PMG estimations in table (4.4).
Except for Chernobyl, the results of our regression models suggest a robust
correlation between nuclear accidents and renewable energy policies. The fact that
no significant effect, despite the severity of the nuclear accident in Chernobyl, could
be detected may have several reasons: first, the large geographical distance and the
different type of reactor used in Ukraine compared to those used in Western Europe
or in the USA (Nohrstedt, 2008). Second, it could be the restricted technological
opportunities in 1986. Renewable energies could not be introduced as a solution,
after the accident, owing to their immaturity level at the time and the fact that
they could not maintain a stable and sufficient energy supply (Trainer, 1995).
Taking the historicity of technical change into account, we now test, whether the
type of policy changes over time. As argued above, while technological opportu-
nities, in terms of green technologies, were limited in the 1980’s, it seems straight
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Dep. variable: ln(REP) for LSDV and REP for NBREG
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
VARIABLES LSDV LSDV NBREG LSDV LSDV
Chernobyl 0.333*** -0.152 0.375 -0.165 -0.049
(0.116) (0.162) (0.363) (0.173) (0.199)
Ibaraki 2.044*** 1.009*** 2.051*** 0.877*** 1.074***
(0.116) (0.240) (0.352) (0.276) (0.320)
Fukushima 2.710*** 1.200*** 2.405*** 1.200*** 1.200***
(0.116) (0.309) (0.392) (0.334) (0.334)
GDP p.c. (in logs) 0.291 0.848*** 0.291 0.291
(0.183) (0.266) (0.419) (0.419)
Total Capacity Mw -0.043** -0.111*** -0.043 0.043
(0.019) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
Renewables gen. (in KTOE) 0.051 0.093* 0.051 0.051
(0.038) (0.051) (0.113) (0.113)
Energy price (in logs) 0.223*** 0.591*** 0.223 0.223
(0.072) (0.120) (0.143) (0.143)
Established Democratic 0.038*** -0.002 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Autonomous Region 0.131 0.227 0.131 0.131
(0.104) (0.150) (0.267) (0.267)
Party orientation = C -0.031 0.071 -0.031 -0.031
(0.065) (0.072) (0.059) (0.059)
Party orientation = L 0.031 0.066* 0.031 0.031
(0.037) (0.034) (0.065) (0.065)
Constant 0.313*** -4.591*** -10.105*** -4.591 -4.591
(0.082) (1.692) (2.497) (3.759) (3.759)
Observations 1,224 955 955 955 955
R-squared 0.837 0.857 0.837 0.857
Number of ctry 34 32 32 32 32
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Window (years) 7 7 7 5 9
LL -1895
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.5 Windows size for 7 years. Additional 5 and 9 years windows are added
for robustness checks.
forward to pass R & D-oriented policies. With increasing technological progress,
diffusion-oriented policies should gain in importance. Having the opportunity to
decompose our dependent variable from being an aggregated index to single policy
types, we may shed light on the kind of policies introduced after the respective
nuclear accidents. We decompose the dependent variable (REP) into two cate-
gories: policies with an explicit focus on R & D and those designed to boost the
diffusion of renewable energy production technologies. We hypothesize that after
an early accident like Chernobyl an increase in policies supporting research and
development should occur. Conversely, we would expect that after Ibaraki and
Fukushima diffusion policies should have prevailed.
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4.4.1 R & D versus Diffusion-oriented Policies
Table (4.6) documents the results for the two types of renewable policy measures.
Model (17) and (18) regress the number of R & D-oriented policies on the nuclear
dummies and the controls, respectively. The dummy for the Chernobyl accident
is insignificant, the dummies for Ibaraki and Fukushima significantly positive in
model (17). With the controls, as used in the previous models, this does not
change. And an increase in R & D policies, to foster the development of renewable
energy technologies, can only be detected after Ibaraki and Fukushima. Note
that both models, (17) and (18) contain a full set of year and country dummies.
Moreover, the calculations were exerted with a 7-year window for the nuclear
accident dummies. The preferred model, according to a likelihood-ratio and a Wald
test, respectively, is model (18). The full model renders a statistically significant
improvement in model fit compared to the nested model (17).
Model (19) and (20) perform the same exercise using the number of diffusion-
oriented renewable energy policies. Including year and country dummies in addi-
tion to 7-year windows as nuclear accident dummies, the cross-correlation between
the nuclear accident dummies and the number of active, diffusion-oriented policies
renders all three nuclear dummies positive and significant. Hence, an increase
in diffusion-oriented policies emerged after Chernobyl. However, when including
the controls, which all have the expected signs in case they are significant, the
coefficient of the Chernobyl dummy loses its significance. We also performed post
estimation tests such as a likelihood-ratio and a Wald test: model (20) appears to
be a better fit than model (19) and the coefficients of the added control variables
are significantly different from zero, indicating that model (20) is more informa-
tive. In sum, we could not identify that R & D-oriented policies lose in importance,
while diffusion-oriented policies gain in importance.
4.5 Discussion
Overall, we observe an elevated political activity in renewable energy support
across countries after nuclear accidents. The results, however, have to be put
into perspective. In table (4.2), only model (1) and (5) pass the specification test
of an omitted variable bias, model (2), (3), and (4) do not. In addition, model
(4) suffers from high multicollinearity. Hence, model (5) is the preferred model
supporting the hypothesis that after external shocks policy activity increases – as
far as Ibaraki and Fukushima are concerned.
Using count data models (table 4.3), the Chernobyl dummy becomes significant
and the Fukushima dummy insignificant. Distinguishing between a short-run and
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(17) (18) (19) (20)
VARIABLES NBREG (R & D) NBREG (R & D) NBREG (DI) NBREG (DI)
Chernobyl 0.511 0.409 0.861*** 0.204
(0.422) (0.498) (0.261) (0.276)
Ibaraki 2.209*** 2.076*** 2.900*** 1.616***
(0.351) (0.511) (0.227) (0.274)
Fukushima 2.693*** 2.440*** 3.584*** 1.852***
(0.344) (0.559) (0.225) (0.294)
GDP p.c. (in logs) 0.045 1.166***
(0.541) (0.262)
Total Capacity Mw 0.024 -0.129***
(0.074) (0.030)
Renewables gen. (in
KTOE)
0.057 0.046
(0.107) (0.049)
Energy price (in logs) 0.346 0.814***
(0.248) (0.115)
Autonomous Region 0.234 0.434***
(0.237) (0.140)
Party orientation = C 0.325** 0.034
(0.130) (0.070)
Party orientation = L 0.109* 0.072**
(0.059) (0.031)
Constant -0.176 -2.843 0.081 -13.561***
(0.341) (5.278) (0.227) (2.552)
Observations 1,296 955 1,224 955
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Window = 7 years yes yes yes yes
LL -1141 -936.9 -2423 -1961
Standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.6 R & D and Diffusion Policies
a long-run perspective (table 4.4), the DHP-models maintain the significance of
the dummies for Ibaraki and Fukushima. As these regression models contain and
error correction, we can calculate the average time span of a “window of opportu-
nity”, which amounts to about 7 years. Taking this information into account in
previous regressions, as reported in table 4.5, the correct version in model (14) is
the preferred model. It advocates again that there is a significantly positive effect
on policy activities after the nuclear accidents in Ibaraki and Fukushima.
The only exception is the effect for Chernobyl, which is mixed. Only in a few
models, we could identify a significant correlation between the shock and policy
measures. Hence, there is no robust evidence in the case of Chernobyl. There could
be various explanations for this result. In 1979, before the starting year of our
data set, there had already been a nuclear accident on Three Mile Island, which
was rated 5 on the INES-scale (Broughton et al., 1989). Hence, the time span
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between Three Mile Island and Chernobyl are only seven years, the length of the
window of opportunity we calculated and consequently, the differential impacts of
both accidents have become unidentifiable. This is in line with Nohrstedt (2005)
arguing that some countries such as Sweden responded immediately after Three
Mile Iland by initiating renewable energy programs so that later on, policy makers
were already alert and unlikely to take additional measures as a response to the
accident in Chernobyl.
Another angle for explaining the aforementioned effect of Chernobyl disaster, is
the public “perception of need” for nuclear energy, as argued by Bisconti (2018).
In 1980s, renewable energy technologies were considered complementary energy
sources alongside nuclear energy, rather than a reliable substitution (Trainer,
1995). Therefore, the public saw a need for nuclear energy and thus the im-
pact of relevant accidents on their attitudes was low. For instance, the decline in
public acceptance for nuclear energy in the US faded out only three months after
the Chernobyl accident (Bisconti, 2018). While in the UK the level of support in
1987 was back to its initial values as before the accident (Renn, 1990; Rosa and
Dunlap, 1994). This, in turn, was translated in a lower activity on political level
(Flavin, 1987).
A further explanation could be that the index is blurred by aggregation. Re-
newable energy policies are quite diverse. Some focus on the development of new
technologies, others focus on the diffusion of renewable energy technologies. The
state of the art of renewable energy technologies was certainly different at the time
of each accident. One might expect that more R & D policies should be identifi-
able after Chernobyl. Likewise, diffusion-oriented policies should be more frequent
after Fukushima, because of the advancements in renewable energy technologies.
While there is evidence for an increase in both policy types after Fukushima and
Ibaraki, no strong empirical support was found for either of the policies after
Chernobyl. The two preferred models in table 4.6, model (18) for R & D-oriented
policies and model (20) for diffusion-oriented policies, do not provide empirical
evidence to support this hypothesis. With respect to the theoretical foundation,
the conceptual model, chosen from communication science, describes the under-
lying mechanism of policy change. The architecture of this concept consists of
several dimensions. It contains a micro, a meso, and a macro perspective to trace
individual behavior via the formation of subgroups to coalitions which finally take
influence on the political decision-making process. With the data at hand, the
empirical exercise cannot give any insights neither on the micro nor on the meso
level. We assume the aggregated elements of the system as given and thus con-
struct the context in which external shocks unfold, either leading to policy change
or not. As claimed beforehand, this paper is just a first attempt to quantify the
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most general propositions of the ACF. Certainly, it needs a more in-depth analysis
both of the theoretical as well as of the empirical perspective.
With respect to the empirical layout, a further weakness of the analysis roots in
the discrepancy between the frequency of events in the political decision-making
process and the frequency in the data. Political change is discontinuous and occurs
often within a shorter time than associated with annual data. Hence, we cannot
claim to provide evidence on the complete causal chain from nuclear accidents to
actual policy change. For this, we would require data of higher frequency (e.g.,
monthly). Thay is why most studies concentrate on case studies, because for a
country-level comparison, such kind of meticulous investigation remains tedious
(Hogan and Feeney, 2012; Nohrstedt, 2005, 2008), but should be pursued in future
research.
4.6 Conclusion
The empirical study presented here is a first step toward quantifying the effect of
external shocks, i. e. nuclear disasters, on political activity in renewable energy
policy making. As for the theoretical foundation, we use the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) which describes the process of how policy change comes along.
The ACF in nature focuses on the formation of advocacy coalitions, beliefs
and coordination within and among coalitions (Sabatier and Weible, 2014, 2007;
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). With the introduction of the policy network
approach and social network analysis (Pappi and Henning, 1998; Schneider, 1992;
Leifeld, 2013), the interest has gradually shifted from solely investigating the role
of beliefs (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994) to the analysis of coordination mech-
anisms (Ingold, 2011; Lubell et al., 2012; Leifeld, 2013). Partially, this is due to
methodological advancements such as the introduction of network analysis into
the ACF. In this work, we suggest a frequentist perspective to the ACF.
From a methodological point of view, it is not surprising that the majority of the
research work applies qualitative techniques, mostly case studies (Schlager, 1995;
Sotirov and Memmler, 2012; Sabatier, 1998, 1987; Henry et al., 2014; Kübler, 2001;
John, 2003), because of the inherent complexity of the political process. This chal-
lenge becomes even more complex, when it comes to trans-regional comparisons.
On these grounds, we tried to add a first, modest, cross-country quantitative view
on the ACF. Hence, the contribution of this paper is less in elaborating on micro
or meso aspects, which still do require a lot more of research to better under-
stand the process of policy change, but rather provide a first step in applying a
quantitative approach to compare political systems across countries based on the
main concepts of the ACF. For these reasons, we had to simplify the ACF to a
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major extent, neglecting many important determinants usually considered within
this framework.26
In doing this, we give a complementary perspective on the ACF when applying a
quantitative approach as we belief that a quantitative replenishment may facilitate
detecting commonalities and dissimilarities in policy change across policy systems
and regions – i. e. countries. As the results suggest, the aftermath of external
shocks (nuclear disasters) point toward an increase in green policy initiatives across
countries – evidence which is in line with our main hypothesis that such external
shocks function as“focusing events”giving a little push toward green policy change.
A further observation in terms of commonalities, although this concerns the
controls of our regression models we did not focus on; yet, it further advocates a
quantitative inductive approach: we identified a positive correlation between left-
wing parties (beliefs) and an increase in green policy activities. Observing such
kind of, to our minds, unexpected commonality is a further advantage of applying
a quantitative approach to the ACF. It were an intriguing research question to
investigate whether there is an explanation to this correlation or whether it simply
is a methodological artefact. This approach nonetheless helps disclose new research
avenues.
With respect to the regressions we performed in this study, i. e. OLS, LSDV,
negative binomial, pre-sample mean, and dynamic panel regressions, and given the
fact that they point toward a positive correlation between nuclear accidents and
a subsequent increase in renewable energy policies, we emphasize that we do not
claim that these correlations describe a causal chain of political reactions induced
by external shocks. We simply tried to find the consequential correlation which
should be observable after external shocks to support the hypothesis that external
shocks, i.e. nuclear accidents, serve as a focusing event, after which the number of
green policies adopted by countries has increased. Solely for Chernobyl, we could
not detect robust evidence, although one would expect that energy policies should
have surged dramatically thereafter.
In future research, we should consider additional determinants as substantiated
e. g. in the policy change literature (Hogan and Feeney, 2012), such as the role
of political entrepreneurs being the crucial agents of change (Dahl Robert, 1961).
Or in a similar vein, the impetus of political institutions to the extent to which
they either are conducive or inhibiting policy change (Hogan and Feeney, 2012).
From a modelling perspective, the role of mass media in setting policy agendas
must be included (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006), since mass media not only
influence public opinion but also attract the attention of policy makers to relevant
26 See e. g. Sabatier and Weible (2014, 2007) or Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) for all the
specificities in the ACF and its research fields.
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topics. The holistic picture, as insinuated with the ACF, should help understand
the mechanisms that bring along policy change.
To derive explicit policy implications from this empirical exercise seems futile,
because external shocks, especially nuclear accidents, are no favorable events peo-
ple would be longing for in order to induce policy change. It rather is a further
evidence to a very sad revelation that policy makers as much as mankind as a
whole apparently need disasters to make a change.
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Appendix A
A.1 Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models
The general model of the dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation, which will
be presented here, is discussed by (Blackburne and Frank, 2007; Freeman, 2000;
Pesaran et al., 1999).
A.2 General Model
The general model assumes that the input data on time period t = 1, 2, ..., T and
across section groups i = 1, 2, ..., N can be estimated by an autoregressive distribu-
tive lag model ARDL(p , q , .., qk ):
yi t =
p
∑
j=1
λi j yi ,t− j +
q
∑
j=0
δ
′
i j Xi ,t− j +µi + εi t (A.1)
where Xi t is the (k ×1)-vector of explanatory variables, λi j a scalar of constants,
δi t the k × 1 coefficient vectors, µi the group specific effect and, εi t the group
specific effect. As T is large enough, each group can be estimated separately. The
variables in Eq. 5.2 are cointegrated I(1) and the error term is an I(0) process for
all i , therefore, the error correction equation can be reparameterized:
4yi t =φi (yi ,t−1−β
′
i Xi t ) +
p−1
∑
j=1
λ∗i j4yi ,t−1+
q−1
∑
j=0
δ
′∗
i j4Xi ,t−1+µi + εi t (A.2)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., T. The error correction speed of adjustment
parameter is expressed as in the following:
φi =−(1−
p
∑
j=1
λi j ), (A.3)
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β
′
i =
q
∑
j=0
δi j , (A.4)
λ∗i j =−
∑p
m= j+1λi m j = 1, 2, ..., p −1 (A.5)
and
δ∗i j =−
∑q
m= j+1δi m j = 1, 2, ..., q −1 (A.6)
assuming that the ARDL model in Eq. 5.2 is stable in that the roots of
∑p
j=1λi j z
j = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., N lie outside the unit circle, ensuring that the er-
ror correcting speed of adjustment term φi < 0. This implies that there is a long
run relationship between the dependent variable yi t and the regressors xi t . It is
calculated as:
yi t =−(β
′
i/φi )xi t +ηi t (A.7)
Estimators for Heterogeneous slopes
Micro panels with small time series (T) and a large number of cross section obser-
vations (N) usually rely on either fixed effects, random effects, static fixed effect
(SFE), or a combination of those (Arellano and Bond, 1991). As Pesaran and
Smith (1995) point out, with large T, such traditional estimators may generate
inconsistent results, because they assume homogeneous slopes among panel units.1
In general, the assumption of homogeneous slope parameters does not hold in
dynamic panel data with large T and large N (Phillips and Moon, 2000; Im et al.,
2003). With T increasing, more attention has to be paid to issues like serial
correlation caused by shocks, whether temporary or persistent, as this may lead
to biased estimation results. Pesaran and Smith (1995), for example, show that
GMM estimation in dynamic panel models has inconsistent long-term coefficients,
when actual slopes are heterogeneous. For these reasons, we apply the pooled mean
group model (PMG) introduced by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Blackburne and
Frank (2007).
The PMG model distinguishes short-run and long-run effects. It allows short-
term coefficients, the convergence adjustments speed (the coefficient of error cor-
rection term), and the error variances to differ across countries. However, it as-
sumes homogeneity of slope parameters across countries on the long run (Black-
burne and Frank (2007)).
The PMG estimator is a combination of the mean group (MG) and the dy-
1Compare Pesaran et al. (1999).
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namic fixed-effects (DFE) models. Whereas the MG model averages the slope
coefficients of separate regressions by panel-unit, the DFE model is similar to the
one-way fixed effects or least square dummy variable (LSDV) approach allowing
for heterogeneous intercepts but homogeneous slope coefficients. In contrast to the
fixed-effects model, the DFE approach also distinguishes between short-run and
long-run effects. There are various reasons to assume common long-run coefficients
across OECD countries. OECD countries have access to common technologies and
similar policy trends. Popp et al. (2011), for example, put forward that the Ky-
oto protocol played a fundamental role in shaping the investment in renewable
energy capacity at the country level during 1979 to 2008; all member countries
were exposed to the same international pressure to introduce further environmen-
tal regulations. The positive effect induced by the Kyoto protocol with respect to
renewable energy policies was also identified by Nesta et al. (2014).
Conversely, assuming the speed of convergence across countries to be similar is
rather implausible, as countries’ institutional frames differ. Together with the fact
that our data set is a large T, large N data set, the PMG appears feasible. The
mathematical background of the PMG model is described in the following:
A.3 Adapted Model
When adapting the general model to our case, we obtain the following long-run
function:
REPi t = θ0t +θ1t Chernobylt +θ2t Ibarakit +θ3t Fukushimat +θ4t B X i t +µi+εi t (A.8)
where i = 1, 2, .., N is the number of countries, t = 1, 2, .., T the time span, and
yi t the respective dependent variable. X i t stands for the control and explanatory
variables and B is the vector of corresponding coefficients. According to a cointe-
gration test, the data appears to be cointegrated I(1) and the error term is an I(0)
process for all i . This transforms the ARDL(1,1,1) dynamic panel specification of
eq. 5.9 into our basic regression equation:
4l n (REP)i t =φi (θ0i +θ1i Chernobyli t +θ2i Ibarakit +θ3i Fukushimat +θ4i B X i t )
+δ11i4Nuclear accidentsi t +δ41i4l n (B X )i t + εi t (A.9)
where φi = −(1− λi ), θ0i =
µi
1−λi , θi t =
δi 0i+δi 1i
1−λi , and φi = −(1− λi ). The error
correction speed of adjustment parameter is φi . The long-run coefficients are
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θ1i ,θ2i , ...,θNi .
A.4 Data
no. iso3 Freq. Percent Cum.
1 AUS 36 2.94 2.94
2 AUT 36 2.94 5.88
3 BEL 36 2.94 8.82
4 CAN 36 2.94 11.76
5 CHE 36 2.94 14.7
6 CHL 36 2.94 17.64
7 CZE 36 2.94 20.58
8 DEU 36 2.94 23.52
9 DNK 36 2.94 26.46
10 ESP 36 2.94 29.4
11 EST 36 2.94 32.34
12 FIN 36 2.94 35.28
13 FRA 36 2.94 38.22
14 GBR 36 2.94 41.16
15 GRC 36 2.94 44.1
16 HUN 36 2.94 47.04
17 IRL 36 2.94 49.98
18 ISL 36 2.94 52.92
19 ISR 36 2.94 55.86
20 ITA 36 2.94 58.8
21 JPN 36 2.94 61.74
22 KOR 36 2.94 64.68
23 LUX 36 2.94 67.62
24 MEX 36 2.94 70.56
25 NLD 36 2.94 73.5
26 NOR 36 2.94 76.44
27 NZL 36 2.94 79.38
28 POL 36 2.94 82.32
29 PRT 36 2.94 85.26
30 SVK 36 2.94 88.2
31 SVN 36 2.94 91.14
32 SWE 36 2.94 94.08
33 TUR 36 2.94 97.02
34 USA 36 2.94 100
Total 1,224 100
Table A.1 List of OECD countries
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A.5 Unit root test
Unit root tests
Levin-lin-Chu Harris-Tzavalis Breitung
REP (log) (0.0054) (0.000) (0.0786)
Table A.2 Unit root tests for the dependent variable
Dickey-Fuller test Statistics P-value
REP (logs)
Inverse chi-squared(68) P 233.3003 (0.000)
Inverse normal Z -10.1908 (0.000)
Inverse logit t(174) L* -10.7846 (0.000)
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 14.1744 (0.000)
Total capacity (logs)
Inverse chi-squared(72) P 140.1075 (0.000)
Inverse normal Z -5.8337 (0.000)
Inverse logit t(184) L* -5.6435 (0.000)
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 5.6756 (0.000)
Renewable energy generation (Logs)
Inverse chi-squared(68) P 170.4037 (0.000)
Inverse normal Z -7.1095 (0.000)
Inverse logit t(174) L* -7.2888 (0.000)
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 8.781 (0.000)
Energy price (logs)
Inverse chi-squared(66) P 412.5097 (0.000)
Inverse normal Z -12.8986 (0.000)
Inverse logit t(169) L* -19.5533 (0.000)
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 30.1598 (0.000)
GDP p.c (logs)
Inverse chi-squared(68) P 169.3637 (0.000)
Inverse normal Z -6.5891 (0.000)
Inverse logit t(174) L* -6.9195 (0.000)
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 8.6919 (0.000)
H0: All panels contain unit roots
Ha : At least one panel is stationary
Table A.3 Unit root tests for the independent variables
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A.6 Cointegration tests
A.6.1 KOA test
Statistic p-value
Modified Dickey-Fuller t -3.9136 0
Dickey-Fuller t -3.3478 0.0004
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -2.3319 0.0099
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller t -4.8799 0
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t -3.759 0.0001
Table A.4 Kao test for cointegration
A.6.2 Pedroni test
Statistic p-value
Modified Phillips-Perron t 1.6324 0.0513
Phillips-Perron t -4.9322 0.0000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -4.3479 0.0000
Table A.5 Pedroni cointegration test
A.7 Additional lists
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Nomenclature
ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework
ARDL Autoregressive Distributive Lag Model
DFE Dynamic Fixed-Effects
DHPM Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Model
EC Error Correction Term
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IEA International Energy Agency
INES International Nuclear Event Scale
LSDV Least Square Dummy Variable
MG Mean Group
OIM Observed Information Matrix
PMG Pooled Mean Group Model
PSM Pre-Sample Mean
REP Renewable Energy Policies
SFE Static Fixed Effect
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Chapter 5
The impact of mass media on environmental policy making
Author: Sherief Emam
In this paper we want to understand and highlight the effect of media to draw
public attention to climate change. Such an attention can drive politicians to
increase renewable energy policies introduced. Using a macro panel of 34 OECD
countries between 1985-2013 collected from the IEA, Lexis Nexis and CSTPR,
we run several regression models such as OLS, negative Binomial regression and
pooled mean group estimation. The results show that media does support in-
troducing more renewable energy policies through drawing public attention and
increasing the pressure on politicians supporting them.
5.1 Introduction
Governments have set ambitious targets to increase the share of renewable ener-
gies. The EU sets a binding target in 2020 to reach 20% final energy consumption
from renewable sources (Menegaki, 2013; EIA, 2014 ). While considerable progress
has been achieved to increase the share of some renewable energy sources, some
are still too immature to compete directly with fossil energies (Menanteau et al.,
2003). This can be partially related, first, to the difficulties to diffuse RE tech-
nologies (Foxon and Pearson,2007; Friebeetal.,2014, 2013; Veugelers, 2011; Polzin
et al. (2015)). Secondly, to the market failures in the energy sector (Dinica, 2006;
Helm, 2002; Jefferson, 2008; Wüstenhagen and Menichetti,2012). Overcoming
and mitigating market failure justifies government interference (Abdmouleh et al.,
2015; Menanteau et al., 2003; Polzin et al., 2015; Ayoub and Yuji, 2012). Without
such an involvement, market forces would result in a limited diffusion of renew-
able energy sources only in niches markets (Menanteau et al., 2003). Governments
can pass adequate policies to support RES. They have a variety of instruments
to regulate the energy market (Feed-in tariff, subsidies and tax systems, Invest-
ment, R & D support). Most of the research done is concentrated on evaluating
the efficiency of renewable energy policies and their outcomes (Nesta et al., 2014;
85
Johnstone et al., 2010a; Polzin et al., 2015). The majority have indicated the pos-
itive outcome of different policies. In other words, the more policies adapted, the
better the overall results for renewable energy. To our knowledge, few empirical
studies have been done to investigate if mass media can support adopting new
environmental policies. The objective of our paper is to shed light on this research
gap.
The research question is not typical in the economic field. Traditionally the
study of political agendas has been accomplished through the lens of political
science and other non-economic disciplines. Yet as more and more economists
have turned their attention to mass media, new interdisciplinary perspectives and
frameworks have emerged (McCluskey and Swinnen, 2010).
A significant part of literature attempts to explain the role that mass media play
in political markets and thus the effects on public policy-making processes. The
bulk of the literature addressing the relationship between public policies and the
mass media are theoretical. However, there are a few studies that have assessed
the effects of mass media on policy outcomes empirically. Some key findings sug-
gest that increased media coverage on political activities of representatives leads
to greater activity in passing policies (Strömberg and Snyder, 2008). These ef-
fects have been found in numerous countries and across various government initia-
tives, for instance, unemployment relief programs in the United States (Strömberg,
2004), increased spending on education in Uganda and Madagascar (Reinikka and
Svensson, 2005; Francken et al., 2009), and state food provision in India (Besley
and Burgess, 2002).
These studies provide valuable insights into media effects on political agenda
setting within a single country context, but on the downside, they do not consider
the variance in government and media systems.
To address the shortcomings of prior research, this study is set out to contribute
to the growing empirical evidence by analyzing the impact of mass media on policy-
making over an extensive period of time and across a wide range of countries. We
utilize panel data obtained from Lexis Nexis and IEA which includes measures for
renewable energy policies for four countries and the time period of 28 years. The
contribution of this paper is twofold. First, this paper contributes to the literature
on the political economy of environmental policies. There is an ample body of
theoretical and empirical literature on what regulates and influences environmental
policy-making, yet there is a scarcity of empirical evidence for mass media role in
this process. The findings of this longitudinal cross-country analysis indicate that
mass media have a substantive impact on environmental policies and serve as an
external pressure for political accountability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section (5.2) discusses the theories
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describing the relationship between media and political agenda setting. Addition-
ally, we illustrate the state-of-the-art and and derive our research hypothesis. In
section (5.3) we lay out the empirical protocol, an overview about our data set,
aggregation of variables and descriptive statistics, followed by the methodological
approach used in section (5.3.2). In section (5.4) we present our base results, ro-
bustness checks, controlling for endogeneity and differentiation of long and short
run effect. Section (5.5) discusses the results, summarizes the main findings and
gives suggestions for future work.
5.2 Theoretical background
Studies concerned with renewable energy policies (REP) have delivered mixed re-
sults about their effectiveness. Yet the majority of the research done still showed
positive results of REP implementation. Fiscal and financial incentive policies,
for example, loan guarantees, government loans and tax-based incentives were all
linked to spur RE deployment (Bergek et al., 2013; De Jager et al., 2011; Bar-
radale, 2010; Bird et al., 2005; Quirion, 2010; Polzin et al., 2015). Menz and
Vachon (2006) evaluated the positive role of five policy instruments1 from 1998 to
2003 across a 39 US states on Wind energy. In similar but broader research done
by Kilinc-Ata (2016) analyzing renewable energy policies in a cross-country study
covering 27 EU countries and 50 US states for 18 years. They state the benefits
of feed-in tariffs, tender and tax on the capacity of RE deployment. In addition,
Neuhoff et al. (2008); Smith and Urpelainen (2014); Kilinc-Ata (2016) linked the
introduction of supportive policies to an increase in the capacity of RE deploy-
ment, however Kilinc-Ata (2016) could not provide a significant effect. Regarding
policies supporting the technological change in the field of renewable energies, the
work of Johnstone et al. (2010b) showed a positive impact of targeted policies
in OECD countries on the number of registered patents for different renewable
energy technologies. Nesta et al. (2014) extended the later work and showed a
further positive impact on the quality of innovation.
Our contribution in this work, however, is not to evaluate the effectiveness spe-
cific renewable energy policies. Because governments and policymakers tend to
pass mixed policies supporting RE, and based on the above mentioned research
we will not be concentrating either on a specific technology or policy but on a
global view over renewable energy policy making process. We are trying to under-
stand the policy making process and the role mass media can play in fostering the
renewable energy policies. To understand the process, we need to have a closer
1renewable portfolio standard, fuel generation disclosure requirement, mandatory green power
option, public benefit fund, and retail choice
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look at the political science theories. Two main theories are related to our work
are: the “political” and “media” agenda setting theories.
Political agenda defines topics, which political actors and policy makers pay at-
tention to. Determining the issues on the agenda is a requirement to meet any
political decision (Walgrave et al., 2008); therefore setting or codetermining the
topics to be considered in the agenda is a sensitive issue. Some studies ascer-
tain the role mass media can play on setting the political agenda and boosting
political attention; however, the evidence is mixed and precise empirical studies
on this effect have been given little attention (Walgrave et al., 2008; Walgrave
and Van Aelst, 2006). These varying findings are “related to the fact” that media
effects vary across political agendas and topics. In this contribution, we want to
fill the void concerning the explicitly environmental agenda. The main question
we are trying to answer in our study is: Can media boost the political attention
to the environment and set topics in the agenda to pass more policies?
Answering this question by just ascertaining the contingency of media power
will not be enough to build a theory on the political agenda setting by the media.
Therefore, looking deeper into the reasons behind political responsiveness to media
and the tools media has to interfere in the policy making cycle is valuable.
Comprehensive studies on why political actors react to media coverage might
be still missing, but researchers suggest multiple reasons for media responsiveness
(Mathias Kepplinger, 2007; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). The first straightfor-
ward reason for policymakers to adopt media issues is the association of media
coverage with public opinion (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). Since the public
opinion is difficult to measure (Protess (1992)), politicians see media coverage as a
proxy for the public agenda or as mentioned by Pritchard (1992, p.105) media as
surrogate for public opinion. When mass media emphasize a topic, the public au-
dience will consider this topic to be important (Cohen, 1963; McCombs and Shaw,
1972), or, as explained by Mccombs et al., that public opinion is a reflection of
the extent and prominence of media coverage (McCombs, 2014; Dumitrescu and
Mughan, 2010; Brulle et al., 2012). Strömberg and Snyder (2008) give an exam-
ple that if media devotes a large amount of articles to unemployment, then the
public may in return give more attention to unemployment issues. Also, Brulle
et al. (2012) came to a similar conclusion that media coverage has a significant
impact and directly affects the level of public concern over climate change. Taking
into account that the ultimate goal for politicians is to be reelected by the public,
reacting and being responsive to the public opinion is critical (Pritchard, 1992;
Cook, 1989).
Despite the fact that politicians might have accurate information about public
opinion and whether the media agenda really aligns with the public one or not,
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this might be irrelevant (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006), and politicians will still
tend to listen to the media. The reason for this is the perception among political
actors that the media has a profound impact on the general public (Protess, 1992),
explained by Gunther and Storey (2003) as “the influence of presumed influence”
effect. Politicians know the effect media might have on public, if they start re-
porting about a specific topic. Political actors, in this case, do not react directly
to the media coverage but rather on the predicted impact on the public and thus
build their political strategies on that premise (Eichhorn, 1996; Eilders, 1997).
Schudson (1995) points out that the potential of mass media lies not only in the
direct influence of mass media on the general public, but also in the perception of
politicians that the media has a profound impact on the general public (Protess,
1992).
A second reason to make us believe that media can influence the policy making
process is the ability of media to interfere in the speed of policy making. Be-
cause the media is often the only way for politicians to reach out to the public
(Pritchard, 1992) and since the media´s issue attention cycle is relatively short
(Downs, 1972), political actors are pushed to react as fast as possible (Walgrave
and Van Aelst, 2006). Most clearly the media can direct politicians to react, take
positions to different topics and alter the policy making timetable by accelerating
or even decelerating it (Linsky et al., 1986, p: 107-112). The more coverage me-
dia advocate to a specific topic, the higher the level of government engagement.
Livingston (1997) imposed the importance of media as an accelerator in policy
making. However, the effect of mass media can be exactly the the opposite. In-
creased attention by the media can create political frictions and debates as much
as it can lead to slowing down the policy making process rather than accelerate it
(Koch-Baumgarten and Voltmer (2010, p:216);Wolfe (2012)).
A third way media can shape the political agenda is related to the“gate-keeping”
concept by Shoemaker (1991) or as Walgrave et al. (2010) called it the “Agenda-
constraining”. The straightforward relationship is: the more media coverage given
to a topic, the more prominent position it gets on the political agenda (Van Aelst
et al., 2013). This relationship is described mostly positively; however, the power
of media as concluded by Brants et al. (1999, p: 199) lies more in denying access,
filtering and selecting specific topics to cover.
The last reason on how media and policymakers interact is that politicians re-
act to media cues to communicate with each other. In this case politicians do not
react to public demands, but “go public” through media. They pass information
about their policies in order to garner support for particular policies (Wuesten-
hagen et al., 2007; Sigal, 1973; Kernell, 1997). In this scenario media as stated by
Bennett (1990) tends to collect their information from elite politicians and govern-
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ment representatives to provide legitimacy to reports (Sigal, 1973). In this way,
politicians can alter the content of what is reported by the media. This is what
the “Indexing” theory explains, where policymakers set the media agenda and feed
it with relevant information to pass it to the general public (Bennett, 1990).
The relationship between media and policy making still can not be simply de-
scribed by who sets the others’ agenda, but rather as a relationship, where both
intersect with each other. Elder and Cobb (1983, p: 394) defined five stages for
any policy making process: problem definition, policy formulation, -adoption,
-implementation and finally policy evaluation. The importance of media appears
in the first and last phases of the policy process because of its ability to focus at-
tention (Esser and Pfetsch (2013, p: 388); Baumgartner and Jones (1993)). This
feedback effect as mentioned by Sellers (2009) shows an alternating effect of mass
media. At the beginning it quietly report about policies and later actively evaluate
them.
There are plenty of examples to support our outcome that media interfere and
can set the political agenda. In the case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, media
reported intensively and regulatory policy changes followed (Birkland, 1997). A
similar case is the development of an oil slick off the California coast in 1969. Re-
consideration of offshore drilling regulations (Elder and Cobb, 1983) were passed
afterwards. In Germany, after Fukushima, reports from the print and television
media were in-depth and dominated headlines for weeks. As a result of this cov-
erage, Germany decided to reverse decisions to extend the life-time of its nuclear
reactors, accelerated a nuclear energy phase out and closed immediately eight out
of its 17 reactors (Skea et al., 2013). Similar policy changes took place in Indonesia
(Fauzan and Schiller, 2011).
From the above mentioned theories we drive two hypothesis. The first one is
to test if there is a relationship between media coverage about renewable energies
and the adoption of new environmental policies.
Hypothesis 1: Media coverage do positively influence the policy agenda and lead
to the introduction of more environmental policies.
Secondly, Although the focus of this work is not on determining the first-movers
with respect to climate change; whether mass media take the lead (set agendas) or
lag (index) as described in both the “policy agenda-Setting” theory or government
officials lead the media as explained in the “indexing” theory by Bennett (1990).
However, based upon the outcome, it can either be concluded that policymakers
concerned with environmental issues are more likely to work based on their own
predefined agenda, which they actively apply or it rather is an external catalyst
(media coverage) that increases the pressure on them to pass supportive policies.
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Hypothesis 2: Governments representatives are more likely to act first when
media reports start.
5.3 Data and Econometric Protocol
We apply panel data econometrics to estimate the relationship between media
coverage in four countries (The United States, United Kingdom, Germany and
Austria), relying on a data set covering a time span from 1985 till 2012. We apply
various econometric models like OLS, negative binomial regressions and pooled
mean group estimators.
5.3.1 Data
A. Dependent variables
Similar to Johnstone et al. (2010b); Nesta et al. (2014); Dasgupta et al. (2001), we
build an index for renewable energy policies by aggregating the number of policies
for each of the four countries. The index is based on a detailed dataset available
from the international energy agency (IEA). It contains the information about the
year of adoption and expiration of a renewable energy policy.
Although policy measures do certainly not compare on a cardinal basis and the
aggregation of different types of policies in a single index might imply a loss of
information in terms of policy-specific individual effects (Johnstone et al., 2010b),
policy measures still allow us to trace the activity level of policymakers.
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Figure 5.1 Renewable energy policy index the four chosen countries.
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B. Explanatory variables
Our main explanatory variable about media coverage is collected from Lexis Nexis.
We search for renewable energy policy articles in newspapers. The search includes
keywords like wind power, geothermal and solar energy, excluding words like wars.
Figure (5.2a). shows the accumulated number of articles for the time span from
1985 until 2013. The full command can be found in the Appendix (5.6).
For a robustness check we also include a dataset collected by the center for
science and technology policy research from Colorado university. The dataset
covers four more countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Spain) and covers
the period between year 2000 and 2013. Despite the short time span, adding more
countries will increase the heterogeneity of our dataset.
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Figure 5.2 Numbers of articles per country per year.
C. Control variables
Energy prices: The interaction between shrinkage of fossil fuel sources and increas-
ing energy prices can lead policymakers to support renewable energy sources, see
figure (5.3). Both effects should increase the incentive to search for alternatives
and therefore foster policies supporting renewable energy production. Data on
end-user electricity prices in both residential and industry sectors was collected
from the IEA database. The calculated price index was constructed by weighting
price indices for both sectors with their corresponding consumption levels, similar
to (Johnstone et al., 2010b; Nesta et al., 2014). A positive significant is expected.
Stock of Knowledge: is a particularly relevant variable from the policy theory
perspective. Accumulated learning, scientific results and evidence lead to a policy
change as discussed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999). The more scientific
knowledge a country owns, the more policy alternatives they can apply (Weible
et al., 2011). We include the number of patents per country for each year. They
can be seen as proxy for the scientific and technical information available.
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Figure 5.3 Energy Price Index. Source: own calculations.
Despite several empirical and conceptual caveats (Griliches, 1990), patents have
been widely used in quantitative empirical studies in the environment domain as
an indicator for innovation (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier and Cohen,
2003; Costantini and Crespi, 2013). Just counting the annual number of patents
in green technologies does not reflect the actual stock of knowledge of a country.
The Stock of Knowledge, by nature, is difficult to measure. Accumulating patent
counts instead would ignore the fact that knowledge wears off over time (Popp,
2002). Therefore, we use the perpetual inventory method (PIM) as suggested and
applied by (Meinen et al., 1998; Hall, 1993; Hall et al., 2000; Nesta and Saviotti,
2006). The number of patents (Pa tt at time t ) is counted while depreciating
past patent counts. Correspondingly, the stock of green knowledge (GK) is calcu-
lated as GKi t = (1−δ)GKt−1+Pa tt .2 The patent data originates from PATSTAT.3
Due to a change in classification, we had to merge green patents from the IPC
classification with the new CPC, the Cooperative Patent Classification. The lat-
ter is the outcome of harmonizing the EPO classification system (IPC) with the
USPTO classification system (CPC). For patents identification purposes, we used
the OECD Indicator of Environmental Technologies (OECD, 2012). We expect
that the higher the stock of knowledge in a country, the more they introduce new
2The annual depreciation rate δ is assumed to be 15%
3We used the 2015 version of the EPO database PATSTAT EPO (2015).
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REPs.
GDP and population: are the simplest measures used to account for the eco-
nomic growth and the size of the country. To decrease the correlation between
variables, we calculate GDP per capita as a combined variable. By including this
variable we expect that the bigger and richer a country, the higher the level of
renewable energy policies.
Renewable energy production : To control for the energy mix and as an indi-
cator for the deployment of renewable energy sources, we include the production
capacity of renewable energy in our dataset. We expect that the more a country
produces energy from green sources, the more policies are introduced.
Table (5.8) provides an overview of the variables, references to the data sources
and expected signs in the econometric analysis. Table (5.1) displays the descriptive
statistics.
Name Obs Mean Std dev Minimum Maximum
REP 116 2.161 1.420 0 4.625
Media Attention 108 2.614 1.112 0 5.170
Energy price 106 0.822 0.188 0.541 1.431
GK 116 6.228 1.595 2.732 8.965
Ren. production 115 3.989 1.316 1.626 6.270
GDP per Capita 116 3.460 0.203 3.002 3.845
Kyoto 116 0.414 0.495 0 1
Table 5.1 Dataset descriptive Statistics.
5.3.2 General Empirical Approach
In this section we apply panel-data regression. When researching using long time
series, it is important to understand and distinguish the requirements of each
econometric model and the restrictions. We start our analyzes with a typical OLS
regression, expressed in equation (5.1).
l n (REP)i t = β0+θ1t l n (Me d i a At t e n t i o n )t +θ4t B X i t + εi t (5.1)
where i = 1, 2, .., N is the number of countries, t = 1, 2, .., T the time span, and
REPi t the respective dependent variable. B i X i t stands for the explanatory vari-
ables. We extend our models and run a clustered standard errors fixed effect.
For additional robustness, we use the original format of the dependent variable
as a count data and run negative binomial regressions. Poisson regression is suit-
able for count data, but it assumes that the mean and variance of the errors are
equal. Therefore and because of over dispersion we preferred a negative binomial
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regression to a Poisson model. Finally, we introduce variables sequentially to see
whether there are changes in th estimation significance, while further covariates
are considered.
It is important to take into consideration that our panel data is a macro dynamic
panel data (Long (T) period and few number of cross section observations (N)) and
therefore, we shall expect inconsistent results from the above mentioned models
because of the endogeneity and the false assumption of homogeneous slopes among
panel units.4 In addition to the models mentioned above, we will use the Dynamic
Heterogeneous Panel Model (DHPM) explained following.
Estimators for Heterogeneous slopes
Micro panels with small time series (T) and a large number of cross section obser-
vations (N) usually rely on either fixed effects, random effects, static fixed effect
(SFE), or a combination of those (Arellano and Bond, 1991). As Pesaran and
Smith (1995) point out, with large T, such traditional estimators may generate
inconsistent results, because they assume homogeneous slopes among panel units.5
In general, the assumption of homogeneous slope parameters does not hold in
dynamic panel data with large T and large N (Phillips and Moon, 2000; Im et al.,
2003). With T increasing, more attention has to be paid to issues like serial corre-
lation, and endogeneity may lead to biased estimation results. Pesaran and Smith
(1995), for example, show that GMM estimation in a dynamic panel model has
inconsistent long-term coefficients when actual slopes are heterogeneous. For these
reasons, we apply the pooled mean group model (PMG) introduced by Pesaran
and Smith (1995) and Blackburne and Frank (2007).
The PMG model distinguishes short-run and long-run effects. It allows short-
term coefficients, the convergence adjustments speed (the coefficient of error cor-
rection term), and the error variances to differ across countries. However, it as-
sumes homogeneity of slope parameters across countries on the long run (Black-
burne and Frank, 2007).
The PMG estimator is a combination of the mean group (MG) and the dy-
namic fixed-effects (DFE) models. Whereas the MG model averages the slope
coefficients of separate regressions by panel-unit, the DFE model is similar to the
one-way fixed effects or least square dummy variable (LSDV) approach allowing
for heterogeneous intercepts but homogeneous slope coefficients. In contrast to the
fixed-effects model, the DFE approach also distinguishes between short-run and
long-run effects. There are various reasons to assume common long-run coefficients
across our dataset countries. Conversely, assuming the speed of convergence across
4Compare Pesaran et al. (1999).
5Compare Pesaran et al. (1999).
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countries to be similar is rather implausible, as countries‘ political frames differ.
Together with the fact that our data set is a large T, large N data set, the PMG
appears feasible. The mathematical background of the PMG model is described
in the following:
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models
The general model of the dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation, which will
be presented here, is discussed by (Blackburne and Frank, 2007; Freeman, 2000;
Pesaran et al., 1999).
General Model
The general model assumes that the input data on time period t = 1, 2, ..., T and
across section groups i = 1, 2, ..., N can be estimated by an autoregressive distribu-
tive lag model ARDL(p , q , .., qk ):
yi t =
p
∑
j=1
λi j yi ,t− j +
q
∑
j=0
δ
′
i j Xi ,t− j +µi + εi t (5.2)
where Xi t is the (k ×1)-vector of explanatory variables, λi j a scalar of constants,
δi t the k × 1 coefficient vectors, µi the group specific effect and, εi t the group
specific effect. As T is large enough, each group can be estimated separately.
The variables in equation(5.2) are cointegrated at level 1 (I(1)) and the error
term is an I(0) process for all i , therefore, the error correction equation can be
reparameterized:
4yi t =φi (yi ,t−1−β
′
i Xi t ) +
p−1
∑
j=1
λ∗i j4yi ,t−1+
q−1
∑
j=0
δ
′∗
i j4Xi ,t−1+µi + εi t (5.3)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., T. The error correction speed of adjustment
parameter is expressed as in the following:
φi =−(1−
p
∑
j=1
λi j ), (5.4)
β
′
i =
q
∑
j=0
δi j , (5.5)
λ∗i j =−
∑p
m= j+1λi m j = 1, 2, ..., p −1 (5.6)
and
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δ∗i j =−
∑q
m= j+1δi m j = 1, 2, ..., q −1 (5.7)
assuming that the ARDL model in equation (5.2) is stable in that the roots of
∑p
j=1λi j z
j = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., N lie outside the unit circle, ensuring that the error
correcting speed of adjustment term φi < 0. This implies that there is a long-
run relationship between the dependent variable yi t and the regressors xi t . It is
calculated as:
yi t =−(β
′
i/φi )xi t +ηi t (5.8)
Adapted Model
When adapting the general model to our case, we obtain the following long run
function:
REPi t = θ0t+θ1t Mediat+θ2t Energy pricest+θ3t Stock of knowledget+θ4t B X i t+µi+εi t
(5.9)
where i = 1, 2, .., N is the number of countries, t = 1, 2, .., T the time span, and
yi t the respective dependent variable. X i t stands for the control and explanatory
variables and B is their corresponding coefficient. According to a cointegration
test, the data appears to be cointegrated I(1) and the error term is an I(0) process
for all i . This transforms the ARDL(1,1,1) dynamic panel specification of equation
(5.9) into our basic regression equation:
4l n (REP)i t =φi (θ0i +θ1i Mediai t +θ2i Energy pricest +θ3i Stock of knowledget
+θ4i B X i t ) +δ11i4Mediai t +δ21i4Energy pricesi t +δ31i4Stock of knowledgei t
(5.10)
+δ41i4l n (B X )i t + εi t (5.11)
where φi = −(1− λi ), θ0i =
µi
1−λi , θi t =
δi 0i+δi 1i
1−λi , and φi = −(1− λi ). The error
correction speed of adjustment parameter is φi . θ1i ,θ2i , ...,θNi are the long run
coefficients.
5.3.2.1 The direction of information
To test our second hypothesis and determine the direction of information between
mass media and policymakers, we apply a Granger causality test (Granger, 1969),
expressed in following equation (5.12).
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yt = α+
k
∑
k=1
βk yt−k +
k
∑
k=1
γk xt−k + εt (5.12)
yi ,t = αi +
k
∑
k=1
βi k yi ,t−k +
k
∑
k=1
γi k xi ,t−k + εi ,t (5.13)
If past values of x are significant predictors of y , while including the past values
of y , we can conclude that x Granger causes y (Lopez et al., 2017). While
equation (5.12) is for time series, we follow the work by Dumitrescu and Mughan
(2010). He proposed a Granger causality test for panel data. He states under the
null hypothesis equation (5.14) the absence of a homogeneous Granger causality.
The alternative hypothesis states that a relationship exists at least in one unite,
equation (5.15).
H0 : γi 1 = ...= γi k = 0 ∀i = 1, ..., N (5.14)
H1 : γi 1 6= 0 o r....o r γi k 6= 0 ∀i =N1+1, ..., N (5.15)
5.4 Empirical results
The aim of our research is to uncover the influence of mass media on the envi-
ronmental policy making process. We are trying to answer two questions. First,
whether mass media reporting can encourage policy and decision makers to pass
more renewable energy policies or not. The second question is the direction of
influence between mass media and policy making; can it be described as a unidi-
rectional relationship or a bidirectional one. Stata 15 is used to estimate all our
28 models.
In table (5.2) we present the findings for the fixed effects OLS regression (Models
1-3) and standard error fixed model (Models 4-6). We applied fixed effects models
after performing the Hausman test, which was in favor of a fixed effect model
rather than random effect one. Model 1 is a univariate regression of forwarded
value of REP on media coverage log variable. The correlation suggests a positive
relationship between media coverage and renewable energy policies. We start
adding the control and explanatory variables sequentially to capture any changes
in the estimates when further covatriates are considered. Through Model 1-3 the
value of media coverage indicator decreased but stayed positively significant. Stock
of green knowledge remains positive and significant through all models, indicating
that countries with higher technological background and innovation tend to pass
more renewable energy policies.
98
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Media Attention 0.823*** 0.298*** 0.165*** 0.823*** 0.298 0.165*
(0.065) (0.068) (0.061) (0.118) (0.138) (0.052)
Energy price -0.694 -2.237*** -0.694 -2.237**
(0.495) (0.542) (0.533) (0.452)
GK 0.848*** 0.399*** 0.848*** 0.399**
(0.079) (0.131) (0.052) (0.093)
Ren. production 0.913*** 0.913**
(0.175) (0.253)
GDP per Capita 2.668*** 2.668**
(0.854) (0.464)
Constant 0.154 -3.231*** -11.722*** 0.154 -3.231*** -11.722***
(0.181) (0.389) (2.166) (0.303) (0.496) (1.692)
Observations 104 98 98 104 98 98
R-squared 0.615 0.833 0.893 0.615 0.833 0.893
Number of ctry 4 4 4 4 4 4
R2 adj. within 0.615 0.833 0.893 0.615 0.833 0.893
R2 adj. between 0.817 0.982 0.719 0.817 0.982 0.719
R2 adj. overall 0.577 0.885 0.677 0.577 0.885 0.677
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep. variable is forwarded by one lag.
Table 5.2 Model (1-3) Fixed effects. Model (4-6) standard errors fixed effect.
For models (4-6) we run a robustness check. We re-estimate the regression with
standard error fixed models. As was the case for the OLS regression, we added the
variables in the same order as in models 1-3. The positive significance still stands
except in model 5. In model 3 and 6 the stock of knowledge in green technologies
correlates positively with the number of policies initiated in a country. This finding
is similar to the results reached by Johnstone et al. (2010a) and Nesta et al. (2014).
However, the results of energy prices seem to be mixed. Models 3 and 6 show that
countries with a higher share of renewable energy in their energy mix tend to pass
more supportive policies. The GDP per Capita variable is positively significant,
indicating that the richer the country, the higher the likelihood of passing more
renewable energy policies. Finally, by having a short look at the determination
coefficients, we notice that the R2 value increases, while adding more variables into
our model, we reach almost 90% in model 6. The results, so far, deliver evidence to
support our alternative hypothesis, that media can alternate the political agenda
and lead to the introduction of more environmental supportive policies.
To verify further robustness of the results presented in table (5.2), we tested
a series of alternative specifications. In table (5.3), we run the same regression
models but changed the dependent variable and the media attention one. In other
words, models (7-12) regress the renewable energy policies on the growth rates of
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VARIABLES (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Media Attention 0.045** 0.081* 0.076* 0.075* 0.079*
(0.011) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031)
Energy price -2.901 -2.726 -2.723 -2.927
(2.123) (2.115) (2.115) (2.136)
GK 0.516*** 0.522*** 0.573***
(0.019) (0.026) (0.020)
Ren. production 0.040 0.047
(0.263) (0.272)
GDP per Capita -1.490
(0.869)
Constant 0.104*** 0.144** 0.077* 0.074** 0.097*
(0.001) (0.028) (0.030) (0.019) (0.032)
Observations 100 92 92 92 92
R-squared 0.013 0.138 0.182 0.182 0.192
Number of ctry 4 4 4 4 4
R2 adj. within 0.0126 0.138 0.182 0.182 0.192
R2 adj. between 0.973 0.108 0.0716 0.0815 0.0501
R2 adj. overall 0.0131 0.133 0.172 0.173 0.182
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep. variable is forwarded by one lag.
Table 5.3 Differenced variables REP and Media. Model (7-9) Fixed effects. Model
(10-12) standard errors fixed effect.
media variable to test the short-run effect. In models (7-9) we run a fixed effect
OLS regression and in models (10-11) a standard error fixed effect regression for
robustness. The results are homogeneous, consistent and complementary to the
results shown before. The media attention effect on the short-run correlates posi-
tively with the increase in renewable energy policies. Therefore, we can interpret
the results that a media campaign will result in increasing the supportive policies
on the short-run. Rapid increase in the technological advances will help politi-
cians to pass more related policies. The coefficient of green stock of knowledge is
strongly significant. Energy prices results are still however mixed.
Table (5.4) presents another robustness check. We use the original index for the
renewable energy policies as a count data variable and solving the over dispersion
negative binomial regression is preferred to the Poisson model. As done before,
we introduce the variables sequentially to monitor changes in the estimates, when
further covariates are added. The results in models (12-16) are consistent with
the prior results. The media attention variable correlates positively with REPs.
More media attention will lead to an increase in the number of green policies intro-
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VARIABLES (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Media Attention 0.969*** 1.262*** 0.541*** 0.537*** 0.235***
(0.119) (0.128) (0.092) (0.091) (0.091)
Energy price -2.377*** -1.136*** -1.230*** -0.730***
(0.472) (0.281) (0.358) (0.218)
GK 0.685*** 0.710*** 0.589***
(0.049) (0.062) (0.044)
Ren. production -0.039 -0.286***
(0.073) (0.072)
GDP per Capita 3.758***
(0.460)
Constant 0.112 1.252*** -2.536*** -2.457*** -13.376***
(0.393) (0.422) (0.382) (0.446) (1.423)
Observations 104 98 98 98 98
Log Likelihood -380.7 -349.2 -297.9 -297.7 -279.4
Pseudo R2 0.0693 0.0994 0.232 0.232 0.280
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep. variable is forwarded by one lag.
Table 5.4 Negative Binomial regression. Dep. Variable REP as count variable.
duced. Energy prices appear to be consistently significant and negative; however,
technological advances in green energy has maintained a positive effect on REP
through all the models.
Final results in this robustness regression series are presented in table (5.5).
In this series of regressions, we changed the independent variable to the media
coverage variable from the Center of Science and Technology Policy Research as
described in section (5.3.1). This variable covers 7 countries instead of four with
time span between the years 2000 and 2013. We run the same regressions as done
before to test the robustness of the results. For models 17 and 18 we applied a
standard error fixed effects model, followed by the growth rates models (19-20).
Finally, in models 21 and 22 we use the count data of the dependent and the
explanatory variables and run a negative binomial regression.
In model (17) we correlate the new explanatory variable to our renewable energy
policies index. Both variables are logged and the dependent variable is forwarded
by one lag, the same configuration as all past regressions. The results show a
strong positive correlation at significance level 1%. When adding subsequently
more variables, the significance of media seems to fade out. In models (19-20)
we use the logged growth rates values, where the effect of media is positive and
consistent. The different results between models (18-20) reveal an interesting
finding, where the effect of media seems to fade out on the long run and just have
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VARIABLES (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
Media Attention
CSTPR
0.423*** 0.039 0.169** 0.155* 0.468*** 0.149***
(0.071) (0.094) (0.053) (0.079) (0.066) (0.039)
Energy price 0.544 -0.082 0.593**
(1.190) (0.647) (0.261)
GK 0.503** 0.295** -0.030
(0.190) (0.095) (0.063)
Ren. production 0.184 -0.357 -0.047
(0.342) (0.370) (0.039)
GDP per Capita 1.386 -1.102 4.287***
(1.742) (0.659) (0.660)
Constant 0.125 -6.377 0.068*** 3.731 -0.086 -13.059***
(0.525) (6.265) (0.005) (3.200) (0.500) (1.974)
Observations 87 78 80 71 87 78
Number of ctry 7 7 7 7 7 7
R-squared 0.497 0.749 0.137 0.232
R2 adj. within 0.497 0.749 0.137 0.232
R2 adj. between 0.340 0.692 0.00105 0.360
R2 adj. overall 0.395 0.687 0.130 0.0696
Log Likelihood -360.2 -257.9
Pseudo R2 0.0491 0.233
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep. variable is forwarded by one lag.
Table 5.5 Model (17-18) standard errors fixed effect. Model (19-20) differenced
Dep. variable. Model (21-22) level data-negative binomial regression.
a short-run effect. Running negative binomial regression in models (21-22) show
a strong positive influence of media coverage over the number of passed policies.
The regressions in table (5.6) refer to the heterogeneous panel techniques in-
troduced in equation (5.10) and discussed in section (5.3.2). We apply dynamic
heterogeneous panel models, which offer an alternative estimator in addition to
the traditional fixed-effects estimators, i.e. the pooled mean-group estimator by
Pesaran and Smith (1995). The advantage of using this models is its ability to
capture serial correlation between the variables themselves as well as with the error
term (endogeneity). In all the models we applied a pooled mean group method,
where the speed of adjusted convergence and the error variances are allowed to dif-
fer across countries on the short run but restrict homogeneity of slope parameters
across countries on the long run.
The model introduced in equation (5.10) delivers numerous results: long-run,
short-run effects, and error correction coefficients and allows us to monitor the
short and long run effect of media on REP in the same regression model. The
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VARIABLES (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
S
h
or
t
ru
n Error correction -0.040 0.013 0.017 0.033 0.034
(0.098) (0.111) (0.041) (0.052) (0.044)
Media Attention = L, 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.049***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016)
L
on
g
ru
n
Media Attention 0.261*** 0.421 1.265 1.005 0.645
(0.094) (0.325) (1.896) (1.214) (1.020)
Energy price -0.299 1.507 6.484 13.251
(0.941) (4.630) (10.810) (21.074)
GK -2.167 -1.179 -6.230
(4.862) (2.806) (11.178)
Ren. production -3.095 -4.848
(4.749) (7.452)
GDP per Capita 24.434
(41.397)
Constant 0.252 0.219 0.139 -0.100 2.031
(0.192) (0.150) (0.397) (0.533) (2.148)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100
Esigma 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.6 Pooled mean group estimator.
results in table (5.6) are homogeneous and complementary to the results presented
before. The main finding of the series of regressions, in models (23-27), is the
positively consistent effect of media coverage on REP on the short-run. The same
effect on the long run does not hold and loses its significance while adding more
covariates to the regression equation.
The results in tables (5.2 - 5.6) deliver consistent results that media has a pos-
itive effect on green energy policies on the short run but not on the long run.
Policymakers start to increase their activity in passing new green policy measures
after an increase in the media coverage about environmental issues. Evidence does
support the hypothesis that media can encourage policymakers to introduce more
renewable energy policies.
5.4.1 Direction of information
As discussed in section (5.2), different theories, such as the political agenda set-
ting, state that mass media can interfere in the political agenda. We have em-
pirically applied this theory to our model and dataset. Indexing theory refers to
the opposite effect, where policymakers set the media agenda (Bennett, 1990).
To understand the information and the influence direction between mass media
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and policy making, we run a Granger causality test. This test shows whether the
results are uni- or bidirectional, namely if media Granger causes policies or the
other way around.
Null Hypothesis Granger-
Causality Wald
statistics
Probability
Media does not Granger-cause Policies 33.7641 0.0000
Policies does not Granger-cause Media -0.2144 0.5715
Table 5.7 Granger Causality test after (Dumitrescu and Hurlin, 2012).
We follow the same methodology presented by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012).
The results are presented in table (5.7) and they indicate a unidirectional rela-
tionship between mass media and policy making. It appears that mass media
does Granger cause policymakers with a strong significance. The hypothesis that
policymakers does not Granger causes media cannot be rejected because of the
high P − v a l ue .
5.5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper is a part of ongoing research done to understand the intersection in-
fluence of mass media on policy making process. We base our research on two
main theories from communication and political science, “Political agenda setting”
and “Indexing” theory. The political agenda theory illustrates the tools mass me-
dia has to interfere in the political agenda. It also tries to answer the question:
why policymakers react to mass media coverage. We explained in the theoret-
ical background that politicians are influenced by mass media because of three
different reasons. First because of the association of media coverage with public
opinion. The more media covers an issue, the higher the likelihood that the general
audience will consider this issue important. Even if this reason does not stand,
politicians still know the effect mass media can have and therefore react to media
topics. Secondly, mass media can interfere in the speed of policy making by inten-
sively reporting about a specific topic, which can result in either speeding up or
sometimes slowing down the policy making process. The third reason is that mass
media is a gate keeper to public policies. They act as a filter which can constrain
reporting specific policies to the public. The second theory we explained is the
“Indexing”theory which puts mass media more in the follower position. It explains
that mass media get their information from policymakers and government repre-
sentatives. In this case politicians use media to communicate with the public and
seek their support. Based on these two theories, we push two hypothesis. First,
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we study the effect of mass media on policymakers regarding environmental issues
and secondly the direction of information between mass media and politicians.
Are politicians pro-active regarding renewable energy plans and have their own
policy agenda or are they more likely to react after an intensive media coverage?
To investigate these two hypotheses, we build a dataset from different sources
covering a time span from 1985 to 2013 . The dependent variable is an aggregated
index of active renewable energy policies collected from IEA. For mass media
coverage we collected the number of articles in the main newspapers publishing
about renewable energy for four countries (USA, UK, Germany and Austria). We
added to our study the energy prices in each country as well as their own stock of
knowledge about green technologies. We account as well for the size of the country
and their current production of renewable energy power. For robustness checks we
also added a dataset for media coverage collected by the Center for science and
technology policy research from the university of Colorado. The dataset covers 7
countries and has a time frame from 2000 till 2013.
We use different regression methods during our study: OLS fixed effect model,
negative binomial regression and pooled mean group for heterogeneous panel data.
The later regression is relevant to solve the endogeneity and serial correlation
problem between variables specially in long panel data, as in our case.
The results are presented in tables (2-6). In all 27 models the dependent variable
is forwarded by one lag and logged except in the negative binomial regression,
where we use the level count data. The results shade out a consistency and show
a positive effect of mass media on the number of renewable policies. An increase
in the number of published articles will reflect in more policies passed. In other
words, the mass media can interfere in the political agenda and help pass new
supportive policies. This effect is strongly correlated on the short-run more than
on the long run. The advantage of using the pooled mean group is testing both
effects in one equation. The results are consistent with the finding that the effect
of media is more significant and consistent on the short-run rather than on the
long term.
The finding is aligned to the issue of attention cycle introduced by Downs (1972).
He explains that keeping the public attention sharp can only be done on the short
run while exploring the problem, reporting on it and introducing solutions. After
that the public attention enters a phase of inattention. This is the same cycle
mass media has when covering specific topics.
The second finding of our study is the relationship between policy making and
mass media. In this content we try to analyze the direction of the information
flow, either media driven political activities regarding green energy policies, or
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politicians leading the media and telling them what to report. This analysis is
important to know if policymakers are proactively increasing and supporting the
share of renewable energy or if they need a catalyst to pass more policies. The
findings indicate that it is more likely that policymakers tend to pass more renew-
able energy policies after mass media intensively reports about renewable energy
and climate change. The Granger causality test also prove evidences that policy-
makers do not Granger cause any increase in the media reporting activities. In
other words, policymakers do not interfere in the media agenda but rather the
other way around.
There are shortcomings and caveats which have to be considered in further work.
Including social media would give us more insight and direct information about
public attention and concern; however, the short time span of social media will be
difficult to be compared to policy changes, especially when policy making processes
take a long legislative time. Also another improvement is to collect more data and
cover more countries with different political positions.
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5.6 Appendix
Lexis Nexis search command
policy W/25 offshore wind power OR geothermal energy OR solar energy OR
hydro power NOT war OR Film OR book OR space AND byline (letters OR
Anonymous)
Data
Name Label Source Unit
REP Renewable energy policies IEA Count
Media Attention Media articles Lexis Nexis Count
Media Attention
CSTPR
Media coverage CSTPRa Count
Energy price Index for Energy price IEA $/unit using PPP
GK Accumulated Green knowledge Patstat PIM / Count
Ren. production Renewable energy production IEA MW
GDP per Capita Gross Domestic Product IEA Billion 2005 $ using PPPs
Population population per country IEA Millions
a International Collective on Environment, Culture & Politics. Center for Science and Technol-
ogy Policy Research
Table 5.8 Data properties and sources.
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Conclusion
Our modern life and welfare depend on the energy sector. It eases our daily life and
enables us with more opportunities and enjoyable live. The economy benefits as
well from the energy sector. The more energy produced is translated into products
and increasing trade and hence a flourishing economic growth.
Yet an increase in the economic growth and energy consumption depend mainly
on fossil fuels. In 2018, 85% of the global energy production was generated from
fossil energy sources. While fossil fuel energy may supply us with a relatively cheap
and stable energy supply, it come with two major challenges, namely scarcity and
GHGs emissions. Fossil energy sources are scarce and will be depleted one day,
and greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide do contribute to global warming. A
consistent increase in the global average temperature can lead to climate change
and affect not only the environment, Eco-system but also the public health and,
in consequence, labour productivity and the economy.
It is in everyone’s interest to find solutions for those challenges and limit any
undesirable consequences for society. The intention of this dissertation project
was to analyze the energy market from an economic viewpoint and to investigate
the determinants of a successful shift toward low carbon technologies, that is,
renewable energy. The main research question raised in the first part of the dis-
sertation is: Whether energy markets have the endogenous capacity to switch the
market from the current fossil fuel based to more environmental friendly sources,
like renewable energies. The second part of the dissertation concentrates on the
determinants to increase the introduction of renewable energy policies. i.e. mass
media and major accidents.
If energy markets were perfect, we expect the market to shift endogenously to-
ward renewable energy. With dwindling fossil energy sources, energy prices will
rise as demand is non-decreasing. The consequence of a price increase is twofold.
As it increases competitive pressure, rising prices should force energy suppliers
to increase the efficiency in production. In addition, producers will search for
alternative energy sources such as renewable energy, since their relative prices go
down. Technologies which used to be not competitive become gradually competi-
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tive. This, in turn, should give producers the incentive to invest in new renewable
energy technologies.
If the energy market does not function as expected or the shift is slow, gov-
ernments do interfere and introduce proper policies to accelerate the shift toward
low carbon technologies. With adequate policies governments try to boost the im-
plementation and diffusion process of renewable energy technologies. Policies can
vary between, taxes, tradable quotes, R & D programs, subsidies such as feed-in
tariffs and regulation instrument. This set of policies can induce innovation ac-
tivities, increase efficiency, decrease emissions and contribute in economic growth
.
Against this background, the objective of this dissertation is to shed light on
the changes in energy systems. It consists of four papers which can be partitioned
into two groups of papers. The first group of papers (paper 1 and 2) investigates
the functioning of the market mechanisms, while the second group (paper 3 and
4) takes up the empirical findings, asking about the inhibiting determinants to
introduce new policy measures to support the change toward renewable energies.
The first step to understand the energy market mechanism is to investigate the
link between raising energy prices and the resulting effect on the energy efficiency
and innovation activities. The first paper, titled “Can rising energy prices lead
to higher efficiency levels in energy production?” tries to answer this question
regarding the link between energy prices and improvement in energy efficiency.
Evidence can be found that an increase in energy prices can lead to an improvement
in energy efficiency on both the log-run and the short-run. In addition, public
policies and competition have a positive effect in boosting the efficiency levels.
With regards to induced innovation activities, the second paper, “Rising Energy
Prices and Advances in Renewable EnergyTechnologie”, looks at the link between
energy prices and the number of registered patents. Patent data for wind tech-
nologies are used as an index for innovation, and oil prices are proxies for energy
prices. The result concludes that energy prices can induce innovation activities in
OECD Countries. Prices have a positive long-run effect on the innovation process
in wind technologies. Additionally, beside the main result, we find that renewable
energy policies, such as R & D funding can increase innovation activities on both
the short as well as the long-run.
The outcome from the first two research papers is the observation that energy
markets are shifting toward low carbon technologies. This conclusion can be drawn
by monitoring the increase in the efficiency as well as innovation levels. Nonethe-
less, this shift does not meet either the public demands nor policy maker plans.
Although, achievements have been made, the rate of diffusion of renewable ener-
gies is still relatively slow. To accelerate the shift, more stringent policies shall
109
be adopted. This outcome emphasizes the importance of governmental interfer-
ence and the introduction of supportive policies in achieving the climate change
mitigation plans.
For policy and lawmakers to pass more policies in favour of renewable energies,
they need to be focused on the environment. This can be achieved, for instance,
through major accidents or mass media coverage. The third paper is meant to
provide empirical evidence for identifying whether major accidents (i.e. nuclear
accidents) focus decision makers attention and create incentives to pass new sup-
portive renewable energy policies. The conclusion is that such accidents can func-
tion as a catalyst; that is, as a focusing event for policy making and drive for major
non-incremental policy changes. Evidences were found that nuclear disasters can
exert a positive impact on the enactment of renewable energy policies. This effect,
according to the calculations, fades out after about seven years. Within these
seven years, a window of opportunities is opened for supportive political collations
to introduce new policies.
Another main player that can push policymakers to pass more legislation is mass
media. When mass media intensively reports on a topic, it signals its importance
to the policymakers to adopt the topic. Mass media can influence the political
agenda directly through three main mechanisms. Primarily due to policymakers’
perception that media represents the public and policymakers tend to listen to
the public demands. Secondly, by forcing policymakers to take positions and
show their fast responses. Finally, mass media can act as a gate keeper which
allows politicians to communicate to the public or perhaps not. For these reasons,
policymakers tend to react to the mass media and respond accordingly.
The results reveal a consistent positive effect of mass media on the number of
active policies. An increase in the number of published articles about environmen-
tal issues will be translated into passing more policies. In other words, mass media
can interfere in the political agenda by raising the importance of environmental
topics. Policymakers respond accordingly and pass more supportive legislation.
The effect of mass media is measurable only on the short run, which corresponds
well with the theory of attention cycle. The theory suggests that keeping the pub-
lic attention share can be only done on the short run while exploring the problem
and introducing solutions.
From the last two research papers, a pattern can be concluded. External cata-
lysts can help policymakers, pushed by public demands, to increase their activity
levels to fight climate change. Through Crisis and intensive reporting, policymak-
ers can sense the seriousness of the topic and understand its consequences and yet
pass supportive policies.
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Outlook
Despite the efforts accomplished so far, the challenge still exists on how we can sus-
tain global economic performance while reducing and hopefully eliminate climate
change impacts. If reducing the overall energy consumption is not applicable, then
achieving both targets simultaneously requires innovation of low or zero emitting
energy technologies. Trying to induce and strengthen the energy price signal can
lead to this kind of innovation and a technological shift, but it might be not in
the pace needed to mitigate climate change consequences. Unfortunately, we are
working under a tight time schedule. Figure 6.1 indicates the development of CO2
and the future scenarios. If we continue further with the same technologies and
attitude then climate change is inevitable. Additional and further steps have to
be taken to cut emissions and reach the required path. This is a challenging task
and it entails economists to focus their efforts. Correcting the price alone will not
solve the climate change challenge. They shall induce the market to shift towards
renewable energies and reduce related CO2 emissions before it is too late (see Fig
6.1). As Sachs (2008) wrote “Economists like to set corrective prices and then be
done with it, leaving the rest decisions to the magic of the market ... This hands-
off approach will not work in the case of a major overhaul of energy technology.”.
While the energy market shows signs to function correctly, yet supportive policies
are well needed to ensure the swift shift toward carbon free technologies.
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Figure 6.1 Energy related CO2emissions. Source: King et al. (2015)
At the moment, the economic system is “locked-in” to an unsustainable large
scaled fossil fuel energy system. Solving this problem obligates the development
of alternatives to this system as a whole (Smith et al., 2009; King et al., 2015).
Nevertheless, innovating such technologies require dedicated government support
(Storm, 2017; Smith et al., 2009).
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Truly, the technological challenge of generating and most notably storing energy
on a large scale appears at the moment to be intractable, but similar challenges
have been solved, such as rapidly searching and retrieving vast volumes of infor-
mation. These technologies were unforeseeable only a short time ago, however
advocated policy programs allow them to happen. In a similar vein, fighting cli-
mate change needs targeted policies to motivate incremental, disruptive as well as
radical innovations, by which new methods and technologies can be introduced to
assure a regime shifting from fossil fuel energy system to a more sustainable and
renewable one.
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